Opinion
C.A. No. 03A-02-007 JTV.
Submitted: August 6, 2003.
Decided: November 18, 2003.
Upon Consideration of Appellant's Appeal From Decision of Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. AFFIRMED.
Joyce R. Hamby, Townsend Delaware. Pro Se.
Custom Decor, Inc., Smyrna, Delaware. Pro Se.
Stephani J. Ballard, Esq., Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the parties' briefs and the record of the case, it appears that:
1. On September 1, 2002, Joyce Hamby ("the claimant") filed a claim for unemployment benefits after quitting her employment with Custom Decor, Inc. Her claim was denied by a Department of Labor Claims Deputy. She appealed. An Appeals Referee also denied her claim, finding that she had voluntarily terminated her employment without good cause. She then appealed to the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ("the Board"). The Board scheduled a hearing for January 15, 2003. The claimant did not appear at the hearing or notify the Board that she would not be there. The Board dismissed the appeal because of her failure to appear. On January 21, 2003, the claimant sent a letter to the Board stating that she did not attend the hearing because of a family emergency. She requested that a new hearing be scheduled. On February 19, 2003, the Board denied her request. Its decision reads as follows:
The Board denies claimant's motion for rehearing. Claimant provides no details or documentation concerning the emergency and the Board notes that claimant made no effort to contact the Board concerning her absence until six days after to [sic] the hearing. A party to a claim has an obligation to appear when noticed to prosecute her claim, or to provide the Board with timely notice as to why she cannot appear. The Board does not find that claimant has shown good cause for her failure to attend the hearing. Accordingly, claimant's motion for a new hearing is DENIED.
The claimant appeals from the Board's decision denying her request for a new hearing.
2. The limited function of this Court in reviewing an appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is to determine whether the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. In other words, the Board, not the Court, determines the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. The court merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings. Therefore, if there is substantial evidence for the Board's decision, the decision will be affirmed.
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (Del. 1965); General Motors v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686, 688 (Del. 1960).
Oceanport Industries, Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994); Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 517 A.2d 295, 297 (Del.Super. 1986), appeal dismissed, 515 A.2d 397 (Del. 1986).
Behr v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, 1995 WL 109026 (Del.Super. 1995).
5. The claimant devotes most of her brief to the merits of her claim for unemployment compensation. However, the only issues which can properly be considered by the Court on this appeal are the propriety of the Board's dismissal of the claimant's claim and the denial of her request for the grant of a new hearing. The Court does not reach the merits of the claimant's claim for unemployment compensation because she did not exhaust all administrative remedies by appearing at the January 15 hearing and presenting her case.
Wilson v. Servalli Restaurant, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 307 (Del.Super. 1999).
6. The Board's rules provide that it may dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to appear for the hearing. I see no error or abuse of discretion in the Board's January 15, 2003 dismissal of the claimant's appeal when she failed to appear. The claimant did not request a continuance or notify the Board in any way that she could not or would not be at the hearing.
UIAB Rule 4.2.
7. In her request that the Board reschedule another hearing, the claimant said simply that she was unable to attend the January 15 hearing because of a family emergency. No explanation of any kind as to the nature of the emergency was given. The Board's rules require that a motion for a rehearing should "briefly and distinctly" set forth the grounds for the motion. While this is not a demanding standard insofar as setting forth the grounds for the motion are concerned, I find no error or abuse of discretion in the Board's decision to deny the request for a rehearing under these circumstances. The absence of any detail at all regarding the nature of the emergency, coupled with an unexplained delay of six days from the date of the hearing until the time the request was submitted, provide an adequate basis for denying the claimant's request. The Board acted within its discretion in deciding that the information provided was simply too insufficient to establish just cause for granting a rehearing.
In her brief on this appeal, the claimant has stated that she "was in Va. for family emergency." The fact that she was in Virginia was not included in her letter to the Board.
UIAB Rule 7.0.
8. Therefore, the decision of the Board is affirmed.