Opinion
No. SA-01-CA-0837-RF.
March 23, 2005
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANT WELDON TUCKER
BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate the Court's entry of summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Weldon Tucker (Docket No. 130), along with two supplemental briefs in support (Docket Nos. 130, 131). Plaintiff moves the Court to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59(e), citing facts that Plaintiff contends were not considered. Having carefully reviewed Plaintiff's submissions, the Court DENIES the motion to vacate.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are set forth in greater detail in the Court's Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Order") (Docket No. 69) and in the Court's separate order on Plaintiff's other motion for reconsideration. For purposes of this motion, the following procedural developments are relevant.
On January 3, 2005, Defendant Tucker moved pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) for reconsideration of his motion for summary judgment as to these remaining claims, citing the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Brosseau v. Haugen, which Tucker contends directly impacts the Court's analysis of these claims. The Court found that, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Brosseau, the existing case law did not "clearly establish" that the officer's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. As a result, the Court found that Defendant' motion to reconsider its earlier denial of summary judgment as to Defendant Tucker was meritorious and granted the motion to reconsider and the motion for summary judgment.
125 S.Ct. 596 (Dec. 13, 2004).
DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Vacate
In order to prevail on a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e), the moving party must satisfy at least one of the following criteria: (1) the motion is necessary to correct a manifest error of fact or law; (2) the movant presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) the motion is necessary in order to prevent manifest injustice; or (4) the motion is justified by an intervening change in the controlling law. A district court has considerable discretion to grant or to deny a motion under Rule 59(e).
11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHURR. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995).
See Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
However, reconsideration of a prior order is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly. In considering the motion to alter or amend judgment, "[t]he court must strike the proper balance between two competing imperatives: (1) finality, and (2) the need to render just decisions on the basis of all the facts."
See 11 WRIGHT, MILLER KANE, supra note 3.
Bohlin, 6 F.3d at 355 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff moves to vacate the Court's entry of summary judgment as to his claims against Deputy Weldon Tucker, contending that the Court appeared not to fully consider certain facts in its grant of summary judgment. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that since the facts before the Court are distinguishable in certain respects from the facts before the Supreme Court in the recently decided case Brosseau v. Haugen, the Court should not have relied upon Brosseau and found that the law regarding excessive force was not "clearly established" when Plaintiff was shot by Defendants in September 1999.
The Court recognizes that the facts in Brosseau are not identical to those before it in this matter. In fact, in its earlier order reconsidering its previous denial of Defendant Tucker's motion for summary judgment, the Court examined the facts in Brosseau and other cases, concluding that the law regarding what constitutes excessive force in the situation here — where a fleeing felon presents a potential risk to officers and others — was not clear in late 1999 when Plaintiff was shot by Defendants.
The Court finds no reason to abandon its earlier decision on the argument before it. Plaintiff cites to the Supreme Court decision Tennessee v. Garner, asking the Court to apply the rule that "the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable." However, later cases — including Brosseau — make clear that this holding does not mean that using deadly force is always constitutionally unreasonable. Rather, the Garner decision stands for the proposition that it is sometimes constitutionally permissible for officers to use deadly force when apprehending a fleeing felon, "when the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or others. . . ."
471 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1985).
Id. at 11-12.
As a result, the Court will deny Plaintiff's motion to vacate its earlier order granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Tucker.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Vacate (Docket No. 130) is hereby DENIED.