Halter v. Schoreck

7 Citing cases

  1. Vortanz v. Elmhurst Memorial Hospital

    534 N.E.2d 625 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that the dismissal in medical malpractice action after patient's expert failed to appear for deposition on date ordered by trial judge was an abuse of discretion where the expert was not under the direct control of the plaintiff or his attorneys

    • 1 Plaintiff implies that a motion must be in writing, but cites no authority in support of this proposition. In Halter v. Schoreck (1966), 69 Ill. App.2d 104, 216 N.E.2d 278, the court stated that the primary difference between a petition and a motion is that a petition is always in writing while a motion is usually in writing but is sometimes made orally. ( Halter, 69 Ill. App.2d at 111, 216 N.E.2d at 281.)

  2. City of Chicago v. Heinrich

    187 Ill. App. 3d 876 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 2 times

    ) After the 30-day period expires without either party filing a post-trial motion, a party seeking relief from a judgment must petition the court in accordance with the procedure set out in section 2-1401. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-1401.) The petition for relief must be written. ( Halter v. Schoreck (1966), 69 Ill. App.2d 104, 216 N.E.2d 278.) The petitioner must affirmatively set forth specific factual allegations supporting each of the following elements: (1) the existence of a meritorious defense or claim; (2) due diligence in presenting this defense or claim to the circuit court in the original action; and (3) due diligence in filing the section 2-1401 petition for relief. Smith v. Airoom, Inc. (1986), 114 Ill.2d 209, 499 N.E.2d 1381.

  3. In re Marriage of Flatow

    430 N.E.2d 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 2 times

    " • 2, 3 An order or judgment from which an appeal might have been taken is not reviewable on appeal from a subsequent order entered in the same cause. ( Harty v. Kirby (1975), 26 Ill. App.3d 688, 325 N.E.2d 406; see also Rone v. Boncar Construction Co. (1976), 45 Ill. App.3d 1, 358 N.E.2d 1315.) Where a final order has been vacated pursuant to a section 72 petition, and the parties go to trial, the party whose judgment was vacated, having failed to prosecute an appeal, is precluded, after the subsequent trial and judgment, from making a collateral attack on the order vacating the first judgment. ( Johnson v. Coleman (1977), 47 Ill. App.3d 671, 365 N.E.2d 102; Halter v. Schoreck (1966), 69 Ill. App.2d 104, 216 N.E.2d 278.) Petitioner, by choosing not to take timely appeal from the order vacating the default judgment which had been previously entered in her favor, has in effect waived her right to appeal from that order. ( Johnson; Holt v. Holt (1979), 71 Ill. App.3d 87, 388 N.E.2d 1353.)

  4. Holt v. Holt

    388 N.E.2d 1353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 1 times

    ( Goldstick v. Saporito (1974), 22 Ill. App.3d 621, 317 N.E.2d 774.) Accordingly, where a final order is vacated pursuant to a section 72 petition and the parties go to trial, the party whose judgment was vacated having failed to prosecute a direct appeal, is precluded, after the subsequent trial and judgment, from making an indirect or collateral attack on the order vacating the first judgment. ( Halter v. Schoreck (1966), 69 Ill. App.2d 104, 216 N.E.2d 278.) In other words, a party choosing not to take a timely appeal from an order granting or denying any of the relief prayed for in a section 72 petition waives his right to appeal from that order.

  5. Johnson v. Coleman

    47 Ill. App. 3d 671 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 25 times

    ( Goldstick v. Saporito (1974), 22 Ill. App.3d 621, 317 N.E.2d 774.) Accordingly, where a final order is vacated pursuant to a section 72 petition and the parties go to trial, the party whose judgment was vacated having failed to prosecute a direct appeal, is precluded, after the subsequent trial and judgment, from making an indirect or collateral attack on the order vacating the first judgment. ( Halter v. Schoreck (1966), 69 Ill. App.2d 104, 216 N.E.2d 278.) In other words, a party choosing not to take a timely appeal from an order granting or denying any of the relief prayed for in a section 72 petition waives his right to appeal from that order.

  6. People v. Thomas

    34 Ill. App. 3d 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)   Cited 7 times
    Finding that juvenile's motion to transfer trial to adult criminal court may be made orally

    (See Black's Law Dictionary 1164 (4th ed. 1951); Reilly v. Wilkins (1896), 67 Ill. App. 104.) In Halter v. Schoreck (1966), 69 Ill. App.2d 104, 216 N.E.2d 278, the court found the principal distinction between a motion and a petition to be that, while a motion is usually made in writing, it may be made orally while a petition is always in writing. It is apparent, then, that the statute is complied with when the minor, either orally or in writing, makes application for transfer.

  7. Sunderland v. Future Investments, Inc.

    256 N.E.2d 667 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970)   Cited 5 times

    [5] Plaintiffs' petition was addressed to the court's discretion, and in passing on the issues raised the court could exercise equitable powers. Numerous decisions have held that reinstatement of a cause dismissed for want of prosecution or vacating default orders is proper where a verified petition shows failure of the giving of notice. Halter v. Schoreck, 69 Ill. App.2d 104, 216 N.E.2d 278 (1st Dist 1966); Maierhofer v. Gerhardt, supra; Stackler v. Village of Skokie, 53 Ill. App.2d 417, 203 N.E.2d 183 (1st Dist 1964); Nagel v. Wagner, 46 Ill. App.2d 2, 196 N.E.2d 728 (5th Dist 1964). We do not deem that the rule of these cases has been changed by the late decision of Fennema v. Vander Aa, 42 Ill.2d 309, 247 N.E.2d 409 (1969), where the Supreme Court affirmed an order of the circuit court denying a petition to vacate an order of dismissal, based upon only an allegation that the plaintiff's attorney did not receive notice.