Opinion
No. 5-208 / 04-0427
Filed April 28, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert Blink, Judge.
A teacher appeals from a district court ruling on judicial review affirming the Iowa Board of Educational Examiners's decision to suspend her teaching certificate for a period of not less than three years. AFFIRMED.
Gerald L. Hammond, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Christie J. Scase, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Diane Halter appeals from a district court ruling on judicial review affirming the decision of the Iowa Board of Educational Examiners to suspend Halter's teaching certificate for a period of not less than three years due to a founded child abuse report. We affirm the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Diane Halter was a licensed teacher with the Iowa Board of Educational Examiners (Board). On October 24, 2002, the Iowa City Community School District (District) filed a complaint against Halter with the Board. The complaint alleged the Department of Human Services (DHS) had determined that a child abuse complaint against Halter was founded, that the DHS report revealed Halter had admitted to participating in illegal and fraudulent activities, and that the founded assessment had been placed on the Child Abuse Registry. The complaint asserted the foregoing constituted a violation of Iowa Code section 272.2(14) (2001) and Iowa Administrative Code rule 282-12.2(1)(e), under which it is a violation of the Board's criteria "for a member of the teaching profession to be guilty of . . . [p]hysical or sexual abuse of a child as evidenced by a founded abuse report against the person." Iowa Admin. Code r. 282-12.2(1)(e).
The complaint also alleged a violation of Iowa Administrative Code rule 282-12.2(1)(d). However, that portion of the complaint was withdrawn by the District.
The Board found probable cause to conduct a hearing. Halter filed an answer admitting she was the subject of a founded abuse report but asserting the information upon which the report was based was "largely false," the report was on appeal, and the allegations in the complaint had little if any relation to Halter's status as a teacher.
The District did not appear at the hearing or offer evidence. Halter testified, and admitted to the existence of the founded abuse report. Although the report itself was never admitted into evidence, Halter's own testimony and exhibits, including her appeal letter from the founded report, disclosed that the founded assessment was based upon Halter's a denial of critical care to and inadequate supervision of her eleven-year-old daughter, Alicia. In making its assessment DHS relied upon statements from Alicia that Halter had an interlock ignition device on her vehicle, that when Halter had been drinking she required Alicia to blow into the device so that Halter could start her vehicle, and that if Alicia refused to blow into the device Halter would "give her a consequence." In addition, Alicia asserted that she had witnessed her mother smoking marijuana.
Halter confirmed that she did have an interlock ignition device on her vehicle. She also admitted that Alicia had blown into the device, and that on occasion Alicia had done so at Halter's request. However, Halter denied Alicia had done so to enable Halter to drive while intoxicated. Rather, Halter asserted that she required Alicia to blow into the device when Halter had been smoking or had used mouthwash, as the use of those items could result in a false reading by the device. Halter also admitted she had smoked marijuana on a couple of occasions in 2002, but denied doing so in front of her daughter. In addition, Halter offered testimony and other evidence of her remorse and rehabilitation.
In her proposed decision the administrative law judge determined, based upon Halter's testimony and the information in her appeal letter, that a child abuse report had been founded against Halter and that the existence of the founded report provided a ground for discipline. The judge noted that Halter disputed many of the underlying contentions in the report, but concluded that "[n]either the statute nor the rule contemplate that the Board will separately litigate or second guess a founded child abuse report. . . ." Turning to the question of whether Halter should be disciplined, the judge considered the five factors she was required to consider before revoking a practitioner's license, as set forth in Iowa Code section 272.2(14)(a) and as enacted in Iowa Administrative Code rule 282-12.2(2)(b). She then recommended an indefinite suspension of Halter's teaching license, but further recommended that, if the founded report was reversed by DHS, the suspension should be vacated upon an application by Halter.
The Board took action to initiate a review of the proposed decision. Following notice from the Board, Halter filed a notice of appeal to the full Board. The Board voted to adopt the administrative law judge's findings and conclusions, with the exception of the proposed sanction. The Board suspended Halter's license for a period of not less than three years, but held that, if the founded report was reversed, it would vacate the license suspension upon application by Halter.
Halter filed a petition for judicial review. She raised three assignments of error before the district court. First, she asserted the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence because the decision was solely based on the existence of the founded child abuse report. She contended that because the founded report was neither introduced into evidence nor testified to by its author, any evidence pertaining to the founded report was uncorroborated hearsay. Second, Halter asserted the Board erred in its analysis of the five factors under rule 282-12.2(2)(b). Third, Halter specifically asserted the Board erred in its analysis of the first of these five factors — "The nature and seriousness of the . . . founded abuse in relation to the position . . ." — because there was no nexus between her alleged conduct and her teaching duties and responsibilities. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 282-12.2(2)(b)(1).
The district court affirmed the Board's decision. The court concluded the decision was supported by substantial evidence, as the complaint's allegation of a founded child abuse report was corroborated by Halter's testimony, admissions, and exhibits. The court agreed with the Board's conclusion that "once it has been established that a founded child abuse report exists, the Board's inquiry is limited to examination of five specific factors [enumerated in rule 282-12.2(2)(b)] to determine whether revocation is warranted." The court also rejected Halter's claim that the Board erred in its analysis of the first factor under rule 282-12.2(2)(b), concluding that it was the function of the Board "to determine the impact misconduct has upon the fitness of an individual to continue in the practice of a profession. . . ." The court did not address Halter's contention that a proper analysis of all five factors revealed that the imposed sanction was unwarranted.
Halter appeals. She maintains the district court erred in affirming where the founded child abuse report was never made a part of the record and the remaining evidence consisted entirely of disputed hearsay evidence. She further asserts the court erred in affirming the suspension of her license because it, like the Board, failed to properly analyze the five factors set forth in rule 282-12.2(2)(b) when determining an appropriate sanction.
II. Scope and Standards of Review.
Iowa Code chapter 17A (2003) governs judicial review of agency decisions made by the Board. See Iowa Code § 272.13. When the district court exercises its judicial review power it acts in an appellate capacity to correct errors of law on the part of the agency. Grundmeyer v. Weyerhauser Co, 649 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Iowa 2002). Our review of the district court's decision requires application of the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19(10) to determine whether our conclusions are the same as those of the district court. P.D.S.I. v. Peterson, 685 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Iowa 2004). If they are the same, we affirm; if not, we reverse. Id.
A party challenging agency action bears the burden of demonstrating the action's invalidity and resulting prejudice. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(a). This can be shown in a number of ways, including proof the action was ultra vires; legally erroneous; unsupported by substantial evidence in the record, when that record is viewed as a whole; or otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. See id. § 17A.19(10).
Where matters have been vested by a provision of law in the Board, we give appropriate deference to the agency's view. Id. § 17A.19(11)(c). Thus, "when the legislature has `clearly' delegated the authority to interpret a statute to an agency, courts may reverse that interpretation only if it is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or an abuse of discretion." Locate.Plus.Com, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 650 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 2002). However, this court is bound by the Board's factual determinations if they are supported by "substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole." Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f). Webroadly and liberally apply the Board's findings to uphold rather than to defeat its decision. IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 632 (Iowa 2000).
III. Substantial Evidence.
We first address Halter's claim that the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence, because the only "direct evidence" of the founded child abuse report, and its contents, was uncorroborated hearsay. We believe this claim both misstates the record made before the administrative law judge, and misapprehends the nature of the Board's evaluation.
Iowa Code section 272.2(14)(a) (2001), which authorizes the Board to adopt rules to determine whether an individual is qualified to perform her duties, and sets down requirements for the rules, provides that the Board "may . . . revoke the license of person upon the board's finding by a preponderance of evidence that either the person has been convicted of a crime or that there has been afounded report of child abuse against the person." The Board has enacted this portion of section 272.2(14)(a) in Iowa Administrative Code rule 282-12.2(1), which provides, in relevant part, that a licensee is deemed to have acted unprofessionally, and in violation of the Board's criteria, if he or she is guilty of certain public offenses, or "[p]hysical or sexual abuse of a child as evidenced by a founded abuse report."
We agree with the Board, and the district court, that under the structure of section 272.2(14)(a) and rule 282-12.2(1), there need only be proof of a qualifying, founded child abuse report. Just as the Board would not be required to reexamine the underlying elements of a qualifying criminal conviction, it is not required to reevaluate whether the licensee in fact committed the acts upon which the founded report is based.
Moreover, contrary to Halter's assertion, in this matter the existence of a founded child abuse report is not proven solely by uncorroborated hearsay evidence. During her direct testimony, Halter admitted to the existence of the founded report, as well as to many of its underlying allegations and findings. This testimony is direct evidence, not hearsay. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.801( c) (defining hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing"). Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the Board was presented with substantial evidence of a violation by Halter that subjected her to discipline by the Board.
IV. Sanction.
Halter contends that, even if she is subject to discipline based on the founded report, upon proper consideration of the five factors set forth in section 272.2(14)(a), and enacted in rule 282-12.2(2)(b)(1) through (5), the sanction imposed by the Board was unwarranted. However, we conclude Halter preserved error on this claim only to the extent she challenges the Board's consideration of the first factor, "[t]he nature and seriousness of the . . . founded abuse in relation to the position [of teacher] . . .," Iowa Admin. Code r. 282-12.2(2)(b)(1), and its conclusion that the founded abuse in this case bore upon Halter's fitness to teach.
As previously noted, the district court did not address Halter's claim that the Board erred in its consideration of all five factors. To preserve error on this claim, Halter was required to file a post-ruling motion or otherwise bring this omission to the court's attention. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 539 (Iowa 2002). She did not do so. We therefore limit our review on this issue to the Board's analysis of rule 282-12.2(2)(b)(1).
Halter asserts the Board erroneously concluded that the nature and seriousness of the founded abuse bore a relationship to her fitness to teach because the abuse involved only her own child, and there is no evidence the abuse has negatively impacted her students in particular or the school community in general. She contends any conclusion by the Board that the founded abuse impacts her fitness to teach is no more than unfounded speculation. In support of her claim Halter cites to the case of Erb v. Iowa State Bd. of Public Instruction, 216 N.W.2d 339, 343 (Iowa 1974), wherein our supreme court concluded a teacher's license could not be revoked when the only evidence of his alleged unfitness to teach was an adulterous affair. We have reviewed the case, and conclude it does not support Halter's position.
At the time of Erb, license revocation was governed by Iowa Code section 260.23, which allowed revocation of a license of a person not "morally fit to teach." The court in Erb concluded that section 260.23 did not "vest the board with unfettered power to revoke the certificate of any teacher whose personal, private conduct incurred its disapproval regardless of its likely or actual effect upon his teaching." Erb, 216 N.W.2d at 343. Rather, the court concluded that under section 260.23 a license should be revoked "only upon a showing before the board of a reasonable likelihood that the teacher's retention in the profession will adversely affect the school community." Id. at 344.
Notably, Erb does not stand for the proposition that there must be proof of an actual impact upon the school community. Moreover, Erb was decided before the legislature enacted the current governing statute, section 272.2(14). The language of section 272.14 makes it clear that a license revocation can be based upon founded abuse of any child, including the licensee's own child. Neither section 272.14, nor the enacting rules, limit the acts to those involving children in the licensee's school community. In addition, section 272.2(14)(a) does not codify any particular standard for judging "the nature and seriousness of the founded abuse . . . in relation to the position. . . ." Rather, it vests the Board with discretion to assess how the founded abuse impacts upon the fitness to teach. See id. Accordingly, we give a certain amount of deference to the Board's analysis in this matter. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(11)(c) (2003).
In relating the nature and seriousness of the founded abuse in this case to Halter's position as a teacher, the Board made the following determinations:
The founded child abuse report against [Halter] involved illegal activities that threatened the health and safety of a child and which also set an extremely poor example of behavior for the child. . . .
[Unlike Erb, h]ere, there is a statute and rule specifically authorizing Board discipline of a teacher who has had a founded child abuse report. . . . Any founded child abuse report against a teacher has some relevance to licensure, regardless of whether it requires suspension or revocation. Parents and administrators must be able to have confidence in and trust teachers who are given authority and control over the children in their classrooms. Moreover, by Board rule, teachers are required to make reasonable efforts to protect students from conditions harmful to their health and safety. Teachers are required to provide leadership and direction for others by appropriate example. Teachers are required to exercise discretion and reasonable judgment in their use of authority.
A teacher's abuse of their own child or another child who is not a student may make the teacher less likely to exercise authority properly or to use reasonable judgment and more likely to abuse students. In addition, if a teacher willingly exposes their own child to illegal activities or dangerous situations or conditions, this demonstrates poor judgment and a lack of discretion that may adversely impact decisions made in the classroom with respect to students. Moreover, such behavior undermines the confidence and trust that parents and administrators must have in the classroom teacher.
(Citations omitted).
The Board's discretion to impose sanctions is extremely broad, and Iowa Code chapter 272 (2001) must be liberally construed to carry out the Board's purposes. See Burns v. Bd. of Nursing, 528 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Iowa 1995). Clearly, one such purpose is protecting the health and safety of the children entrusted to the care and supervision of the licensee. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 282-12.3(1)(c). As noted by the Board, here the out-of-school conduct involves more than personal and subjective standards of moral fitness, as was the case in Erb. It involves the abuse of a school-age child, which has been expressly recognized by statute and rule as a violation of teaching standards warranting discipline. Iowa Code § 272.14; Iowa Admin Code r. 282-12.2(1)(e).
As previously noted, the existence of the report and many of the underlying allegations were introduced through the direct testimony of Halter. We recognize that, to the extent the Board relied upon facts contained within the appeal letter that were not confirmed in Halter's testimony, those statements constituted hearsay. However, hearsay evidence is generally admissible in administrative hearings. Nieman v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 452 N.W.2d 203, 205 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989). If a decision is based solely on hearsay evidence, the court must examine the evidence closely in light of the entire record[,] . . . evaluat[ing] the quantity and quality of the evidence to see whether it rises to necessary levels of trustworthiness, credibility, and accuracy required by a reasonably prudent person in the conduct of serious affairs.
Schmitz v. Iowa Dep't of Human Services, 461 N.W.2d 603, 607-08 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990); see also Walthart v. Board of Directors, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2005) (approving similar standard in school board termination case under Iowa Code chapter 279 (1999)). Given that the appeal letter was introduced by Halter and prepared by her own counsel in an attempt to refute the content of the founded report, we conclude the letter's representation of that content is sufficiently accurate and credible. Moreover, even if the Board had erred in relying on those parts of the appeal letter not confirmed by Halter's own testimony, that error was waived by Halter's introduction of the letter. See Knudsen v. Merle Hay Plaza, Inc., 160 N.W.2d 279, 285 (Iowa 1968) (citation omitted) ("Defendant cannot have the benefit of self-created error. . . . `[I]t is elementary a litigant cannot complain of error which he has invited or to which he has assented.'").
It was a reasonable exercise of the Board's discretion to determine that the abuse of any child bears upon a person's fitness to teach. In concluding that the founded abuse in this case bore upon Halter's position as a teacher, the Board did more than merely give voice to unfounded speculation; it raised valid concerns about Halter's ability to ensure her students' safety and set a good example when she engaged in behavior that not only lacked reasoned judgment, but endangered the welfare of her own child. Affording appropriate deference to the Board's analysis, we agree with the district court that it was not arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or an abuse of discretion for the Board to conclude that the nature and seriousness of the abuse in this case was relevant to Halter's position as a teacher.
V. Conclusion.
In light of Halter's own testimony admitting the existence of a founded abuse report, there was substantial evidence from which the Board could conclude that Halter had committed a violation which subjected her to discipline by the Board. In determining the appropriate sanction, the Board did not err in its analysis of whether the nature and seriousness of the founded abuse bore a relationship to Halter's position as a teacher. The district court properly upheld the agency decision. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the district court.