Halsell v. Renfrow

33 Citing cases

  1. Southern Pine Co. v. Ward

    208 U.S. 126 (1908)   Cited 14 times
    In Southern Pine Lumber Co. v. Ward, 208 U.S. 126, at page 143, 28 S. Ct. 239, 52 L. Ed. 420, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma (16 Okla. 131, 85 P. 459) holding that a judgment recovered by a plaintiff whose attorney had no authority to institute the action was void.

    An appellee, who has not himself appealed, cannot be heard in this court to assail the judgment below. Nat. Live Stock Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 203 U.S. 296, 305, followed, as to when jurisdiction of this court to review judgments of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Oklahoma is by appeal and not by writ of error. Halsell v. Renfrow, 202 U.S. 287, followed, as to when this court, in reviewing a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Oklahoma, is confined to determining whether that court erred in holding that there was evidence tending to support the findings made by the trial court in a case submitted to it by stipulation, without a jury, and whether such findings sustained the judgment. In this case this court holds that the Supreme Court of the Territory did not err in finding that there was evidence to support the findings made by the trial court and that those findings sustained the judgment.

  2. Foster v. Atlas Life Ins. Co.

    6 P.2d 805 (Okla. 1931)   Cited 21 times

    " Our court, in the case of Halsell v. Renfrow, 14 Okla. 674, 78 P. 118, 2 Ann. Cas. 286, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 202 U.S. 287, says: "A memorandum to be sufficient under the statute of frauds must be complete in itself and leave nothing to rest in parol."

  3. Frazier v. Davenport

    No. 361604 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2023)

    This was premature, however, because if Holmes and defendant never had a contract in which Holmes agreed to sell the property to defendant, then there was no agreement for defendant to partially perform. See, e.g., Halsell v Renfrow, 202 U.S. 287, 294; 26 S.Ct. 610; 50 L.Ed. 1032 (1906) ("As there was no agreement at the last stage, there can have been no part performance then.").

  4. Brooklyn Mining Co. v. Miller

    227 U.S. 194 (1913)

    Blight v. Schneck, 10 Pa. 285; Fred v. Fred, 50 A. 776; Fitch v. Bunch, 30 Cal. 208-212; Great Western Tel. Co. v. Lowenthal, 154 Ill. 261; MacDonald v. Huff, 77 Cal. 279; Tharaldson v. Evereth, 87 Minn. 168; Wittenbrock v. Cass, 110 Cal. 1. The undisputed testimony and admissions of appellees (defendants) conclusively show that the failure of appellant to dismiss the suit mentioned in the contract sued on had absolutely nothing to do with and did not cause the failure of appellees to perform the condition precedent of a sale of the West Brooklyn to the United Verde Copper Company. Halsell v. Renfrow, 202 U.S. 287; Davis v. Williams, 54 L.R.A. 749; So. Pine Lumber Co. v. Ward, 208 U.S. 126; Ward v. Sherman, 192 U.S. 168. The defendants having taken the position, before litigation was started to compel performance, that the West Brooklyn had in fact been sold to the United Verde Copper Company on or before January 1, 1908, cannot, after suit, change front and assert that a failure to sell was for the fault of plaintiff.

  5. Diaz v. United States

    223 U.S. 442 (1912)   Cited 854 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that double jeopardy was not implicated when a defendant was tried for assault, then subsequently tried for murder after the victim of the assault passed away a few weeks later

    In reviewing a judgment based on the verdict of a jury the court can always consider whether there was any evidence to sustain the conclusion reached. Halsell v. Renfrew, 202 U.S. 287, 292; Lancaster v. Collins, 115 U.S. 222, 225; Phil. Comp. Stat., §§ 2764, 2765, 3311. The presumption of innocence is expressly provided for by the Philippine statutes.

  6. Lowrey v. Hawaii

    215 U.S. 554 (1910)   Cited 5 times

    The findings of fact from which the conclusion that there was no breach reached by the Supreme Court of Hawaii necessarily are binding and conclusive upon this court. Halsell v. Renfrow, 202 U.S. 287; San Pedro Co. v. United States, 146 U.S. 120; Zeckendorf v. Johnson, 123 U.S. 617; Eilers v. Boatman, 111 U.S. 356; Sturr v. Peck, 133 U.S. 541; Sims v. Sims, 175 U.S. 162; Holloway v. Dunham, 170 U.S. 615; Idaho Co. v. Bradbury, 132 U.S. 509; Grayson v. Lynch, 163 U.S. 468. Plaintiffs are not entitled to maintain this or any cause of action for a breach of this agreement.

  7. Joseph E. Seagram Sons, Inc. v. Shaffer

    310 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1962)   Cited 12 times
    Interpreting Oklahoma law

    The memoranda or writings must plainly set forth the parties to the contract, the subject matter thereof, the price or consideration, a description of the property, and all of the terms and conditions of the contract, and must leave nothing to rest in parol. Irvine v. Haniotis, 208 Okla. 1, 252 P.2d 470; Hawkins v. Wright, 204 Okla. 55, 226 P.2d 957; Jennings v. New York Petroleum Royalty Corp., 169 Okla. 528, 43 P.2d 762; Mason Motors Spirit Distributing Co. v. Cosden, 105 Okla. 244, 231 P. 890; Atwood v. Rose, 32 Okla. 355, 122 P. 929; Halsell v. Renfrow, 14 Okla. 674, 78 P. 118, aff'd 202 U.S. 287, 26 S.Ct. 610, 50 L.Ed. 1032. Parol evidence cannot be permitted to supply an omission of any essential element of the contract. Halsell v. Renfrow, supra.

  8. Universal Gas Co. v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co.

    102 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1939)   Cited 14 times

    In order to establish such waiver, plaintiff relies largely upon the act of the defendant in accepting natural gas from the plaintiff prior to the approval of the contract by the Commerce Commission and for nearly four years continuing to accept gas, and a recognition by the defendant of the terms of the contract in various particulars and by the further claim that the defendant misled the Commerce Commission as to the adequacy of the gas supply furnished by the plaintiff so as to prevent an approval of the contract by the Commerce Commission. Inasmuch as the question of waiver is generally one of fact (Vol. 27, R.C.L. 912), and under the well established rule that this court is bound by the finding of the trial court upon such questions, where predicated upon substantial evidence, it becomes important to consider the conclusion of the trial court in this respect. Halsell v. Renfrow, 202 U.S. 287, 291, 26 S.Ct. 610, 50 L.Ed. 1032, 6 Ann. Cas. 189; Furrer v. Ferris, 145 U.S. 132, 134, 12 S.Ct. 821, 36 L.Ed. 649; Nygard v. Dickinson, 9 Cir., 97 F.2d 53, 58; Fuller v. Reed, 1 Cir., 249 F. 158. Finding No. 16 is: "that by receiving natural gas instead of artificial gas before said contract had been approved by the Illinois Commerce Commission, Central Illinois Public Service Company did not intend to, and did not, waive or modify the express provision of said contract of June 25, 1932 that it was made and entered into subject to approval by said Commission; and that neither of said parties understood or intended that the delivery and acceptance of natural gas prior to such approval by the Illinois Commerce Commission should alter the contract of June 25, 1932, or that it should constitute a waiver of the express proviso or condition of that contract with reference to approval by said Commission, but that both said parties intended that for the time being they should proceed in accordance with the provisions of that contract until

  9. Cattell v. Jefferson

    51 F.2d 317 (D.C. Cir. 1931)   Cited 6 times

    Specific performance, being not a matter of right but resting in discretion, will usually be denied against a vendor unable to comply with his contract for lack of title, although his lack of title may result from his own act, or, as here, from his omission to act. McCabe v. Matthews, 155 U.S. 550, 15 S. Ct. 190, 39 L. Ed. 253; Hennessey v. Woolworth, 128 U.S. 438, 9 S. Ct. 109, 32 L. Ed. 500; Halsell v. Renfrow, 202 U.S. 287, 26 S. Ct. 610, 50 L. Ed. 1032, 6 Ann. Cas. 189; Evans v. Neumann, 51 App. D.C. 300, 278 F. 1013; Ryan v. Martin (C.C.) 165 F. 765, 771; Smith v. Bangham, 156 Cal. 364, 104 P. 689, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 522; Ward v. Newbold, 115 Md. 689, 81 A. 793, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 919; 25 R.C.L. 245, par. 48. As Justice Gray states the rule in Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128 U.S. 671, 9 S. Ct. 202, 203, 32 L. Ed. 576: "A court of chancery cannot decree specific performance of an agreement to convey property which has no existence, or to which the defendant has no title."

  10. Premier Homes, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp.

    76 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D. Mass. 1999)   Cited 1 times

    The allegation that Premier was not a bona fide purchaser for value is most likely not intended to act as a separate claim against Premier (which, after all, was a "Necessary Party," and not a defendant) but rather to fulfill a legal requirement in the claim against Kattar. It is likely that the Complaint was drafted with the idea in mind that "specific performance is impossible where the party to the contract has sold the property to one who is free from all equities." Halsell v. Renfrow, 202 U.S. 287, 292, 26 S.Ct. 610, 50 L.Ed. 1032 (1906); see also Barshak v. Buccheri, 406 Mass. 187, 193, 547 N.E.2d 23 (1989) ("Rescission against a wrongdoer is not possible, of course, if the wrongdoer has sold the land"). Thus, Kattar's Complaint may have included an allegation relating to Premier's status as a bona fide purchaser for value so as to allow an equitable order for recission, rather than an action solely for damages against Demoulas.