Summary
In Halloway v. Halloway, 189 Miss. 723, 198 So. 738 (1940), it was held that a presumption must give way to the facts established by the evidence.
Summary of this case from Dicks v. City of NatchezOpinion
No. 34281.
November 25, 1940. Suggestion of Error Overruled, December 9, 1940.
1. TRIAL.
In wife's alienation of affections action against sisters of minor husband, refusal to instruct that sisters were presumed to have acted in good faith and without malice and that burden was on wife to overcome the presumption, was not error, where evidence was introduced which, if believed with all the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, gave rise to the conclusion that sisters acted with malice, and jury was instructed that the burden of proof was on wife as to such issues.
2. EVIDENCE.
Where the facts themselves appear in the proof, the presumptions as to such facts disappear.
APPEAL from the circuit court of Harrison county; HON. L.C. CORBAN, Judge.
White Morse, of Gulfport, and Grant Tonsmeire, of Biloxi, for appellants.
The peremptory instructions requested by each of appellants should have been given.
I.C.R.R. Co. v. Fowler, 123 Miss. 826, 86 So. 460; Boggs v. Jewett, 127 Miss. 308.
The court committed error in refusing the following instruction: "The court instructs the jury that it is presumed that the defendants in this case acted in good faith and without malice, and the burden is on the plaintiff to overcome the presumption that the defendants acted under the influence of natural affection, and for what they believed to be the real good of the minor husband of the plaintiff."
Tucker v. Tucker, 74 Miss. 93, 19 So. 955, 32 L.R.A. 623; McRae v. Robinson, 145 Miss. 191, 110 So. 504; Morrow v. Morrow, 68 Pa. Sup. Ct. 208.
Lemuel H. Doty and J.D. Stennis, Jr., both of Biloxi, for appellee.
The peremptory instructions refused appellants were properly refused for the reason that: Questions of fact are for the determination of the jury, and a peremptory instruction to return a verdict for the defendant is proper only where, admitting the truth of the evidence for the plaintiff, as a matter of law plaintiff could not have a verdict. In suits for damages for the alienation of the affections of one spouse from the other, where the question of motive is involved, it is for the jury to determine whether or not the defendant acted from an improper motive. Direct evidence of wrongful motive is not required, but may be inferred from the conduct of defendant. And where no cause is shown or attempted to be shown for the alienation of the husband's affections, or his separation from the plaintiff, except certain false charges made solely by the defendant, the jury may rationally infer that the defendant's acts, false charges, and bad motives caused the separation. Where there is evidence reasonably tending to show improper motive the question should be left to the jury. Likewise, where malice or conspiracy to separate the married couple is involved it is for the jury to determine the sufficiency of the proof to sustain such action. Conflicting evidence and the credibility of witness's testimony are questions for the jury only.
Cantrell v. Lusk, 113 Miss. 137, 73 So. 885; Sakler v. Slade, 148 Miss. 575, 114 So. 396; M. O.R.R. Co. v. Cox, 153 Miss. 597, 121 So. 292; C. G.R.R. Co. v. Coleman, 172 Miss. 514, 160 So. 277; Holmes v. Simon, 71 Miss. 245, 15 So. 70; State v. Spangler, 74 Miss. 129, 21 So. 4; Anderson v. Cumberland Tel. Tel. Co., 86 Miss. 341, 38 So. 786; M.J. K.C.R.R. Co. v. Jackson, 92 Miss. 517, 46 So. 142; Hemming v. Rollins, 144 Miss. 643, 110 So. 118; Moorhead v. Gilmer Gro. Co., 153 Miss. 467, 121 So. 143; N.O. G.M.R.R. Co. v. Walden, 160 Miss. 102, 133 So. 241; Fore v. I.C.R.R. Co., 172 Miss. 451, 159 So. 557, 160 So. 903; Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. DeVance, 110 Miss. 196, 70 So. 83; King v. King, 161 Miss. 51, 134 So. 827; Marathon Lbr. Co. v. Denis, 296 Fed. 471; Multer v. Knibbs, 193 Mass. 556, 79 N.E. 762, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 322; Ickes v. Ickes, 237 Pa. St. 582, 85 A. 885, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1118; Gross v. Gross, 70 W. Va. 317, 73 S.E. 961, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 261; Dodge v. Rush (D.C.), 28 App. Cas. 149, 8 Ann. Cas. 671; Burch v. Goodson, 85 Kans. 86, 116 P. 216, Ann. Cas., 1912C, 1177; Morris v. Warwick, 42 Wn. 480, 85 P. 42, 7 Ann. Cas. 687; Ann. Cas., 1912C, 1180; Tri-State Transit Co. v. Moore, 196 So. 231; G.M. N.R.R. Co. v. Seymour, 148 Miss. 456, 114 So. 35; Miss. P. L. Co. v. Smith, 169 Miss. 447, 153 So. 376; Knapp v. Wing, 72 Vt. 334, 47 A. 183; 13 R.C.L. 1466, 1467, 1474, 1475, 1477; 27 Am. Jur. 132.
All of the instructions given for both the plaintiff and the defendant are to be construed together and, if they when so construed, state the law applicable to the issues presented, a verdict founded thereon will not be disturbed because of error in any one or more of such instructions. The instructions given stated the law applicable to the case and cannot be complained of.
A. V.R.R. Co. v. Fountain, 145 Miss. 515, 111 So. 153, 47 C.C.A. 769, 274 U.S. 759, 71 L.Ed. 1338; Ainsworth v. Lakin, 180 Mass. 397, 62 N.E. 746, 57 L.R.A. 132; Richmond Ryite Co. v. Garthright, 92 Va. 627, 245 S.E. 267, 32 L.R.A. 220; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Mackey, 57 U.S. 72, 15 S.Ct. 491, 39 L.Ed. 624; State v. Davis, 88 S.C. 229, 70 S.E. 811, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 295; Gidding v. Freedley, 128 Fed. 355, 63 C.C.A. 85, 65 L.R.A. 327; Montgomery v. Crosthwait, 90 Ala. 553, 8 So. 498, 12 L.R.A. 140; People v. Lawrence, 143 Cal. 148, 76 P. 893, 68 L.R.A. 193; Burnside v. Peterson, 43 Colo. 382, 96 P. 256, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 76; Georgetown, etc., R. Co. v. Smith, 25 App. Cas. 259, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 274; Atlanta Consol. St. R. Co. v. Owings, 97 Ga. 663, 255 S.E. 377, 33 L.R.A. 798; Maloney v. Wenston Bros. Co., 18 Idaho 740, 111 P. 1080, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 634; Joliet v. Shufeldt, 144 Del. 403, 32 N.E. 969, 18 L.R.A. 750; McIntyre v. Orner, 166 Ind. 57, 76 N.E. 750, 4 L.R.A. 1130; State v. Eifert, 102 Iowa 188, 65 N.W. 309, 38 L.R.A. 485; Fowler Packing Co. v. Enzinperger, 77 Kans. 406, 94 P. 995, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 784; Lockwood v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 200 Mass. 537, 86 N.E. 934, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 784; Benson v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 124 Minn. 222, 144 N.W. 774, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 170; Harrington v. Britte, etc., Min. Co., 33 Mont. 330, 83 P. 467, 114 A.S.R. 821; Callahan v. St. Louis Merchant's Bridge Terminal Co., 170 Mo. 473, 71 S.W. 208, 60 L.R.A. 249; Mapson v. J.I. Case Thresh. Mach. Co., 81 Neb. 546, 116 N.W. 281, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 963; Scott v. Astoria R. Co., 43 Or. 26, 72 P. 594, 62 L.R.A. 543; Mason v. Southern R. Co., 58 S.C. 70, 36 S.E. 440, 53 L.R.A. 913; Brown v. Odill, 104 Tenn. 250, 52 L.R.A. 660; Lund v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 31 Wn. 286, 71 P. 1032, 61 L.R.A. 506; Pusser v. Thompson, 132 Ga. 280, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 571; Braash v. Michigan Stove Co., 153 Mich. 652, 118 N.W. 366, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 500; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Zernicke, 59 Neb. 689, 82 N.W. 26, 55 L.R.A. 610; Pirham v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 33 Or. 451, 53 P. 14, 40 L.R.A. 799; Sroufe v. Moran Bros. Co., 28 Wn. 381, 68 P. 876, 58 L.R.A. 313; Marsh v. Taylor (N.J.), 10 A. 486, 488; Capek v. Krapid, 129 Del. 509, 21 N.E. 836, 837; Robinson's Estate, 39 Pa. Super. 192, 195; 2 Words Phrases (Second Series) 989; 27 Am. Jur. 130-131, 134; Brock v. Brock, 132 Me. 202, 168 A. 873; Cole v. Johnson, 183 Or. 319, 205 P. 282; Townsend v. Holderby, 197 N.C. 550, 149 S.E. 282; Hollinghauser v. Ade, 289 Mo. 362, 233 S.W. 39; Barton v. Barton, 119 Mo. App. 507, 94 S.W. 574; Briles v. Briles, 66 Ind. App. 444, 112 N.E. 449; Rockwell v. Rockwell, 181 Minn. 313, 231 N.W. 718; Smith v. Kaye (Eng.), 20 Times 261.
Where the instructions given fully submit the disputed issues to the jury, the refusal of other instructions requested on the same point or involving substantially the same principles is harmless and not reversible error, and particularly is this true where the instruction refused does not properly state the law applicable to the case. Thus the instruction refused appellants was properly refused and its refusal could in no sense be reversible error.
Gulf M.C.T. Co. v. Raymond, 157 Miss. 439, 128 So. 327; Y. M.V.R.R. Co. v. Mullins, 158 Miss. 774, 131 So. 101; Goodyear Yellow Pine Co. v. Mitchell, 168 Miss. 152, 149 So. 792; Brister v. Dunaway, 149 Miss. 5, 115 So. 36; Tucker v. Tucker, 74 Miss. 93, 19 So. 955; McRae v. Robinson, 145 Miss. 191, 110 So. 504; Stanton v. Cox, 162 Miss. 438, 139 So. 458; Sivley v. Sivley, 66 Miss. 137, 51 So. 457; Wolf v. Frank, 92 Md. 138, 49 A. 132, 52 L.R.A. 102; Price v. Price, 91 Iowa 693, 29 L.R.A. 150; Survis v. Survis, 172 N.Y. 438; Williams v. Williams, 20 Colo. 51, 37 P. 614; Rice v. Rice, 104 Mich. 371, 62 N.W. 833; Roth v. Roth, 2 Neb. 600; N.Y., etc., R. Co. v. Winter, 143 U.S. 60, 12 S.Ct. 356, 36 L.Ed. 71; Southern Pac. Co. v. Hogan, 13 Ariz. 34, 108 P. 240, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 813; State v. Robb-Lawrence Co., 17 N.D. 257, 115 N.W. 846, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 227.
Argued orally by Leslie Grant and by S.E. Morse, for appellant, and by Lemuel H. Doty and J.D. Stennis, Jr., for appellee.
The evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict; the instructions, when read together, fairly well inform the jury upon the law, and there is no reversible error that we see in the record. The points raised require no comment except that it may be of interest to deal with the following instruction refused by the court: "The court instructs the jury that it is presumed that the defendants in this case acted in good faith and without malice and the burden is on the plaintiff to overcome the presumption that the defendants acted under the influence of natural affection, and for what they believed to be the real good of the minor husband of the plaintiff."
The action was for alienation of affections. The defendants are the sisters of the husband. The quoted instruction embodies a correct statement in point of law, and which would prevail and be made effective by a peremptory charge when no substantial evidence has been introduced to show to the contrary. But when evidence has been introduced, which, if believed with all the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, conduces to the conclusion that the defendants acted without good faith and with malice, and the jury is instructed, as was done by other instructions, that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff as to those issues, then the quoted instruction has no proper place; for the general principle applicable to trials in civil cases, with few exceptions, is that when the facts themselves appear in the proof the presumptions as to those facts disappear.
Affirmed.