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Hallack Howard Co. v. Bagly

100 Colo. 402 (Colo. 1937)
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Hallack Howard Co. v. Bagly

5 Citing cases

  1. C.F.I. Corp. v. Ind. Comm

    380 P.2d 28 (Colo. 1963)   Cited 76 times

    There being competent evidence to support the findings of the commission we must affirm the judgment. Hallack and Howard Lumber Company, et al., v. Bagly, et al., 100 Colo. 402, 68 P.2d 442 (1937). Judgment affirmed.

  2. Etter v. Blue Diamond Coal Co.

    215 S.W.2d 803 (Tenn. 1948)   Cited 8 times

    In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Robinson, 149 Va. 307, 141 S.E. 225, 227 the court in construing a statute (identical with ours) held: "we do not, however, construe the provisions of this section to exclude compensation for hernia simply because an external knot is not visible immediately upon rupturing of the abdominal wall." To the same effect, Hay v. Swiss Oil Co., 249 Ky. 165, 60 S.W.2d 385, Ussery v. Erlanger Cotton Mills, 201 N.C. 688, 161 S.E. 307, Hallack and Howard Lumber Co. v. Bagly, 100 Colo. 402, 68 P.2d 442; McBride Co. v. Kuehn, 168 A. 64, 65, 11 N.J. Misc. 764, Duff Hotel Co. v. Ficara, 150 Fla. 442, 7 So.2d 790, McNaboe v. General Motors Corporation, 47 A.2d 345, 346, 24 N.J. Misc. 161, Strauss v. Wright Aero. Corporation, 135 N.J.L. 371, 52 A.2d 412. The word "immediately" must gather its meaning from its application.

  3. Lewis v. American Surety Co.

    143 Tex. 286 (Tex. 1944)   Cited 33 times
    In Lewis v. American Surety Co., 143 Tex. 286, 184 S.W.2d 137 (1944), the court held that the statutory matter inquired about in Special Issues 1, 3, 4, and 5 are fact issues which should be determined by the jury, and that by the express language of Section 12b, copied above, they are the employee's issues and not defensive issues.

    In all of them it is described as being a protrusion, and it is universally held, so far as our investigation discloses, that unless a protrusion follows an injury no hernia is sustained within the meaning of compensation statutes. Typical of the many cases so holding may be cited the following: Stoddard v. Mason's Blue Link Stores, 55 Idaho 609, 45 P.2d 507; In re Frihauf, 58 Wyo. 479, 135 P.2d 427; Robbins v. Original Gas Engine Co., 191 Mich. 122, 157 N.W. 437; Pollack v. Clairton School District, 100 Pa. Super. 333; Hallack Howard Lumber Co. v. Bagley, 100 Colo. 402, 68 P.2d 442; Furferi v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 117 N.J.L. 508, 189 A. 126. In the case of Stoddard v. Mason's Blue Link Stores, 45 P.2d 597, the Supreme Court of Idaho construed a provision of the compensation statutes of that state substantially identical with the corresponding provision in our statutes above copied.

  4. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Blackshear

    28 S.E.2d 860 (Ga. 1944)   Cited 27 times
    In Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Blackshear, 197 Ga. 334, 337 (28 S.E.2d 860), the Supreme Court said: "The rule under our workmen's compensation law as to hernia is somewhat different from that applying to other injuries, in that not only must the hernia have resulted from injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment, but it must be definitely proved to the satisfaction of the Industrial Board that such resulting hernia `did not exist prior to the accident,' and `was accompanied by pain,' and `appeared suddenly' and `immediately following [the] accident.'"

    '" But the rule was laid down clearly and emphatically that the word when used with reference to time means "without delay." This ruling was followed in Vess v. United Benevolent Society of America, 120 Ga. 411 ( 47 S.E. 942). While there appears to be some contrariety of authority on this subject (Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Barnes, 72 Kan. 293, 80 P. 1020, 82 P. 1099, 7 Ann. Cas. 809; Rathbun v. Globe Indemnity Co., 107 Neb. 18, 184 N.W. 903, 24 A.L.R. 191; Hallack Howard Lumber Co. v. Bagly, 100 Colo. 402, 88 P.2d 442; 29 Am. Jur. 880, ยง 1167, and cit.), most of the courts in accident- or disability-insurance cases have recognized the rule which appears to have been definitely announced in this State, and have held that this word, when used with reference to time, means "without delay," "presently," or "without any substantial interval." Preferred Masonic Mut. Accident Asso. v. Jones, 60 Ill. App. 106 ; Kennard v. Travelers Protective Asso. of America, 157 Va. 153 ( 160 S.E. 38); Burrell v. Provident Life Accident Ins. Co., 162 Tenn. 672 ( 39 S.W.2d 1031); Wall v. Continental Casualty Co., 111 Mo. App. 504 ( 86 S.W. 491); and case-notes, 24 A.L.R. 226, citing also cases from Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana Kansas, Kentucky, and New York. Like rulings as to the meaning of the word "immediately" have been made with respect to hernia cases.

  5. Colorado F. I. Corp. v. Frihauf

    58 Wyo. 479 (Wyo. 1943)   Cited 17 times
    In Colorado Fuel Iron Corporation v. Frihauf, 58 Wyo. 479, 135 P.2d 427, 433-434, we said that the term "clearly prove" required evidence that was clear and convincing, and we just recently said in Pangarova v. Nichols, Wyo., 419 P.2d 688, 695, that although this meant something more than a preponderance, it did not mean proof beyond all reasonable doubt.

    Every definition which we have found agrees with these texts, including the definitions contained in the decided cases. Robbins v. Gas Engine Co., 191 Mich. 122; Southern Casualty Co. v. Fulkerson (Tex.) 30 S.W.2d 911; Berner v. Coal Iron Co., 100 Pa. Super. 324; Central Surety Ins. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 84 Colo. 481, 271 P. 617; Hallack Howard Lumber Co. v. Bagley, 100 Colo. 402, 68 P.2d 442; Stoddard v. Mason's Blue Link Stores, 55 Ida. 609, 45 P.2d 597; Cook v. Winget, 60 Ida. 56, 94 P.2d 676; Spirakoff v. Mining Co., 105 Colo. 552, 100 P.2d 154, 157; Fulerri v. R.R. Co., 117 N.J.L. 508, 189 A. 126. In Taylor v. Kirby Lumber Co. (La.) 182 So. 169, and Cormier v. Furnace Co. (La.) 9 So.2d 814, it was held that an enlargement of the inguinal ring, or a large relaxed inguinal ring is not hernia; that some call it congenital, some a potential hernia, some as a beginning hernia, but that it is not a true hernia and compensable until a protrusion appears.