Opinion
Civil Action 20-1431
12-06-2022
LAMONT HALL, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL ZAKEN, et al., Defendants.
DODGE, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
WIEGAND, JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants (ECF No. 66) be granted.
II. Report
A. Relevant Background
Plaintiff Lamont Hall (Hall), a prisoner currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Somerset, Pennsylvania (“SCI Somerset”), brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asserts claims related to his conditions of confinement while previously incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Greene, Pennsylvania (“SCI Greene”) between 2018 and 2021. Specifically, he raises claims under the Eighth Amendment for being placed in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) on Administrative Custody (“AC”) status for more than two years. He also asserts a claim under the procedural due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for being placed and maintained on the Restricted Release List (“RRL”) for an indefinite period of time, allegedly without penological justification.
Originally named as defendants were Michael Zaken (the Superintendent of SCI Greene), Robert Gilmore (a former Superintendent), John E. Wetzel (then-Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”)), SCI Greene Officers Lieutenant T.A. Lewis, Captain Durco, Correctional Officer Lukachyk and Keri Moore, a DOC grievance officer.
Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to his remaining claims. For the reasons that follow, their motion should be granted.
B. Procedural History
Hall commenced this action by submitting a Complaint without the filing fee or a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on September 23, 2020. (ECF No. 1). After his subsequent motion to proceed in forma pauperis was granted, his Complaint was filed. (ECF No. 5.)
In Count I, Hall alleged that his solitary confinement in the RHU and placement on the RRL constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He claimed in Counts II and III, respectively, that his confinement violated his procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Along with monetary damages and other relief, he sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction mandating his return to the general prison population.
Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 28) was subsequently filed. On July 6, 2021, a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) was issued (ECF No. 40), recommending that their motion be granted in part and denied in part. Hall did not assert any objections to the R&R. On August 5, 2021, Judge Wiegand adopted the R&R as the opinion of the Court (ECF No. 42).As a result of the Court's ruling, the following claims were dismissed with prejudice: Hall's official capacity claims against all defendants, other than the claim for injunctive relief as it related to Secretary Wetzel; all claims against Defendant Moore; the claims in Count II against defendants Lewis, Durco and Lukachyk; Count III; and any claims that Hall may have sought to assert related to a false misconduct report and confiscation of property.
After the entry of Judge Wiegand's order, Hall filed a motion for extension of time to file objections (ECF No. 43), which Judge Wiegand granted (ECF No. 44). Hall did not subsequently file any objections; rather, he filed a motion to stay the case indefinitely (ECF No. 45), which Judge Wiegand denied. In an order dated September 2, 2021, Judge Wiegand treated Hall's motion for a stay as his objections to the R&R, overruled them and reaffirmed her earlier order adopting the R&R as the opinion of the Court. (ECF No. 46.)
In addition, Hall's claims in Counts I and II against Defendant Gilmore were dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. Hall was also granted leave to amend his Complaint if he sought to assert a First Amendment retaliation claim and/or a conspiracy claim under the Eighth Amendment with respect to Defendants Lewis, Durco and Lukachyk.
Defendants' motion to dismiss Count I against Defendants Lewis, Durco and Lukachyk was denied.
As noted above, Hall did not move to amend the Complaint at that time. Therefore, the remaining claims and defendants in the case are Count I, which alleges an Eighth Amendment claim regarding his conditions of confinement against Zaken, Wetzel, Lukachyk, Lewis and Durco, and Count II, which asserts a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim arising out of his placement on the RRL against Zaken and Wetzel.
On July 1, 2022, Hall filed a motion for leave to amend (ECF No. 75). This motion was filed nearly a year after the ruling on the motion to dismiss in which he was given permission to amend his claims and three months after Defendants filed and briefed a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 66). Defendants opposed Hall's motion (ECF No. 78).
An order was entered on July 21, 2022 (ECF No. 79) denying Hall's motion to amend and directing him to respond to the pending motion for summary judgment by August 19, 2022. He failed to do so but was given a further extension of time until September 16, 2022 to respond and was cautioned that if he did not file a response, the Court would proceed to decide the motion for summary judgment on the merits without his response (ECF No. 80).
Hall did not file a response. Instead, he filed another motion for leave to amend on September 19, 2022 (ECF No. 81). By order dated September 29, 2022 (ECF No. 82), the Court denied this motion, which it construed as either a motion for reconsideration of the July 21 order or another motion to amend. Hall was again given additional time and finally filed a response to the motion on November 25, 2022 (ECF No. 88).
C. Material Facts
Hall was sent to the RHU at SCI Greene on or around August 3, 2018 for disciplinary custody purposes. He was confined in the RHU for engaging in or encouraging unauthorized group activities, which is a violation of DOC policy. Specifically, DOC staff accused him of engaging in or encouraging unauthorized group activity by receiving unauthorized monetary gifts directly or indirectly from other inmates between April 5, 2018 and July 10, 2018. (Defendants' Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute (“DSMF”) ¶¶ 3-5.) As a result of this activity, as detailed in Misconduct No. D029580, Hall was sanctioned to ninety days in disciplinary custody, 180 days' loss of commissary, and suspension/loss of job. (Id. ¶ 6.)
ECF No. 68. Hall's Response to Defendants' Statement of Material Facts (“PRDSMF”) (ECF No. 87) merely states “yes” to all but one of these facts. The sole fact to which he states “no” is Defendants' assertion that as of December 14, 2021, he was confined in the general population at SCI Somerset. This fact is not relevant to the resolution of Hall's claims. Thus, all other material facts cited by Defendants are deemed admitted. LCvR 56(E). Hall did not submit a counter statement of material facts.
After he was placed in disciplinary custody, Hall received five additional misconducts, including possession of contraband and the unauthorized use of the mail or telephone. (DSMF ¶¶ 27-28.)
Following completion of the disciplinary custody sanction, Hall was placed on AC status and continued to be housed in the RHU. (DSMF ¶ 7; ECF No. 69-2.)Hall states that while in the RHU, he spent 23 hours a day in a small cell, was denied adequate exercise, could not speak to other inmates and his cell was illuminated 24 hours a day. As a result of this confinement, he claims to have suffered “loss of sleep, headaches, major bouts of depression, crippling anxiety, memory loss, loss of empathy ... inability to concentrate, and loss of appetite.” Although he had access to a mini RHU law library for two hours a week, it lacked any books and contained only a computer that he did not know how to use. (Compl. ¶¶ 54-58.)
While the record is not entirely clear, Hall's Complaint, which is dated September 15, 2020, alleges that he was still housed in the RHU at that time. See also Ex. C to Defendants' Appendix (ECF No. 69-2), which reflects placement in the RHU beginning on August 3, 2018 through at least October 16, 2020.
Defendants contend that Hall has produced no evidence in support of his allegations, but his verified Complaint is the equivalent of an affidavit. See, e.g., Ziegler v. Eby, 77 Fed.Appx. 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2003). Hall can describe his cell conditions based on his personal knowledge.
Defendants do not address the conditions in the RHU during Hall's confinement there; rather, they cite to the DOC policy that describes the privileges to which inmates are entitled. (ECF No. 67 at 6 n.2) (citing DC-ADM 802 § 3 (A-B.)) On summary judgment, any dispute about Hall's cell conditions must be resolved in his favor as the non-moving party.
Defendants assert that Hall was not in solitary confinement, which they interpret to refer to an extreme type of confinement where inmates are completely cut off from contact with others in total isolation. They note that the DC-ADM 802 policy permits inmates to have contact with families and visitors, personal property including television and radios, leisure reading, exercise five times a week, showers three times a week, to work in the general labor pool, educational services, commissary, library services, casework, counseling, and diagnostic/classification services, religious guidance, recreational programs, and medical treatment and care. (See DC ADM 802 at § 3 (A-B)). At the same time, Defendants have not proffered any evidence regarding Hall's conditions of confinement.
An inmate may be placed on the RRL under the DOC's DC-ADM 802, Administrative Custody Procedures Manual, when he poses a threat to the secure operation of a facility and a transfer to another facility or jurisdiction would not alleviate the security concern. The criteria and procedures for placing an inmate on the RRL are enumerated in the policy. While the review process for placing an inmate on the RRL includes input from various staff, then-Secretary John Wetzel was responsible for making the final determination regarding an inmate's placement on the RRL. (DSMF ¶¶ 6-10.)
Wetzel was DOC Secretary during the underlying events in this case. He retired from his position on October 2, 2021. (Wetzel Decl. ¶ 1) (ECF No. 69 Ex. B.)
After being placed on AC status, Hall was staffed for and approved to be placed on the RRL. This was due, in part, to his most recent misconduct for engaging in group activity. Secretary Wetzel made the decision to place Hall on the RRL on April 4, 2019. He states that his decision was based on various considerations, including the following:
• Hall's history of sixteen total adjudicated misconducts spanning three separate DOC institutions, the most serious of which included possession of a controlled substance, encouraging group activity, and possession of contraband including possession of a cell phone on numerous occasions;
• Hall's placement in the RHU at SCI Greene in May 2017 after being found to be in possession of multiple cell phones with the involvement of at least three other inmates. He later was found to be in possession of a phone in the RHU which was suspected to have come from a staff member;and
• Hall's misconduct charge in January of 2019, after placement into the RHU for possessing a cell phone.
Hall argues in his brief that “the staff member who gave [him] his tray that day has not been charged, nor investigated.” (ECF No. 88 at 3 n.1.) The implication of Secretary Wetzel's statement appears to be that the phone was taken from a staff member, not that the staff member gave it to Hall. At any rate, this issue, even if disputed, is not dispositive of the merits of Defendants' motion.
(DSMF ¶¶ 11-12.)
The placement on the RRL of inmates, including Hall, is subject to periodic review. While on the RRL, inmates are seen weekly by their counselors. The Unit Management Team reviews the status of RRL inmates held in ACevery thirty days. After the first sixty days, the Program Review Committee (“PRC”) interviews every RRL inmate in AC every ninety days unless the Unit Management Team recommends an earlier review, which would prompt a shorter period until the interview. (DSMF ¶¶ 13-16.)
“AC” status is a classification for inmates whose presence in general population would constitute a threat to life, property, himself/herself, staff, other inmates, the public, or the secure or orderly running of the facility. (See DC-ADM 802 § III.) It differs from Disciplinary Custody (“DC”) status, which typically involves inmates who are sentenced to disciplinary time with imposed restrictions after misconduct charges are sustained against them. (DSMF ¶ 15 n.1.)
The PRC then determines whether the inmate should continue his current placement or be released to general population. The inmate is provided a copy of the PRC's decision. A qualified psychologist or psychiatrist interviews and assesses RRL inmates in AC after thirty days and then again every ninety days. A full review specific for RRL inmates is conducted once a year. The annual review includes involvement by the inmate's Counselor, the Unit Manager, the Corrections Classification and Program Manager, the Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services, the Deputy Superintendent for Facilities Management, the Facility Manager, the Regional Deputy Secretary, and the Executive Deputy Secretary for review and input into the recommendation on whether to continue the inmate's placement on the RRL. After this process is completed, the annual review form is forwarded to the DOC Secretary, who makes the final determination regarding the inmate's placement on the RRL. (DSMF ¶¶ 17-21.) This process was employed with Hall.
As reflected in Ex. A to Defendants' Appendix, the PRC conducted its periodic review and annual reviews took place as well. (ECF No. 69-6.) Secretary Wetzel explains that, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, decisions to maintain and remove inmates from the RRL were delayed and not conducted on the typical timeline. Therefore, he conducted only one annual review after Hall's placement on the RRL in 2019 before Hall was removed from the RRL in 2021. (Wetzel Decl. ¶ 24 n.2.) Notably, however, the annual review at SCI Greene did occur and the vote sheet that was prepared is consistent with the continuation of Hall's status in the RHU under AC status.
Section 4 of the manual outlines the procedures for removal of an inmate from the RRL if it is believed that an inmate could be safely released to general population or a specialized housing unit. The final decision to remove Hall from the RRL and place him in a step-down program was made by Secretary Wetzel on June 16, 2021. (DSMF ¶¶ 22-24.)
On December 14, 2021, Hall was transferred from SCI Greene to SCI Somerset. Defendants state that, as of December 14, 2021, Hall was confined in the general population at SCI Somerset. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.) Hall disputes this statement, contending that he was placed in another segregated unit for eighteen months and not released until September 2022. (PRDSMF ¶ 26; ECF No. 88 at 5 n.2.) However, a Cell History Report (ECF No. 69 Ex. C) supports Defendants' statement, and Hall has not cited any evidence to contradict it. In any event, and Hall's Complaint does not include claims about conditions at SCI-Somerset.
D. Standard of Review
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that: “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Summary judgment may be granted against a party who fails to adduce facts sufficient to establish the existence of any element essential to that party's case, and for which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying evidence which demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Once that burden has been met, the non-moving party must set forth “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” or the factual record will be taken as presented by the moving party and judgment will be entered as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). An issue is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court of Appeals has held that “where the movant bears the burden of proof at trial and the motion does not establish the absence of a genuine factual issue, the district court should deny summary judgment even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented.” National State Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 979 F.2d 1579, 1582 (3d Cir. 1992).
In following this directive, a court must take the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all doubts in that party's favor. Hugh v. Butler County Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266 (3d Cir. 2005); Doe v. County of Centre, Pa., 242 F.3d 437, 446 (3d Cir. 2001).
Although courts must hold pro se pleadings to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), at the summary judgment stage a pro se plaintiff is not exempt from his burden of providing some affirmative evidence, not just mere allegations, to show that there is a genuine dispute for trial. See, e.g., Barnett v. N.J. Transit Corp., 573 Fed.Appx. 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that pro se plaintiff was still “required to designate specific facts by use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories . . . sufficient to convince a reasonable fact finder to find all the elements of her prima facie case”) (citation and quotation omitted); Siluk v. Beard, 395 Fed.Appx. 817, 820 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural law”). However, courts should “consider as affidavits [Plaintiff's] sworn verified complaints, to the extent that they are based upon personal knowledge and set out facts that would be admissible in evidence.” Porter v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrs., 974 F.3d 431, 443 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).
E. Analysis
Plaintiff's claims are asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). “The first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). See also Baker, 443 U.S. at 140; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).
The Complaint alleges a violation of Hall's rights under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment.” His other claim is an alleged violation of his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits a state actor from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
1. Eighth Amendment Claim
Hall alleges that in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, Zaken, Wetzel, Durco, Lewis and Lukachyk kept him, or recommended that he be kept, in solitary confinement for an extended and unlimited period without penological purpose. He contends that this caused him to suffer “substantial physical and psychological harm.” (Compl. ¶ 84.)
Hall was housed in the RHU as of August 3, 2018 and was placed on the RRL on April 4, 2019. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Hall, he was housed in the RHU first on DC and then on AC status for approximately two years. His Complaint alleges that he was confined for 23 hours a day in his cell, which was illuminated 24 hours a day and was unable to speak to other inmates and get adequate exercise. He claims that as a result, he sustained various damages, including depression and anxiety.
The Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is well settled that the decision where to house inmates is at the core of prison administrators' expertise.” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002). Thus, a transfer of a prisoner to the RHU alone does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Williams v. Armstrong, 566 Fed.Appx. 106, 109 (3d Cir. 2014) (because the Eighth Amendment applies only when a deprivation results in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,” placement of prisoner in RHU for 112 days alone, without allegation that he was denied life's necessities, did not state a claim for relief); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997); Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348, 352 (3d Cir. 1981). Nor does mere placement of an inmate in AC status or on the RRL alone violate the Eighth Amendment. See Bramble v. Wetzel, 2022 WL 55021, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2022); Booze v. Wetzel, 2014 WL 65283, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2014).
In order to maintain a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must show that: (1) he was subjected to a deprivation that was “objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison official's act or omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities”; and (2) a prison official must have acted “deliberate indifference to a prisoner's needs,” which occurs only if the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 837 (1994).
To satisfy the objective prong of this test, “the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). To satisfy the subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment test, an inmate must show that the prison official “knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep't of Corrs., 806 F.3d 210, 229 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847). The inmate “may demonstrate deliberate indifference by showing that the risk of harm was longstanding, pervasive, well documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past such that defendants must have known about the risk.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43) (internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating the subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment test, courts also should consider whether officials “had a legitimate penological purpose” behind their conduct. Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 475 (3d Cir. 2018).
Defendants contend that Hall cannot satisfy either factor. They argue that, with respect to the objective factor, despite his allegations, he has not produced any evidence that by his placement in the RHU or on the RRL, he was denied the “minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” See Bramble, 2022 WL 55021, at *8 (“while we recognize that Bramble remained in Administrative Custody on the RRL for over two years before he was returned to the Delaware DOC, Bramble has not set forth any evidence tending to show that his confinement in Administrative Custody denied him ‘the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,' or that there was no legitimate penological objective for his placement in Administrative Custody.”) They also argue that there is no evidence that prison conditions posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his current or future physical or mental health.
Hall responds that his mental health needs were “well documented.” The sole support for this statement, however, is the affidavit of Antoine Riggins, another inmate at SCI Greene, who describes the effects that RHU confinement had on Riggins' mental health. (ECF No. 87 Ex. C.) This does not constitute evidence about Hall's mental condition or the effect RHU confinement may have had on him, nor does it demonstrate that Hall's mental health needs were well documented and were ignored by Defendants.
As previously noted, Hall references being in a cell for 23 hours per day with minimal contact with other inmates. Hall also produced some evidence that he was subjected to conditions that are inconsistent with the description in DC-ADM 802. For example, the policy states that “Exercise shall be offered one hour per day, five days per week.” (DC-ADM 802 § III(A)(6).) Hall states that this provision only applied if the weather was permitting; he was not allowed indoor exercise. (Compl. ¶ 54.)
Given the misconducts levied against him that related to other inmates, this restriction may have been a measure employed to prevent further misconduct.
Nevertheless, Hall has not supported his claim that he was denied “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Id. at 832 (citation omitted). There is no evidence of record that Hall did not receive basic necessities. He does not contend that he was unable to shower, did not receive adequate toiletries or clothing, was denied necessary medical care, or that the cell in which he was housed had persistent unsanitary or unsafe conditions. Moreover, Hall acknowledges, and the record reflects, that he was seen every three months by the PRC, which provided a forum to address issues he experienced in the RHU. (Compl. ¶¶ 59, 63.) As reflected in Exhibit A to Defendants' Appendix (ECF No. 69-6),these records also show that the PRC granted him additional privileges during his time in the RHU.
This exhibit is also referenced as Exhibit B on the first page of the Appendix. The sealed and unredacted version is filed at ECF No. 71.
With respect to the subjective factor, Defendants argue that Hall has not produced evidence that they knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to him. Hall cites a grievance he filed based on a failure to be allowed in the yard on two occasions. The grievance was denied on the ground that he did not sign up on one occasion and because he became argumentative before he could be taken outside on the other. (ECF No. 87 Ex. A.) He also references a document titled “Adjustment Record for Security Level 5 Inmates,” which contains the same information (id. Ex. B), with an additional indication that Hall verbally refused lunch on one occasion. In short, these isolated and relatively minor incidents do not create a genuine issue of material fact that Defendants knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to him. Further, the PRC documents do not reflect that Hall expressed concerns about the conditions of his confinement during his periodic meetings with the PRC, nor is there any other evidence that any of the defendants knew of and ignored a substantial risk of serious harm.
Finally, Defendants argue that, to the extent such risk existed, it was outweighed by the DOC's legitimate penological interest in responding to the imminent safety concerns presented by Hall's conduct. He had sixteen adjudicated misconducts while housed at three DOC institutions, the most serious of which included possession of a controlled substance, encouraging group activity and possession of contraband on numerous occasions. Even after he was placed in the RHU, he received three additional misconducts for possession of contraband.Thus, the uncontroverted record shows that Hall was not transferred to the RHU randomly, but as a result of multiple misconducts for engaging in or encouraging unauthorized activities, misconducts that continued after his RHU placement.
Hall contends in his brief that one of these misconducts was dismissed after lab tests concluded that it was men's cologne rather than contraband, and that the other misconducts were for possession of drugs but that his cellmate had admitted they were his. (ECF No. 88 at 3.) He cites no evidentiary support for these contentions, but even if he stated them in the form of an affidavit, he lacks the requisite personal knowledge.
Hall's rhetorical statement that “if Plaintiff was such a high risk to their institution (SCI Greene), why keep him there?” (ECF No. 88 at 3) misses the mark, as does his unsupported conjecture that Defendants' “sole purpose[] of targeting Plaintiff was due to him practicing his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, as he had no knowledge of his cellmate's illegal drug activity.” (Id.) Rather, the issue is whether Defendants had a legitimate penological interest in placing him on AC status, confining him to the RHU and placing him on the RRL. In fact, the uncontroverted evidence of record establishes that Defendants did have a legitimate penological justification for his placement in the RHU and on the RRL-security concerns raised by his repeated and ongoing serious misconduct. These facts, coupled with the absence of any evidence that Hall was deprived of the minimal necessities of life or that any of the Defendants knew and disregarded a serious risk to Hall's health or safety, are fatal to his Eighth Amendment claim. Thus, Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted.
Given the nature of this finding, it is unnecessary to review in detail the personal involvement of each defendant. It is fair to say, however, that Hall has failed to proffer facts that could establish that any of the defendants was deliberately indifferent to a serious risk to his health of safety.
2. Procedural Due Process Claim
In Count II of the Complaint, Hall asserts that with respect to his confinement in the RHU, Zaken and Wetzel violated his civil rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He alleges that in connection with what he characterizes as his solitary confinement, these defendants failed to provide him with a meaningful opportunity to challenge it; provide information about the basis for decisions about his continued placement there; give him a meaningful opportunity to be heard by the decision-maker; and advise him of what was necessary to be released.
The Supreme Court has held that states may create liberty interests which are protected by the procedural due process clause, but these interests “will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (citations omitted). “Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected [parameters] of the sentence imposed by a court of law.” Id. at 485. Based on Sandin, the Court of Appeals held in Griffin that an inmate who was held in administrative custody for 15 months while a charge that he raped a guard was being investigated did not suffer “atypical and significant hardship.” 112 F.3d at 706-08. See also Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (seven months of disciplinary confinement did not present an atypical and significant hardship).
The Third Circuit has held that, with respect to a convicted inmate, “the periodic review offered to Pennsylvania inmates who are indefinitely confined in administrative confinement comports with procedural due process, and does so with respect to placement on the RRL as well.” Bracey v. Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 686 Fed.Appx. 130, 135-36 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000)). Similarly, in Shoats, the court found that while a convicted inmate stated a liberty interest in not being held in administrative custody for eight years, his continued administrative custody status did not violate his procedural due process rights. This finding was based on the fact that the inmate received periodic reviews in accordance with DOC policy and prison officials justified their decision to continue to hold him in administrative custody because they considered him a current threat to the security of the institution and the safety of others. 213 F.3d at 146. See also Booze v. Wetzel, 2015 WL 5173937, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 2, 2015).
In this case, Hall was on the RRL for approximately twenty-six months. However, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that he was seen weekly by counselors and that his status was reviewed every thirty days by the Unit Management Team, every ninety days by the PRC and once in a full annual review (although a second review which ordinarily have taken place was delayed by the pandemic). In his brief, Hall contends that he was not provided with the reason he was placed and kept on the RRL (ECF No. 88 at 4). However, Defendants have produced record evidence that he was so informed (ECF No. 69 Ex. A) and he cites no factual support for contending otherwise. Indeed, he was aware that he was cited for various misconducts both before and after his confinement in the RHU and on the RRL.
Thus, because Hall's due process rights were not violated, Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to Count II should be granted.
In the alternative, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court need not reach this argument.
3. Official Capacity Claim
The Court previously dismissed all official capacity claims except the claim for injunctive relief against Secretary Wetzel, which sought to compel his release from the RRL at SCI-Greene. Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because Hall has been released from the RRL.
Pursuant to Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), “...a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (citation omitted).
Here, Hall seeks prospective relief in the form of an injunction releasing him from solitary confinement. However, it is undisputed that he has been released from the RRL and the RHU at SCI Greene and is now housed at another correctional facility. Thus, his claim for injunctive relief against Secretary Wetzel related to his placement in the RHU and on the RRL at SCI Greene is moot.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 66) be granted in its entirety.
Litigants who seek to challenge this Report and Recommendation must seek review by the district judge by filing objections by December 21, 2022 or December 23, 2022 if proceeding pro se. Any party opposing the objections shall respond by January 4, 2023, or January 6, 2023 if proceeding pro se. Failure to file timely objections will waive the right of appeal.