Opinion
C. A. 9:23-00883-SAL-MHC
05-02-2023
Samuel Vance Hall, II, Plaintiff, v. Joseph Williford, Brianna Hegeman, M. Ringgaberg, Jane Neal, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MOLLY H. CHERRY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This a civil action filed by Plaintiff Samuel Vance Hall, II (Plaintiff), a pretrial detainee. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff's claims were originally filed in two civil actions, this case (case number 9:23-00883-SAL-MHC) and case number 9:23-01120-SAL-MHC. These two cases, which both name the same Defendants and involve the same claims, have been consolidated into one case. See ECF No. 7).
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Class Certification. ECF No. 9. Although he uses the word “Plaintiffs” and states that “Plaintiffs filed this civil rights action...[,]” only Plaintiff has signed the Complaint and this Motion. Plaintiff appears to be requesting certification of a class of all persons presently incarcerated at the Chester County Detention Center (CCDC). He asserts that the defined class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable because there are over 90 persons in the class “with some coming and going each day.” ECF No. 9 at 2. He asserts that the questions of law and fact are common to the class including whether Defendants have failed to provide “a sanitary, safe, and healthy environment” and whether Defendants have used “methods of punishment with no penological justification while inflicting pain[.]” Id. Plaintiff asserts that the representative party's claims are typical of the class because each is a prisoner of the CCDC or will be in the future and allegedly will be denied protections of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 3.
BACKROUND
Plaintiff was previously a pretrial detainee at the CCDC. However, he has submitted a change of address indicating he is now in Ohio and thus is no longer detainee at CCDC. See ECF No. 5. Plaintiff brings claims for violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§1983). ECF No. 1 at 1. He asserts claims concerning his conditions of confinement and complains about the grievance process. He requests declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. See ECF No. 1 at 6-8.
Plaintiff alleges that on January 20, 2023, Defendant Line Officer Brianna Hegeman halted the intake and processing procedure and told Defendant Line Officer Williford (Williford) “to place Plaintiff in holding cell for sarcastic speech.” Plaintiff claims that his cell was “unnecessarily filthy” and had “evidence of feces improperly sanitized still visible on wall[,]” the presence of roaches, and holes in the wall allowing for pest entry. Plaintiff claims that after he voiced his opinion about the alleged cell conditions, Defendant Line Officer M. Ringgaberg (Ringgaberg) used a high-pitched, high-decibel sound as a form of punishment. He also alleges that Defendant Williford shut off all water to his cell. He contends he was housed in filthy conditions for 48 hours and not given clean sanitary bedding for 24 hours at a time when temperatures were “well below” 65 degrees. ECF No. 1 at 3.
Plaintiff states that Defendant Williford transferred him to another cell on January 22, 2023, and alleges his living conditions were unnecessarily filthy with rancid food in the cell and black mold in the shower. He claims he was denied toilet paper for four hours, and his requests for cleaning supplies were ignored for six days. ECF No. 1 at 4.
On January 28, 2023, Plaintiff allegedly was transferred to another dorm. He claims the dorm had inoperable toilets, a strong odor of sewer gas, excessive rust, flaking paint, a window missing glass, black mold, sinks in disrepair, rodents, and holes in outside walls. ECF No. 1 at 45. Plaintiff claims he asked a nurse about a risk to his mental well-being from “consistent denial of daily recreation, for 12 days” and the nurse stated that Plaintiff could not have recreation because they were short-handed. He asserts he asked Defendant Williford about recreation on February 13, 2023, and Williford alleged told him that if he wanted recreation he needed to “bond out.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff also claims that on several occasions the HVAC has not been operational such that “the sewer smell [became] very dominant in [the] living area.” Id.
Plaintiff claims he suffered substantial pain and exacerbation of previous ear damage (tinnitus) after Ringgaberg played the sound. He alleges he now experiences increased intermittent ringing in his ears. Plaintiff also asserts that the lack of recreation had “detrimental [e]ffects to [his] mental well[-]being.” ECF No. 1-7 at 6.
Plaintiff also asserts “class action allegations” on behalf of other persons held at the CCDC. He alleges that detainees are denied running water and working toilets for the prompt removal of human waste; a high-pitched, high-decibel sound is used as a form of punishment and control; detainees are taunted with sadistic and malicious laughter as punishment; detainees are denied cleaning chemicals to remove harmful black mold from showers and living areas; Defendants do not adhere to time constraints when addressing complaints; grievance answers are ambiguous and irrelevant; access to recreation is denied because of staff shortages; there is a failure to maintain minimum health code and building standards (holes are allowed in ceilings, walls, and baseboards and there are broken and missing windows); toilets are not maintained such that there is sewer gas in the living area; and the HVAC system is not maintained in working order at all times. ECF No. 1 at 1-2.
DISCUSSION
Class certification is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 which provides that one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if: “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). In addition to the requirements of Rule 23(a), a class must also satisfy the requirements set forth in one of the three sub-parts of Rule 23(b). See Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., 348 F.3d 417, 423 (4th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff carries the burden of establishing each of the requirements for a class action. See, e.g., Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 321 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is the plaintiff who bears the burden of showing that the class does comply with Rule 23.”) (emphasis in original) In re Zetia (Ezetimibe) Antitrust Litig., 7 F.4th 227, 236 n.6 (4th Cir. 2021); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 362 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The plaintiffs who propose to represent the class bear the burden of demonstrating that the requirements of Rule 23 are satisfied.”). As the Supreme Court has stated:
Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule - that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc. We recognized in [General Tel. Co. of Sw. v.] Falcon that “sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question,” 457 U.S. [147,] 160 [1982], and that certification is proper only if “the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied,” id., at 161 []; see id., at 160[] (“[A]ctual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a)
remains ... indispensable”). Frequently that “rigorous analysis” will entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim. That cannot be helped.Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350-351 (2011).
Typically, a factual record must be developed before the court may rule on certifying or denying certification. Boyce v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, No. 5:09-cv-263-FC, 2010 WL 1253737, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 29, 2010). However, “where the complaint demonstrates as a matter of law that plaintiffs cannot meet the requirements for maintaining a class action,” the court may dismiss without fully developing the record. Id. at *4. Here, certification of a class as requested by Plaintiff is not appropriate, as discussed below.
First, Plaintiff does not meet the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4), that he will be able to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” This requirement is met if it appears that (1) the lead plaintiff has interests in common with, and not antagonistic to, the proposed class's interests; and (2) the lead plaintiff's attorney(s) are qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the litigation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4); Temp. Servs., Inc. v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., No. 3:08-cv-00271-JFA, 2012 WL 13008138, at *2 (D.S.C. July 31, 2012); In re Kirshner Med., 139 F.R.D. 74, 79 (D. Md. 1991); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Here there is no “lead attorney” in this case, or indeed any attorney at all, and it is well settled that the Fourth Circuit does not certify a class where a pro se litigant or litigants are acting as representatives of that class. See Fowler v. Lee, 18 Fed.Appx. 164, 165 (4th Cir. 2001). Because the rights of many persons may be affected in a class action, such an action will not be certified unless counsel has been retained or appointed to represent the class. See Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (it is “plain error for a pro se inmate to represent other inmates in a class action”).
Plaintiff submitted a motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 6) that has been denied. See ECF No. 11.
Although Plaintiff appears to assert that there are common issues regarding certain living conditions, his Complaint concerns his own issues as to his alleged punishment and conditions of confinement. These claims appear to raise claims that are particularized to Plaintiff's own alleged injuries as to being exposed to a high-pitched, high-decibel sound that allegedly exacerbated his tinnitus. Moreover, Plaintiff is no longer at the CCDC.
Further, Plaintiff fails to assert sufficient facts as to commonality, which requires that there be “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P 23(a)(2). The Supreme Court has stated that in order to satisfy the commonality requirement, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the class members have suffered the same injury and that the claim(s) depend on a common contention that is capable of class-wide resolution. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349-350. Here, the allegations set forth in his Complaint concern his own alleged punishment and living conditions. Except for an allegation that a lack of recreation has detrimental effects on his mental well-being, Plaintiff has alleged no injury as to the other conditions of confinement of which he complains. And he has not alleged that class members have suffered from the same injury. Moreover, he requests declaratory and injunctive relief, to which he is not entitled as he is no longer housed at the CCDC.
As Plaintiff has moved to Ohio and is no longer at the CCDC, his requests for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. See Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286-87 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining that “the transfer of an inmate from a unit or location where he is subject to the challenged policy, practice, or condition, to a different unit or location where he is no longer subject to the challenged policy, practice, or condition moots his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief”); see also Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg'l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 249 (4th Cir. 2005) (presuming former pretrial detainee will abide by the law in the future and finding his request for injunctive relief moot); Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding prisoner's Eighth Amendment claims for injunctive and declaratory relief moot based on transfer); Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that the transfer of a prisoner rendered moot his claim for injunctive relief).
Additionally, Plaintiff fails to allege facts as to Rule 23(b) which provides tha to satisfying the requirements enumerated in Rule 23(a), the proposed class must satis three subparts of Rule 23(b). See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 6 party seeking class certification must satisfy the requirements found in Federal R Procedure 23(a) and also demonstrate satisfaction of at least one of the subdivisions f 23(b)); Deiter v. Microsoft Corp., 436 F.3d 461, 466 (4th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff merely he meets Rule 23(b)(2), but fails to allege any facts to indicate that this requirement i it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification be denied.
This Rule provides, in pertinent part, that a class action may be maintained if Federal Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if:
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole[.]Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification (ECF No. 9) be DENIED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).