Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-97-CA-0320 NN
June 4, 2004
I. Introduction
The matters before the court are defendant's motion to alter or amend judgment (docket entry 153) and plaintiff's motion for aid in collection of judgment pursuant to § 31.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (docket entry 164). Before assessing the merits of the motions, it is important to review briefly the recent procedural history of this case.
A jury trial on the instant action began on August 21, 2001, After the jury found for plaintiff and awarded him damages, a final judgment was entered on September 21, 2001. This original judgment held, in pertinent part,
Docket Entry 141.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
Plaintiff, B.J. Hall have judgment against White, Getgey Meyer Co., L.P.A., Defendant herein, in the amount of $405,000.00, plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum from February 10, 1997, until this date, and postjudgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date of this judgment until paid, both prejudgment and postjudgment interest computed as simple interest, and all costs of court.
Docket Entry 141.
Shortly after this original judgment was entered, plaintiff and defendant filed separate notices of appeal. On October 28, 2003, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed my previous ruling on the offset issue, modified the damages award with respect to the amount of a settlement credit, and remanded the case with instructions to enter final judgment in light of the aforementioned rulings. Specifically, the concluding paragraph of the decision stated,
See Docket Entries 142 and 143.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the magistrate judge's pretrial ruling on the offset issue, modify the damages award so that it reflects the proper settlement credit of $80,000, and affirm the final judgment as modified. This case is remanded for entry of an amended judgment in Hall's favor in the amount of $595,000. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
See Docket Entry 160, Exhibit A.
Similarly, the judgment held, in pertinent part,
It is ordered and adjudged that the judgment of the District Court is affirmed as modified, and the cause is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion of this Court.
See Docket Entry 160, Exhibit C.
I then entered an Amended Final Judgment on October 31, 2003, which held, in pertinent part,
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
consistent with the instructions of the 5th Circuit in its Order of October 1, 2003, Plaintiff, B.J. Hall have judgment against White, Getgey Meyer, Co., L.P.A., Defendant, in the amount of $595,000, plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum from February 10, 1997, until September 21, 2001, and postjudgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum from September 2, 2001 until paid, both prejudgment and postjudgment interest computed as simple interest, and all costs of court.
Docket Entry 151.
II. Analysis
A. Defendant's motion to alter or amend the judgment (docket entry 153)Defendant has filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment entered on October 31, 2003. Through the instant motion, defendant
moves to alter or amend the Judgment by deleting from the Judgment the language granting the recovery of pre-judgment and post-judgment interest because this Court lacks authority to award such interest. Alternatively, and without waiving Defendant's primary argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction to award interest, Defendant requests that the Judgment be amended to comply with the statutes allowing for such interest.
Docket Entry 153, ¶ 1.
Thus, the issues before the court are: (1) the authority of this court to include the interest awards in the Amended Judgment; and (2) the authority of this court to alter the interest award in the Amended Judgment and the propriety of so doing.
1. Did this court have the authority to include the interest awards contained in the Amended Judgment?
The primary issue before the court is whether the interest awards contained in the Amended Judgment were proper. In its motion, defendant contends that the clearly controlling case authority, as well as Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 37(b), require this court to remove the interest provisions contained in the Amended Judgment.
See Docket Entry 153.
In opposition to the motion, plaintiff asserts that defendant's failure to raise the interest issue before the Fifth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit's opinion and judgment affirming this court's previous orders "as modified," and this court's duty to implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate, require this court to deny defendant's motion. Plaintiff further argues that granting defendant's motion would violate the Fifth Circuit's mandate. Finally, plaintiff contends that the case at bar does not fall under the ambit of either the case authority upon which defendant relies or Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 37(b) because those authorities control in only one of the two following situations:
See Docket Entry 160.
Id.
(1) the court of appeals reversed the district court judgment, thus, no interest provisions were contained in the judgment; or
(2) neither the district court judgment or the mandate issued by the court of appeals contained provisions regarding interest.
Docket Entry 160, at 6.
Plaintiff emphasizes that the "common thread" to each of the cases cited by defendant
is that Rule 37 requires that the mandate provide for interest when the judgment of the District Court does not. In other words, Rule 37 prevents a district court from adding interest provisions that did not previously exist.
Docket Entry 160, at 8 (emphasis added).
The applicable authority is clear that "an inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by an appellate court." For this reason, when an appellate court's mandate is silent on the issue of interest, the district court is without authority to grant the same. Specifically, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 37 — the Rule governing interest on judgments — provides,
Briggs v. Pennsylvania R. Co. , 334 U.S. 304, 306. See also FED.R.APP.P.37.
Id.
(a) When the Court Affirms. Unless the law provides otherwise, if a money judgment in a civil case is affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law is payable from the date when the district court's judgment was entered.
(b) When the Court Reverses. If the court modifies or reverses a judgment with a direction that a money judgment be entered in the district court, the mandate must contain instructions about the allowance of interest.
The case authority on which defendant relies can be factually distinguished from the instant case. For instance, in many of the cases cited by defendant, the original district court order failed to award interest and the reviewing court subsequently held that, absent its direction in the mandate to include the interest, the district court was without authority to do the same. In this case, however, the original judgment included an interest award.
See Briggs . 334 U.S. 305-307; Canal Ins. Co. v. First General Ins. Co. , 901 F.2d 45, 46-47 (5th Cir. 1990), holding, that "[t]he district court therefore was precluded from considering an award of interest" when the interest issue had not previously arisen during the course of the action and the mandate was silent as to an interest award; Reeves v. Internat'l Telephone Telegraph Corp. , 705 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1983), affirming the district court's refusal to add an interest award when the original judgment and the Fifth Circuit's mandate failed to include an interest award.
In the other cases cited by defendant, the original judgments contained an interest award by the district court but were reversed, in part, and/or vacated, in part, in the mandate by the Fifth Circuit which was silent as to interest. In this case, the original judgment was modified, "affirmed as modified," and remanded with instructions to enter an amended judgment.
See In Re: Incident Aboard the D/B Ocean King on August 30. 1980 , 877 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1989), in which the Fifth Circuit was silent as to the award of interest — despite the district court's granting the same in the original judgment — when it affirmed, in part, reversed, in part, and vacated, in part, the district court's decision; Martin v. Walk. Haydel Associates , 794 F.2d 209, 210-211 (5th Cir. 1986), in which the Fifth Circuit was silent as to an award of interest — despite the district court's granting the same in the original judgment — when it reversed, in part, and affirmed, in part, the negligence findings made by the district court regarding two of the defendants and remanded the action "for a reapportionment of fault and an appropriate reduction of the judgment."
While the procedural and factual distinctions between the above discussed case authorities are helpful in interpreting the nuances of the applicable rule of procedure, interpretative strategies are unnecessary here. Notably, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 37(b) specifically addresses situations where the appellate court either reverses or modifies a judgment. That Rule explicitly states that when a judgment has been modified, "the mandate must contain instructions about the allowance of interest."
In this case, the Fifth Circuit clearly modified the original judgment. In fact, both the Opinion and the Judgment explicitly state that the original judgment was modified and remanded the case with instructions to enter the modified judgment. Further, the mandate is silent as to interest. Based on the language of both Rule 37 and the mandate issued in this case, the interest awards in my Amended Judgment were improper and a Second Amended Judgment must be issued. For these reasons, defendant's motion will be GRANTED .
See Docket Entry 160, Exhibits A, C.
Importantly, there is one case the undersigned located in which the Fifth Circuit allowed the district court to include the same interest award in the amended judgment as that granted in the original judgment despite the mandate's silence regarding the same. Brown Root. Inc. v. American Home Assurance Co. , 321 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1963). Because the mandate remanded only a portion of the case but stated that the original judgment was "in all other respects affirmed," the Fifth Circuit held that the district court's inclusion of the interest award in the amended judgment was proper. ("This Court concludes that it is not necessary for the Circuit Court, when it uses language of the type noted above, to have to specifically state that it is allowing interest." Id. , at 815.) However, the Brown Root case was decided in 1963 — four years before the codification of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 37(b). Therefore, it is cannot be considered controlling authority for the matters at bar.
Given the mandate's silence regarding the interest award, the appropriate procedural vehicle for plaintiff to recover an award of interest is by a motion to recall and reform the mandate once the Second Amended Judgment has been issued. 2. Should this court alter or amend the amount of interest granted based upon changes to Texas statutory law?
See. e.g. Leroy v. City of Houston , 906 F.2d 1068, 1074 (5th Cir. 1990); Canal Ins. Co. , 901 F.2d 45; Reeves , 705 F.2d 750; In Re: Incident Aboard the D/B Ocean King on August 30. 1980 , 877 F.2d 322; Martin , 794 F.2d 209.
Defendant's motion requested, in the alternative, that the amount of interest awarded be amended in light of changes to Texas statutes governing interest awards. Because defendant's primary request for relief is granted, defendant's alternate request for relief need not be addressed further. B. Plaintiff's motion for aid in collection of judgment pursuant to § 31.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (docket entry 164)
Notably, however, this court lacks the authority to amend the judgment. See Briggs , 334 U.S., at 306, "the trial court ha[s] no power to enter judgment for an amount different than directed."
Plaintiff brought a motion for aid in collection of judgment pursuant to § 31.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The motion seeks judicial assistance in the collection of the interest award contained in the original and amended judgments. Because the interest award granted in the Amended Judgment was improper and a Second Amended Judgment, omitting an interest award will be issued, plaintiff's motion — requesting assistance in collecting said award — is moot. Therefore, plaintiff's motion is hereby DENIED AS MOOT .
Docket Entry 164.
See Docket Entry 164, ¶¶ 1-3. The motion only seeks assistance in collecting the interest award because the principal amount of the jury award — $595,000 — has already been paid.
III. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, defendant's motion to alter or amend (docket entry 153) is GRANTED . A Second Amended Judgment will be entered this date. Plaintiff's motion for aid in collection of judgment pursuant to § 31.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (docket entry 164) is DENIED AS MOOT .It is SO ORDERED.