(Citations omitted.) Hall v. State, 255 Ga. 267, 270 ( 336 S.E.2d 812) (1985) (citations omitted). Henry's response "I might need one. If I need one," was at best an ambiguous and equivocal statement regarding his desire to assert his right to counsel.

We find no violation of Edwards v. Arizona, supra. See Hall v. State, 255 Ga. 267 ( 336 S.E.2d 812) (1985). (d) Parker further contends that his agreement to take the polygraph examination was coerced and that all subsequent statements were tainted by the coercion so as to render them unusable by the state.

See also Equivocal Requests for an Attorney: Caveat Emptor Comes to the Fifth Amendment, 45 Emory L.J. 673 (1996). Hall v. State, 255 Ga. 267 ( 336 S.E.2d 812) (1985), does not require a different result. Hall was decided long before Davis clarified the varying approaches of the lower courts with respect to ambiguous references to counsel during custodial interrogation.

1. Dupree argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the statements he gave to police because the statements were taken after he had requested an attorney. He contends that in addition to making an express request for counsel, he subsequently made an ambiguous request when he read to one of the interrogating officers the portion of the Miranda warnings which provided that if Dupree could not afford a lawyer, one would be appointed to represent him. Dupree asserts that, under Hall v. State, 255 Ga. 267 ( 336 S.E.2d 812) (1985), the interrogating officers had a duty to limit the scope of the questions to the clarification of his request. Contrary to Dupree's assertions, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted Dupree's statement into evidence.

Because the defendant did not challenge the admission of her second statement under our State Constitution and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Federal Constitution does not require officers to ask clarifying questions, I reluctantly concur in division 4. See Hall v. State, 255 Ga. 267 ( 336 S.E.2d 812) (1985). See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. ___ ( 114 S.C. 2350, 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 362) (1994) (Souter, J, concurring).

The trial court was authorized to find, from the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, that the statements either had not been taken after Crowe's invocation of his right to counsel or that, if they had been, Crowe initiated them. Hall v. State, 255 Ga. 267 ( 336 S.E.2d 812) (1985). There was testimony that, after Crowe indicated a possible interest in consulting counsel, all questioning ceased and the police provided him with the telephone number of his counsel and the opportunity to call.

Brockman contends that when the interrogation began later, Brockman's desires about counsel were not sufficiently clarified. See Hall v. State, 255 Ga. 267 (2) ( 336 S.E.2d 812) (1985). But even where a suspect makes an unequivocal request for counsel — which cuts off all police-initiated interrogation, including further clarification, see Allen v. State, 259 Ga. 63 ( 377 S.E.2d 150) (1989) — a suspect may be interrogated further if he (a) initiates further discussions with the police and (b) knowingly and intelligently waives his Miranda rights. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 ( 101 S.C. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378) (1981).

See Annot. What Constitutes Assertion of Right to Counsel Following Miranda Warnings — State Cases § 19, 83 ALR4th 443, 518-528 (1991). In Hall v. State, 255 Ga. 267 ( 336 S.E.2d 812) (1985), we concluded that the question "When do you think I'll get to see a lawyer?" constituted an invocation of Hall's Fifth Amendment right to presence of counsel.

, 255 Ga. 267 ( 336 S.E.2d 812) (1985) and cits.

Under Smith v. Illinois, supra, any "equivocation" that "came in" later cannot be used to cast doubt on the clarity of that initial request. Compare Hall v. State, 255 Ga. 267 (1) ( 336 S.E.2d 812) (1985). (b) The state further argues that Officer Boyet's response to Allen's request was not a continued interrogation.