He has established the elements of an entrapment defense (Code § 26-905) which, in fact, could be rebutted only by Len Jones [the informer] or the third individual. (See Hall v. State, supra, 136 Ga. App. 622 p. 623, 222 S.E.2d 140, where it is held that testimony of an officer denying entrapment is of no rebuttal value where the alleged entrapment is that by an informer outside the officer's presence.) "If the informer's testimony would disprove the defendant's testimony, the State should have produced him.

In his first two enumerations of error, Marshall complains that he was entrapped by Mercer's importuning in that he (Marshall) would have had no reason or opportunity to be involved with drugs had it not been for Mercer. Mercer was not called as a witness, and Marshall urges that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal in the absence of disputatious evidence offered by the state. See Hall v. State, 136 Ga. App. 622 ( 222 S.E.2d 140) (1975). He further argues that the charge of the court did not properly inform the jury as requested that it would have to find that the government had affirmatively disproved the fact of entrapment. Reed v. State, 130 Ga. App. 659, 662 (2) ( 204 S.E.2d 335) (1974).

See Moore v. State, 137 Ga. App. 735, 736 ( 224 S.E.2d 856). The state may not merely rest its case upon impeaching testimony as to the witness offering the affirmative defense, but must go further and contradict this witness' testimony as to the affirmative defense. See Harpe v. State, 134 Ga. App. 493 ( 214 S.E.2d 738); Hall v. State, 136 Ga. App. 622, 623 ( 222 S.E.2d 140). Here, the state failed to come forward with any evidence in rebuttal of defendant's testimony.

The Court of Appeals has held in a number of cases that the failure of the State to produce the confidential informant to rebut a defendant's entrapment testimony required a directed verdict of acquittal. See, e.g., Harpe v. State, 134 Ga. App. 493 ( 214 S.E.2d 738) (1975); Hall v. State, 136 Ga. App. 622 ( 222 S.E.2d 140) (1975); Coleman v. State, 141 Ga. App. 193, supra; Robinson v. State, 145 Ga. App. 17 ( 243 S.E.2d 257) (1978). Compare United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971).

Although this was the only evidence of undue coercion, evidence also was adduced indicating that appellant was not predisposed to sell cocaine, as appellant testified that he had never sold drugs before, a statement not challenged by the State. See Bennett v. State, 158 Ga. App. 421, 422 (1) ( 280 S.E.2d 429) (1981); Hall v. State, 136 Ga. App. 622, 623 ( 222 S.E.2d 140) (1975); compare Martin v. State, 175 Ga. App. 704, 705 (2) ( 334 S.E.2d 32) (1985). Appellant also stated that he sold the cocaine only upon the repeated and insistent requests from the informant, and that he did not even have any cocaine but had to obtain it from someone else. Conversely, he also stated that he was in severe financial difficulty and was enticed by the promise of a $300 cut from the sale.

The state has the burden of presenting evidence in rebuttal of testimony offered in support of an affirmative defense. Hall v. State, 136 Ga. App. 622 ( 222 S.E.2d 140) (1978). Appellant's attempt to imply that some part of the transaction occurred outside the agent's presence, and thereby to discredit his testimony, was patently without merit.

He contends that he was entrapped and that the state did not contest or rebut this contention. Hence, he argues, his conviction must be reversed, citing Hall v. State, 136 Ga. App. 622 ( 222 S.E.2d 140) (1975), and Harpe v. State, 134 Ga. App. 493 (2) ( 214 S.E.2d 738) (1975). Both Hall and Harpe stand for the proposition "that where the evidence of the defendant raises the defense of entrapment and is uncontested or not rebutted by the state, a conviction cannot be upheld as the state has the duty to come forward with contrary proof."

This court has consistently held that the state's failure to produce the confidential informant to rebut a defendant's entrapment testimony requires a directed verdict of acquittal. See, e. g., Robinson v. State, 145 Ga. App. 17 ( 243 S.E.2d 257); Henderson v.State, 141 Ga. App. 424 (1) ( 233 S.E.2d 500); Coleman v. State, 141 Ga. App. 193 (2) ( 233 S.E.2d 42); Hall v. State, 136 Ga. App. 622, 623 ( 222 S.E.2d 140); Harpe v. State, 134 Ga. App. 493 ( 214 S.E.2d 738). In State v. Royal, 247 Ga. 309 ( 275 S.E.2d 646), the Supreme Court reviewed this body of law and determined that it did not establish a per se ruling entitling a defendant to acquittal, but that "[a] distinction must be made between evidence which raises a defense of entrapment and which would require that the jury be charged as to the law of entrapment and the burden of proof thereon, and evidence which, under the standards set out in Code Ann. § 27-1802, would demand a finding of entrapment and, therefore, a directed verdict of acquittal.

Byers v. State, 236 Ga. 599 ( 225 S.E.2d 26) (1976). After his motion for directed verdict was denied, appellant presented his defense of entrapment. Citing Harpe v. State, 134 Ga. App. 493 ( 214 S.E.2d 738) (1975), Hall v. State, 136 Ga. App. 622 ( 222 S.E.2d 140) (1975), and other cases too numerous to mention, appellant argues that the evidence of his entrapment demands an acquittal and that the guilty verdict cannot stand. We do not agree.

Coleman v. State, 141 Ga. App. 193, 194 (2) ( 233 S.E.2d 42).' Perry v. State, 143 Ga. App. 227, 228 ( 237 S.E.2d 705); Marshall v. State, [ 143 Ga. App. 249, 252 ( 237 S.E.2d 709)]; Harris v. State, 139 Ga. App. 675, 677 ( 229 S.E.2d 148); Hall [v. State, 136 Ga. App. 622, 623 ( 222 S.E.2d 140)]." Hughes v. State, 152 Ga. App. 80, 83 ( 262 S.E.2d 245).