See Hall v. State, 244 Ga. 86 (5) ( 259 S.E.2d 41) (1979). Compare Livingston v. State, 268 Ga. 205 (1) ( 486 S.E.2d 845) (1997).
"[O]nce a reviewing court reverses a conviction solely for insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the jury's verdict of guilty, double jeopardy bars retrial." Hall v. State , 244 Ga. 86, 93 (5), 259 S.E.2d 41 (1979) (citing Burks v. United States , 437 U. S. 1, 16-17 (III), 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) ). See also Green v. State , 291 Ga. 287, 288 (1), 728 S.E.2d 668 (2012) (same).
Under Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), “once a reviewing court reverses a conviction solely for insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the jury's verdict of guilty, double jeopardy bars retrial.” Hall v. State, 244 Ga. 86, 93(5), 259 S.E.2d 41 (1979). However, the Double Jeopardy Clause “does not preclude the State from retrying a criminal defendant whose conviction is set aside due to trial error, such as the incorrect admission of evidence or improper instructions.
Accordingly, we reject appellant's argument that his motion to bar retrial should have been granted. Hall v. State, 244 Ga. 86, 94 ( 259 S.E.2d 41) (1979).Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 40 ( 109 S.C. 285, 102 LE2d 265) (1988).
As stated recently by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 ( 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1) (1978); Hall v. The State, 244 Ga. 86, 94 ( 259 S.E.2d 41) (1979).Hall, supra; OCGA § 16-1-8 (d) (2).
In these cases, the Court of Appeals held that erroneously-admitted hearsay may be considered in determining whether sufficient evidence to support the verdict had been presented. We reiterate the observation made in Hall v. State, 244 Ga. 86 (5) ( 259 S.E.2d 41) (1979), where this court pointed out that evidence found to be inadmissible hearsay on appeal but which could be made admissible at re-trial by laying the proper foundation may be considered when examining whether the evidence was sufficient to authorize the guilty verdict. The hearsay testimony in the case at bar does not fall into that category and therefore may not be considered.
We also hold that because the employee had personal knowledge of information contained in the records, he was authorized to answer questions and explain aspects of the records. Compare Hall v. State, 244 Ga. 86 (4) ( 259 S.E.2d 41) (1979). 4. Johnson finally contends that, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 ( 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69) (1986), the manner in which the State exercised peremptory challenges against black venirepersons gave rise to an inference of racial discrimination that was not successfully rebutted by the State. Johnson argues that the State struck four black potential jurors for whimsical or fanciful reasons: a black female (Juror No. 13) because her son had been convicted of a crime and she did not believe that her son had been given a "fair deal"; another black female (Juror No. 16) because she was making facial expressions and because she was a postal worker, and postal workers, in the prosecutor's experience, do not make good jurors; a black male because of a lack of sufficient educational or work background (Juror No. 24); and another black male because he appeared to have rather an eccentric personality (Juror No. 27). The trial court denied John
Remanding the case to give the state an opportunity to present evidence on the merits of this issue did not subject the defendant "to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb," U.S. Constitution, 5th Amendment. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. ___ ( 109 S.C. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265) (1988); Hall v. State, 244 Ga. 86 ( 259 S.E.2d 41) (1979). (b) Spencer's guilty pleas were admitted without objection at trial.
It has been recognized in many cases that the primary purpose underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause is to prohibit the retrial of a criminal defendant where the prosecution has, at the initial trial, produced insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. E.g., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Hall v. State, 244 Ga. 86 (5), 259 S.E.2d 41 (1979). The general rule is that retrial of the defendant is not barred where reversal of the conviction results from trial error rather than evidentiary insufficiency.
Although this case is being reversed on the grounds discussed in Division 2, infra, we must, nevertheless, address Wilson's enumeration that the evidence, including evidence improperly admitted, see Division 3, infra, was insufficient to support his convictions. See Lewis v. State, 248 Ga. 566 (1) ( 285 S.E.2d 179) (1981); Hall v. State, 244 Ga. 86 (5) ( 259 S.E.2d 41) (1979). 2.