Hall v. Smith

16 Citing cases

  1. In re Estate of Dumas

    379 A.2d 836 (N.H. 1977)   Cited 2 times

    However, this construction will yield to the intent of the testator to confine the bequest to the named legatees, by employing the class gift concept to carry out this intent. In re Devin Estate, 108 N.H. 190, 230 A.2d 735 (1967); Roberts v. Tamworth, 96 N.H. 223, 73 A.2d 119 (1950); Fowler v. Whelan, 83 N.H. 453, 144 A. 63 (1928); Hall v. Smith, 61 N.H. 144 (1881). "Though the bequest be to individuals by name, yet if it appears upon the whole will that the testator considered them as constituting a class, and intended that the whole should go to the survivors, that intention will prevail."

  2. Fowler v. Whelan

    144 A. 63 (N.H. 1928)   Cited 19 times
    In Fowler v. Whelan, 83 N.H. 453, 144 A. 63 (1928) a bequest was made "to my two sisters, Belle Whelan and Honoria Daley, of said Laconia, all my personal clothing, of every kind whatsoever for such disposition as they may mutually agree upon.

    Such are the holdings of this court. Hall v. Smith, 61 N.H. 144, 146; Brewster v. Mack, 69 N.H. 52. The reason for the prima facie application of the general principle of lapsing to gifts nominative is that language naming the legatees, when given its ordinary significance, usually imports individual gifts. Jackson v. Roberts, 14 Gray 546, 550, 551.

  3. Roberts v. Tamworth

    73 A.2d 119 (N.H. 1950)   Cited 19 times
    In Roberts v. Tamworth, 96 N.H. 223, 225, 73 A.2d 119, it was said: "If the testatrix did not think about the matter, it is difficult to say that she had an intent with respect to it."

    Fowler v. Whelan, 83 N.H. 453, 456. The rule has been well stated in this jurisdiction in Hall v. Smith, 61 N.H. 144, 146; "Though the bequest be to individuals by name, yet if it appears upon the whole will that the testator considered them as constituting a class, . . . that intention will prevail." Other cases employing similar reasoning are Brewster v. Mack, 69 N.H. 52; Romprey v. Brothers, 95 N.H. 258.

  4. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Kern

    142 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1940)   Cited 19 times

    The renunciation by Lena Kern cannot possibly accelerate the payment of the specific legacies because to do so would deprive Ida Beyer of the substantial intervening estate devised to her by the testator, to-wit: The income on $18,000 worth of specific legacies for 14.10 years, the life expectancy of Lena Kern one year after the death of the testator. Crossan v. Crossan, 303 Mo. 572, 262 S.W. 701, 18 L.R.A. (N.S.) 275; Toombs v. Spratlin, 57 S.E. 59, 127 Ga. 766; Young's Appeal, 108 Pa. 17; Windsor v. Barnett, 201 Iowa 1226, 207 N.W. 362; Page on Wills, p. 2030, sec. 1224; Hall v. Smith, 61 N.H. 144; Rose v. Rose, 88 So. 513; Swan v. Austell, 261 F. 465, certiorari denied, 252 U.S. 559; In re Silsby, 229 N.Y. 396, 128 N.E. 212; In re Cooper, 86 L.J. Ch. (N.S.) 507; Foreman Trust Savs. Bank v. Seelenfreund, 329 Ill. 546, 161 N.E. 88; 62 A.L.R. 207; Reighard's Estate, 28 3 Pa. 140, 128 A. 847; Estate of Portuondo, 185 Pa. 472, 39 A. 1105. (2) The will of Charles Kern provides that the children of Ida Beyer are to take the residue of the estate of Charles Kern by purchase from him directly under the will in the event Ida Beyer predeceases Lena Kern. By the terms of the will, if any of the appellants should predecease Lena Kern their specific bequests would become a part of the residue. If payment of the remainder of the estate is accelerated and the payment of the residue is made at this time to Ida Beyer, the receipt by the children of Ida Beyer of said residue will depend entirely upon the disposition of said Ida Beyer. Furthermore, an acceleration would deprive the children of

  5. Ruel v. Hardy

    90 N.H. 240 (N.H. 1939)   Cited 19 times

    The executrix next inquires if "any of said bequests have priority over any other," as to when said bequests are payable, and "When if at all should payments under the provision of clause numbered `Fifth' to Eva G. Hardy of Fifty Dollars per month for the period of her natural life begin." There is nothing in the codicil to indicate an intention on the part of the testatrix that any one of the legacies numbered second to seventh inclusive as therein contained should have priority over any other. Since they are all general legacies there is no priority among them, and the order in which the legatees are named is immaterial. Hall v. Smith, 61 N.H. 144, 147; Sumner v. Society, 64 N.H. 321; Ellis v. Aldrich, 70 N.H. 219; Frost v. Wingate, 73 N.H. 535; P. L., c. 307, s. 16. We are not called upon to consider the question of the apportionment between the legatees of specific sums and the legatee of the annuity of a possible insufficiency in the assets of the estate to pay the expenses of administration and all the legacies.

  6. Loveren v. Eaton

    113 A. 206 (N.H. 1921)   Cited 11 times

    It is immaterial of how many parts the instrument may be formed. All constitute one will. 1 Red. Wills, p. 288; Brown v. Ferren, 73 N.H. 6, 7; Hall v. Smith, 61 N.H. 144. "There may be many codicils there can be but one will." 1 Jar. Wills, p. 27, note.

  7. Frost v. Wingate

    73 N.H. 535 (N.H. 1906)   Cited 5 times

    on his part that he had disposed of his entire property by giving to the devisees and legatees distinct parts thereof, after the payment of his debts, and that a residuary clause would be inoperative and useless. It is more probable than otherwise that he intended the money legacies to be as specific as the other provisions of his will, and that in this respect all should have the same effect. Having a sum of money on deposit in the bank, no reason occurred to him why he could not give a part of it to one and the rest of it to another in the same way he might have given one sheep to one and the rest of his flock to another. Since, therefore, the construction of a will is the ascertainment of the fact of intention from competent evidence, and not the' application of technical rules as legal tests, the indebtedness chargeable to the estate in this case, beyond the value of the personal property given to the son, must be borne pro rata by the devisees and legatees. P. S., c. 196, s. 14; Hall v. Smith, 61 N.H. 144. In this way the testator's general purpose is carried into effect, and no part thereof is defeated or rendered abortive.

  8. Brown v. Ferren

    58 A. 870 (N.H. 1904)   Cited 5 times

    CHASE, J. 1. The provisions of the will and codicil relating to the payment of William's indebtedness, when brought together, as they properly may be (Hall v. Smith, 61 N.H. 144), read as follows: "I direct my executor . . . to pay from my estate the mortgage indebtedness of my half brother, William Ferren, upon his house, whenever that indebtedness shall be reduced by him so that not more than fifteen hundred dollars is due thereon, [such payment to be made] upon the decease of my . . . wife, and not before," etc. The legacy thus given may be said to consist of an obligation placed by the testator upon his estate in favor of his half brother, to pay the balance of the indebtedness mentioned "upon" — that is, immediately after — the decease of the wife, provided the indebtedness is reduced as set forth in the provision.

  9. Snow v. Durgin

    47 A. 89 (N.H. 1899)   Cited 9 times

    It is also evident that the legacy was given to the individuals described by the terms "relatives" and "children" as classes, and consequently that it goes to the survivors of the classes named. Hall v. Smith, 61 N.H. 144; Campbell v. Clark, 64 N.H. 328; Brewster v. Mack, 69 N.H. 52. In such case the legacy vests in the survivors immediately upon the testator's decease.

  10. Ellis v. Aldrich

    70 N.H. 219 (N.H. 1899)   Cited 17 times

    It stands no differently in this respect from the one given to the church in the seventh article. Hall v. Smith, 61 N.H. 144; 2 Wms. Ex. 671. 4.