Moreover, our Court of Appeals correctly noted that such provisions act as exculpatory clauses, and that they therefore "`must be clear and unambiguous, they must be specific in what they purport to cover, and any ambiguity will be construed against the drafter of the instrument.'" Dept. of Transp. v. Arapaho Constr., Inc., supra, 180 Ga. App. at 343 (quoting Hall v. Skate Escape, 171 Ga. App. 178, 180-181 ( 319 S.E.2d 67) (1984)). Accord, e.g., Ace Stone, Inc. v. Wayne, 221 A.2d 515, 517 (N.J. 1966); Grant Constr. Co. v. Burns, 443 P.2d 1005, 1011-1012 (Idaho 1968).
(Citations omitted.) Hall v. Skate Escape, 171 Ga.App. 178, 179, 319 S.E.2d 67 (1984). But the subject lease did not effect such a transfer.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hall v. Skate Escape, 171 Ga. App. 178, 180 ( 319 SE2d 67) (1984). Ambiguities in exculpatory clauses are construed against the drafters.
Hertz Driv-Ur-Self c. v. Benson, supra at 874; accord Southeastern Air Svc. v. Crowell, supra at 823; Parker v. Loving Co., supra. "[A] bailor . . . is liable for any injury or damage which results from a latent defect of which the bailee has no knowledge and the consequences of which he could not avoid through the exercise of ordinary care . . . . Thus, it is essential that a bailor use ordinary care to inspect the bailed article before delivery to ascertain if it was in a reasonably safe condition to avoid injury to another." Hall v. Skate Escape, Ltd., 171 Ga. App. 178, 179 ( 319 S.E.2d 67) (1984); accord Yale Towne, Inc. v. Sharpe, supra at 491; see also Queen v. Patent Scaffolding Co., supra at 368; Hertz Driv-Ur-Self c. v. Benson, supra at 874; Parker v. Loving Co., supra at 286. "It was the duty of the defendant to deliver the [rental property] in such a condition that [plaintiff] could use it with safety."
Because any interpretation will render some part of the contract meaningless, the contract is clearly ambiguous. Altama Delta cites Hall v. Skate Escape, 171 Ga. App. 178, 179-80 ( 319 S.E.2d 67) (1984), and Dept. of Transp. v. Arapaho Constr., 180 Ga. App. 341, 343 (1) ( 349 S.E.2d 196) (1986), for another rule of construction which it claims resolves the ambiguity: Exculpatory clauses "must be clear and unambiguous, they must be specific in what they purport to cover." Id.
Therefore, the relationship between them is governed by the terms of the Rental Agreement and the statutory obligations of a bailor under OCGA § 44-12-63. Mark Singleton Buick v. Taylor, 194 Ga. App. 630, 632 (1) ( 391 S.E.2d 435) (1990); Hall v. Skate Escape, Ltd., 171 Ga. App. 178 ( 319 S.E.2d 67) (1984). 3. Benford has failed totally to come forward with evidence concerning negligence by the ski shop. Lau's, supra; Prince v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 210 Ga. App. 108, 109 (1) ( 435 S.E.2d 482) (1993).
Accordingly, the scope of consent contained in this general provision must be construed as encompassing only those additional procedures which were both necessary and appropriate when rendered. See Zurich American Ins. Co. v. Bruce, 193 Ga. App. 804, 807 (2) ( 388 S.E.2d 923); cf. Law v. Cheek-Law, 258 Ga. 190 ( 366 S.E.2d 680); Hall v. Skate Escape, 171 Ga. App. 178, 180 ( 319 S.E.2d 67). The word "necessary" shall be attributed only its usual and common signification (see OCGA § 13-2-2 (2)), to wit: "being essential, indispensable, or requisite." Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (1989).
Accordingly, "the instant lease provision does not clearly and unequivocally express the mutual intent of [plaintiffs' insureds and defendants] to waive, as against each other, liability for the consequences of their own respective negligent acts or omissions. See generally Hall v. Skate Escape, Ltd., 171 Ga. App. 178 ( 319 S.E.2d 67) (1984)." Borg-Warner Ins. Finance Corp. v. Executive Park Ventures, 198 Ga. App. 70 ( 400 S.E.2d 340).
Howell v. Amerson, 116 Ga. App. 211 (2) ( 156 S.E.2d 370); accord Butler v. Shirah, 154 Ga. App. 111 (1) ( 267 S.E.2d 647). "Thus, it is essential that a bailor use ordinary care to inspect the bailed article before delivery to ascertain if it was in a reasonably safe condition to avoid injury to another." Hall v. Skate Escape, 171 Ga. App. 178, 179 ( 319 S.E.2d 67). "A bailor violating his obligation to furnish property reasonably fit for the purpose for which hired [or his obligation to inspect the bailed article before delivery to ascertain if it was in reasonably safe condition] may be liable to third persons using such property, at the bailee's invitation, for injuries caused by its being in improper condition when delivered to the bailee, but not for injuries resulting from a dangerous condition which arises after delivery, and a bailor intrusting a dangerous article to his bailee, knowing that it will be used in such a manner as to endanger persons and property; is liable for any injury which, by the exercise of ordinary prudence, he could have foreseen." (Emphasis supplied.)
The parties were free to agree to such a term, and it will be enforced as written. See Hall v. Skate Escape, Ltd., 171 Ga. App. 178 ( 319 S.E.2d 67) (1984). Accordingly, appellee's affidavit testimony regarding complaints about the services provided and the amounts charged does not create an issue of material fact with respect to the amount of fees to be paid.