assistance of counsel is the right to representation that is free of actual conflicts of interest. Hall v. Jackson , 310 Ga. 714, 720 (2) (a), 854 S.E.2d 539 (2021) (citations and punctuation omitted). Accord Williams v. Moody , 287 Ga. 665, 667 (2), 697 S.E.2d 199 (2010).

(Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Hall v. Jackson, 310 Ga. 714, 721 (2) (a) (854 S.E.2d 539) (2021). See also Moss v. State, 312 Ga. 202, 205-206 (2) (a) (862 S.E.2d 309) (2021) (same).

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez , 548 U.S. 140, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (addressing right to retained counsel of choice). See also Hall v. Jackson , 310 Ga. 714 (2) (a), 854 S.E.2d 539 (2021) (criminal defendants in Georgia are constitutionally entitled to effective assistance of counsel, which includes the right to representation that is free of actual conflicts of interests). It follows that "[w]e have jurisdiction to consider [this] appeal under the collateral order doctrine ... [since the trial] court's denial of [the] motion to withdraw as counsel satisfies each of the three requirements [of the doctrine] and is therefore immediately appealable."

Whether or not Daker was indigent at the time he was convicted and sentenced, he had a right to counsel for his motion for new trial proceeding and his first appeal of right. See Hall v. Jackson , 310 Ga. 714, 720, 854 S.E.2d 539 (2021) ("A criminal defendant in Georgia is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel during his trial, motion for new trial proceeding, and direct appeal."). See also Evitts v. Lucey , 469 U.S. 387, 393-397, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) ("[T]he services of a lawyer will for virtually every layman be necessary to present an appeal in a form suitable for appellate consideration on the merits.").

Maj. Op. at ––––. See also Rowland v. State , 264 Ga. 872, 875-876, 452 S.E.2d 756 (1995) (holding that where ineffective assistance of counsel—i.e., a violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel—has deprived a defendant of a direct appeal, the defendant may file an out-of-time appeal to remedy the loss of his right to appeal); Hall v. Jackson , 310 Ga. 714, 724, 854 S.E.2d 539 (2021) (explaining that "remedies for Sixth Amendment violations must neutralize the taint of (the) constitutional violation, while at the same time not grant a windfall to the defendant or needlessly squander the considerable resources the State properly invested in the criminal prosecution") (citation and punctuation omitted). It appears, however, that the remedy this Court provided in Maxwell was too broad because it exceeded that which was required to remedy the deprivation of Maxwell's appellate rights because of an alleged constitutional violation (i.e., ineffective assistance of counsel).

Id. at 504-505 (4). According to Daker, the "change in the law" in Allen v. Daker, as well as Hall v. Jackson, 310 Ga. 714 (854 S.E.2d 539) (2021), was that a second, out-of-time direct appeal was now allowed. However, those cases did not change the law; instead, they involved defendants who were entitled to habeas relief in the form of a second, out-of-time direct appeal, which relief was then available.

In so holding, however, we express no opinion on whether Thomas might be entitled to further relief in the habeas court. See Allen v. Daker, 311 Ga. 485, 505 (4), 858 S.E.2d 731 (2021); Hall v. Jackson, 310 Ga. 714, 724-725 (2) (b), 854 S.E.2d 539 (2021). But see OCGA § 9-14-42 (c) (providing that a habeas petition must be filed within four years of certain specified circumstances in felony cases).

" Lafler v. Cooper , 566 U. S. at 170 (II) (C), 132 S.Ct. 1376 (quoting United States v. Morrison , 449 U.S. 361, 364, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981) ). Accord Hall v. Jackson , 310 Ga. 714, 724 (2) (b), 854 S.E.2d 539 (2021) (relying on Lafler ). So a properly tailored remedy will "neutralize the taint" of the constitutional violation without "grant[ing] a windfall to the defendant or needlessly squander[ing] the considerable resources the State properly invested in the criminal prosecution."

While the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion affirming Daker's convictions may well have been set aside, Allen v. Daker, 311 Ga. at 505, that is simply part of the procedure that the Georgia Supreme Court has adopted when a habeas corpus petitioner is granted an out-of-time appeal. Hall v. Jackson, 310 Ga. 714, 724-25 (2021). It does not have the effect of rendering the procedural history discussed in the opinion obsolete.

) (citations omitted); Hall v. Jackson , 310 Ga. 714, 854 S.E.2d 539, 545 (2021) ("Jackson need not show actual prejudice, that is, a reasonable probability that the outcome of his motion for new trial or direct appeal would have been more favorable to him if Fleischman had not labored under a conflict of interest.