The relationship of the parties is also important because when an owner or mortgagor attaches a tangible item to real estate, a presumption arises that it was annexed with the intention of enriching the freehold and thus, it becomes a part of the realty. Energy Control Services, Inc. v. Arizona Dept. of Economic Sec., 135 Ariz. 20, 658 P.2d 820, 823 (1982); Corning Bank v. Bank of Rector, supra; Frost v. Schinkel, supra; Planter's Bank v. Lummus Cotton Gin Co., supra; Western Ag Land Partners v. State Dept. of Revenue, supra; Nearhoff v. Rucker, supra; Hall v. Dare, 142 Wn. 222, 252 P. 926, 928 (1927). Consequently, with no evidence to rebut the presumption which derived from the relationship of the parties in the evidentiary material supporting the partial summary judgment motion, it was improvident to grant summary judgment at this stage.

But the major changes are probably the result of an awareness of the fact that the luxuries of a given generation become the necessities of the next. It seems highly improbable that any present-day court would hold that a foreclosed mortgagor, on surrendering the premises, could lawfully disconnect, and take with him, the household bathtub. We think the court had in mind the two cases just discussed and, perhaps, some others of like tenor, when it said, in Hall v. Dare, 142 Wn. 222, 252 P. 926, 50 A.L.R. 635, a case in which it was held that a flag pole, which could be removed without breaking any fastenings, was a fixture, that: "Some of the early decisions of this court, when superficially read, may seem not wholly in harmony with our conclusions here reached, but we know of no expression of views by this court made since rendering our decision in Filley v. Christopher, supra [ 39 Wn. 22, 80 P. 834], to be other than consistent with the conclusion we here reach, which is that the pole became, by the manner and circumstances of its erection by the owner, a fixture and part of the realty, and hence passed to the defendant by the mortgage foreclosure and the deed from Mrs. Huber."

In the case at bar, the appliances were ordered by a conditional vendee, the predecessor in interest of respondents, whose intention to enrich the freehold may be assumed, other requirements being proven. Hall v. Dare, 142 Wn. 222, 252 P. 926, 50 A.L.R. 635; Nearhoff v. Rucker, 156 Wn. 621, 287 P. 658. Considerable evidence was introduced concerning the various items which appellant had furnished.

Reeder v. Hudson Consolidated Mines Co., 118 Wn. 505, 203 P. 951. See, also, Hall v. Dare, 142 Wn. 222, 252 P. 926, 50 A.L.R. 635; Nearhoff v. Rucker, 156 Wn. 621, 287 P. 658; Reinoehl v. Vervaeke, 196 Wn. 348, 82 P.2d 861. The judgment is reversed, with direction to the trial court to enter judgment and decree in accordance with the views expressed herein.

The respondent J.R. Gillespie was damaged in the sum of $55, the reasonable costs of assembling and removing his implements and machinery for the purpose of moving the house. [1] As to the building, the case is governed by Hall v. Dare, 142 Wn. 222, 252 P. 926, 50 A.L.R. 635, wherein we reaffirmed the doctrine of Filley v. Christopher, 39 Wn. 22, 80 P. 834, 109 Am. St. 853, as follows: "The true criterion of a fixture is the united application of these requisites: (1) Actual annexation to the realty, or something appurtenant thereto; (2) application to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty with which it is connected is appropriated; and (3) the intention of the party making the annexation to make a permanent accession to the freehold."

We have many times held that, when the annexation of a fixture is made by the owner of the property, the presumption is that it was annexed with the intention of enriching the freehold. The last decision to that effect was Hall v. Dare, 142 Wn. 222, 252 P. 926, citing our previous cases. We are compelled to conclude that, under the evidence in this case which the jury were warranted in resolving in favor of respondents, there was actual annexation to the realty, or something appurtenant thereto; that there was application to the use or purpose with which that part of the realty was connected when so appropriated; and that the intention of the party making the annexation, who was the then owner of the major part of the premises and that part to which the annexation was made, was to make a permanent annexation to the freehold.

Without question, however, the flag pole was the property of Dare and his wife, it was a part of the realty. Hall v. Dare, 142 Wn. 222, 252 P. 926. There is not in the case any tangible, reasonable proof of any so-called conspiracy on the part of the appellants nor of any malicious prosecution.

When a property owner attaches the article to the land he is rebuttably presumed to have annexed it with the intention of enriching the freehold. Nearhoff, at 628; Hall v. Dare, 142 Wn. 222, 227, 252 P. 926, 50 A.L.R. 635 (1927). WALP and its predecessors in interest are presumed to have attached the CPIS with the intention of enriching the economic potential of the farm property.