Opinion
Record No. 1351-92-3
October 19, 1993
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE CLIFFORD R. WECKSTEIN, JUDGE.
Robert M. McAdam (Wooten Hart, on brief), for appellant.
Marla Lynn Graff, Assistant Attorney General (Stephen D. Rosenthal, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Koontz, Elder and Fitzpatrick.
Argued at Salem, Virginia.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Chenita R. Hall (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial of concealing goods in violation of Code §§ 18.2-103, 18.2-104(b), and 18.2-11. On appeal, appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. We disagree and affirm the conviction.
As the parties are familiar with the facts, we recite only those facts necessary to explain our decision. Lieutenant Samuel Clay of the City of Roanoke Sheriff's Department was working off-duty as a security guard at the Super-X drug store in the City of Roanoke on March 16, 1992. At approximately 6:15 p.m., Clay saw appellant and Ms. Nicole Jones enter the Super-X, walk up the aisles of the store and look around. Ms. Jones, in the presence of appellant, concealed items under her jacket. In one instance, appellant removed a box of hair care products from a shelf and handed the item to Ms. Jones, who then concealed the box under her jacket. Clay testified that he apprehended both women as they attempted to leave the store. Both women denied that appellant was involved with the theft.
On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. The judgement of a trial court sitting without a jury is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that the judgement is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.
Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987) (citing Code § 8.01-680) (other citations omitted). "The court is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and its findings are of great weight on appeal." Klein v. Klein, 11 Va. App. 155, 161, 396 S.E.2d 866, 869 (1990).
A principal in the second degree is a person who is present, aiding and abetting, by helping some way in the commission of the crime. Presence or consent alone is not sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting. It must be shown that the defendant intended his words, gestures, signals or actions to in some way encourage, advise, or urge, or in some way help the person committing the crime to commit it.
Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 265, 269, 343 S.E.2d 465, 468 (1986).
The trial judge accepted the testimony of Clay and rejected that of appellant and Ms. Jones. Clay testified that he saw appellant hand Ms. Jones the hair relaxer, who in appellant's presence, concealed it under her jacket, along with the other items. This testimony directly contradicts the testimony of the two women, both of whom had prior convictions that the trial court could have considered in assessing their credibility. In addition, Ms. Jones' testimony, along with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from Clay's testimony, established that the property in question belonged to the Super-X.
We find that Clay's testimony is not inherently incredible or unreliable, and taken in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, supports the trial court's determination of appellant's guilt. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Affirmed.