Opinion
2023 CA 0192
12-27-2023
ROBERT HALL v. ROBERT CLEVELAND, MEDICAL DIRECTOR OF RAYBURN CORRECTIONAL CENTER, NURSE ALANA SEAY, AND STATE OF LOUISIANA, THROUGH LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS
Donna U. Grodner Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant, Robert Hall Jeffrey M. Landry Attorney General Phyllis E. Glazer Assistant Attorney General Baton Rouge, Louisiana Mary Katherine Koch Assistant Attorney General New Orleans, Louisiana Counsel for Defendants/Appellees, Dr. Robert Cleveland, M.D., Nurse Alana Seay, and the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the 22nd Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Washington State of Louisiana Docket No. 113866 The Honorable William H. Burris, Judge Presiding
Donna U. Grodner
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant,
Robert Hall
Jeffrey M. Landry
Attorney General
Phyllis E. Glazer
Assistant Attorney General
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Mary Katherine Koch
Assistant Attorney General
New Orleans, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees,
Dr. Robert Cleveland, M.D.,
Nurse Alana Seay, and the State of
Louisiana, through the Department
of Public Safety and Corrections
BEFORE: McCLENDON, HESTER, AND MILLER, JJ.
MILLER, J.
This matter is before us on appeal by Robert Hall, an inmate in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections ("DPSC"), from an amended judgment of the district court granting an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed by defendants, Nurse Alana Seay, the DPSC, and Dr. Robert Cleveland, Medical Director of Rayburn Correctional Center. The judgment dismissed all claims for damages or acts of negligence that did not occur on June 11, 2018, with prejudice, and allowed Mr. Hall thirty days to amend his petition. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 11, 2018, Mr. Hall, who was incarcerated at Raybum Correctional Center ("RCC"), filed a grievance utilizing administrative remedy procedures (ARP), which was assigned No. RCC-2018-457. In his ARP, he complained that, at 10:19 p.m. that evening, he was escorted to the infirmary for a medical emergency with symptoms of dizziness, nausea, and vomiting blood. Mr. Hall alleged that Nurse Alana Seay checked his blood pressure manually and received a reading of 230/135, prompting her to contact Dr. Robert Cleveland. He contended that Nurse Seay administered Clondine as prescribed by Dr. Cleveland, sent him back to his dorm, and informed him that Dr. Cleveland would see him at a scheduled appointment on June 25, 2018. Mr. Hall complained that he was denied adequate medical attention and that he should have been transported to a hospital for treatment immediately. Mr. Hall further stated Nurse Seay told him nothing would "be done" and that he would "have to wait for [his] upcoming appointment in 2 weeks."
On June 12, 2018, Mr. Hall received a "Backlog Notification" informing him that the ARP allowed for the backlogging of multiple requests and that his first request would be accepted and handled accordingly. Also, he was informed that subsequent requests would be logged and set aside for handling at such time as the current request in the system had been exhausted at the second step or time limits had elapsed at the first step. Mr. Hall was advised that, since he currently had ARP(s) in the system, ARP No. RCC-2018-457 would be processed in accordance with ARP guidelines, and that if he wished to have ARP No. RCC-2018-457 processed immediately, he could withdraw all other pending ARPs. There is no indication in the record that Mr. Hall withdrew any pending ARPs.
A First Step Response was issued over seven months later on January 30, 2019, denying Mr. Hall relief and advising him that if his medical condition warranted him being transported to the emergency room, he would have been, noting the "Medical opinion is controlling." The response further stated that when Mr. Hall was examined on June 11, 2018, his blood pressure was 220/110, not 230/135 as he stated in his complaint. Moreover, the response indicated that he was prescribed multiple medications to control his blood pressure; however, his records showed that he did not take the medications as prescribed. Mr. Hall indicated that he was not satisfied with this response, and that he wished to proceed to the Second Step.
A Second Step Response was issued in March of 2019, granting the ARP in part and advising as follows:
It has been determined that your complaint is without merit. As stated in the first step response and which is supported by your medical records, you are prescribed multiple medications to control your blood pressure; but your medical records indicate that you are not compliant with taking these medications as ordered. On 6/11/18 you made an emergency sick call request, at the time your assessment began, your blood pressure was 220/110; therefore, Dr. Cleveland was contacted and it was ordered for you to be given Clonidine 0.3 mg. It is with regret that your blood pressure was not monitored after this incident. The RCC medical staff does not deny the incident, they do concede it will not occur again. Medical opinion is controlling. Since, it was determined that your blood pressure should have been monitored prior to being released back to your dorm on 6/11/18, the
RCC staff is instructed to credit the charge made to your account on this day (6/11/18) in the amount of $6.00 as well as for the three emergency sick call requests dated 6/12/18 which totaled $17.00, for symptoms associated with high blood pressure. Thus, a total amount of $23.00 is to be credited to your account for these four noted emergency sick call requests made due to your blood pressure being elevated.
On August 15, 2019, Mr. Hall filed a "Petition for Damages/Medical Negligence" in Washington Parish against the Medical Director of RCC, Nurse Alana Seay, and the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections as the governing authority over RCC. Therein, Mr. Hall alleged that on June 11, 2018, he reported a medical emergency and was found to have a blood pressure of 220/110. He contended that the Medical Director of RCC, Dr. Cleveland, was notified and prescribed medication to lower his blood pressure and ordered that Mr. Hall's blood pressure be monitored. Mr. Hall alleged that Nurse Seay administered the medication, but then failed to monitor his blood pressure to determine if the medication was working. Two hours after the medication was administered, Mr. Hall contended that he felt dizzy and nauseated, that he felt that his blood pressure was still elevated, and that he requested to make another medical emergency for treatment. Mr. Hall alleged that Nurse Seay refused his request, refused to check his blood pressure, then discharged him to his dorm where he continued to feel dizzy and weak. Without indicating when, Mr. Hall further alleged that he ultimately suffered a massive stroke and heart attack, during which he fell and struck the floor, causing him to suffer a fracture to his face and damage to his left eye, requiring two surgeries and resulting in a loss of vision.
Defendants answered, objecting to the petition as impermissibly vague, asserting affirmative defenses, and urging various exceptions. Thus, on May 11, 2021, Mr. Hall filed an "Amended Petition for Damages/Medical Negligence" naming Dr. Cleveland, in his capacity as the Medical Director of RCC, as a defendant. Therein, Mr. Hall further detailed his medical history and treatment before and after the events of June 11, 2018. In particular, Mr. Hall alleged that on June 26, 2018, he suffered a massive stroke, heart attack, and fall, and that on June 15, 2018, he suffered a fall and fracture to his face. Mr. Hall alleged that the medical staff was negligent in failing to monitor his blood pressure and sought damages for the injuries suffered as a result.
Defendants answered the amended petition, again asserting affirmative defenses, and filing a declinatory exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and peremptory exceptions of prescription and no right of action. Their exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction was based on Mr. Hall's alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies for claims arising after the events of June 11, 2018. In support, defendants contended that none of the damages alleged in Mr. Hall's petition are related to the June 11, 2018 visit, which is the subject of ARP RCC-2018-457. Instead, defendants contended that every injury complained of is alleged to have occurred on June 26, 2018, or is attributed to the events of June 26, 2018. Defendants thus concluded that, given Mr. Hall's failure to file an ARP for the June 26, 2018 events, Mr. Hall had not exhausted his administrative remedies as required by La. R.S. 15:1172(B)(1), and could not invoke the jurisdiction of the district court.
Mr. Hall opposed defendants' exceptions arguing that the objection of failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been raised through a dilatory exception of prematurity. Moreover, Mr. Hall contended that his reference in ARP No. RCC-2018-457 to having to wait for an upcoming appointment in two weeks constituted notice of an ongoing denial of medical care for high blood pressure, which culminated in injuries directly related to the lack of medical attention. He further contended that although ARP No. RCC-2018-457 referenced the June 11, 2018 events, the medical records that were part of the ARP review included records of Mr. Hall's medical treatment from February through June 26, 2018. Thus, according to Mr. Hall, "the Petition in this case is for ongoing denial of medical care for high blood pressure."
The exceptions were heard by the district court on March 23, 2022, with the court taking up defendants' exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction first. On the trial of the declinatory exception, evidence may be introduced to support or controvert any of the objections pleaded, when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition, the citation, or return thereon. La. C.C.P. art. 930. Here, defendants introduced: (A) Mr. Hall's amended petition for damages/medical negligence; (B) ARP RCC-2018-457; (C) Mr. Hall's medical records from RCC; and (D) the entire record. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted defendants' exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed all unexhausted claims that did not occur on June 11, 2018, finding that it had no jurisdiction over claims for any damages stemming from the failure to render treatment on June 26, 2018, or any other date not complained of in ARP No. RCC-2018-457, On April 19, 2022, the district court signed a partial final judgment granting defendants' exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissing "all claims for damages or acts of negligence that are not alleged to have occurred on June 11, 2018," with prejudice. The judgment further allowed Mr. Hall thirty days to amend his petition to include allegations of acts of negligence occurring on June 11, 2018, provided that they appeared in ARP No. RCC-2018-457. Finally, the judgment declared defendants' alternative exceptions of prescription and no right of action moot.
Counsel for Mr. Hall objected to defense counsel's attempt to offer the entire case record in support of the exception. The district court overruled her objection and allowed it.
Mr. Hall now appeals the judgment of the district court contending that the district court erred in finding that he was required to file an additional ARP from the "anticipated injury" for which he had already filed an ARP.
Mr. Hall initially filed an application for a supervisory writ of review of the April 19, 2022 judgment. On November 21, 2022, this court granted the writ finding that the April 19, 2022 judgment was an appealable judgment pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B)(1) and ordered that the case be remanded to the district court with instructions to grant Mr. Hall an appeal pursuant to the pleading by which he notified the district court of his intention to seek writs.
Following the lodging of this appeal, this court issued an interim order noting that the April 19, 2022 judgment was defective in that it failed to properly identify the parties for or against whom the judgment was rendered. This court thus remanded the matter to the district court pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1951, for the limited purpose of issuing an amended judgment correcting this deficiency pursuant to La. C.C.P. arts. 1918(A), 1951, and 2088(12).
An amended judgment correcting the deficiencies set forth above was signed on September 8, 2023, and was supplemented into the record before us on appeal. The amended judgment granted the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed all claims for damages or acts of negligence that are not alleged to have occurred on June 11, 2018, against the DPSC, Dr. Cleveland, and Nurse Seay, with prejudice; allowed Mr. Hall thirty days to amend his petition to include acts of negligence occurring on June 11, 2018, provided that they appeared in ARP No. RCC-2018-457; and declared defendants' alternative exceptions of prescription and no right of action moot.
DISCUSSION
All complaints and grievances of inmates against the DPSC or its employees are subject to the Louisiana Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure Act ("CARP") codified as La. R.S. 15:1171, et seq. Scott v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety &Corrections, 2022-1103 (La.App. 1st Cir. 4/14/23), 364 So.3d 1155, 1157. Such complaints and grievances include, but are not limited to, any and all claims seeking monetary, injunctive, declaratory, or any other form of relief authorized by law and by way of illustration includes actions pertaining to conditions of confinement, personal injuries, medical malpractice, time computations, even though urged as a writ of habeas corpus, or challenges to rules, regulations, policies, or statutes. La. R.S. 15:1171(B).
The administrative remedy procedure shall constitute the administrative remedies available to offenders for the purpose of preserving any cause of action they may claim to have against the State of Louisiana, the DPSC, or its employees, the contractor operating a private prison facility or any of its employees, shareholders, directors, or officers, or a sheriff, or his employees or deputies. La. R.S. 15:1172(A). An offender shall initiate his administrative remedies for a delictual action for injury or damages within ninety days from the day the injury or damage is sustained. La. R.S. 15:1172(B)(1). Liberative prescription for any delictual action for injury or damage arising out of claims asserted by a prisoner in a complaint or grievance in an ARP shall be suspended upon the filing of the complaint or grievance and shall continue to be suspended until the final agency decision is delivered. La. R.S. 15:15:1172(E).
Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:1171(B), the administrative remedy procedures govern offender complaints and grievances against the state, the governor, the department or any officials or employees thereof, the contractor operating a private prison facility or any of its employees, shareholders, directors, officers, or agents, or a sheriff, his deputies, or employees, which arise while an offender is within the custody or under the supervision of the department, a contractor operating a private prison facility, or a sheriff.
The rules and procedures promulgated by the DPSC governing administrative remedy procedures are set forth in Section 325 of Title 22, Part I of the Louisiana Administrative Code. Collins v. Vanny, 2014-0675 (La.App. 1stCir. 1/15/15), 169 So.3d 405, 406. Pursuant to these rules, offenders must exhaust a two-step ARP before they can proceed with a suit in federal or state court. La. R.S. 15:1176; LAC 22:I.325(F)(3)(a)(viii); Dupuis v. Johnson, 2020-1248 (La.App. 1st Cir. 4/16/21), 324 So.3d 666, 670, writ denied, 2021-00832 (La. 10/5/21), 325 So.3d 380. When an inmate has initiated the first step of an ARP, the warden is required to respond within forty days from the date the request is received at the first step, using the first-step response. LAC 22:1.325(J)(1)(a)(ii). An inmate who is not satisfied with the warden's first-step response may proceed to the second step ARP and appeal to the secretary of the DPSC. LAC 22:I.325(J)(1)(b)(i). The final decision of the secretary or his designee shall be made and the offender shall be sent a response within forty-five days from the date the request is received at the second step, utilizing the second-step response. LAC 22:I.325(J)(1)(b)(ii). If an inmate fails to exhaust available administrative remedies, the district court and the appellate court lack subject matter jurisdiction to review the claim. Crooker v. Dillon, 2021-1431 (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/22/22), 343 So.3d 799, 803; see also Larrieu v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2003-0600 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/23/04), 872 So.2d 1157, 1162 ("Where the law provides for an administrative remedy, a claim must be processed through the administrative channels before a trial court will have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the claim."); Swanson v. Department of Public Safety & Corrections, 2001-1066 (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 837 So.2d 634, 637 ("Because the ... administrative remedies provide the exclusive remedy available to an offender for complaints or grievances, Swanson's application for injunctive relief in the district court should have been processed through administrative channels before being reviewed by the commissioner and trial court at the Nineteenth Judicial District Court. Thus, the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over Swanson's claim and its judgment is void."). As such, the declinatory exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction is an appropriate vehicle to address the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine an action of the parties and to grant the relief to which they are entitled. La. C.C.P. art. 1. Subject matter jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted. La. C.C.P. art. 2. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction addresses the court's authority to adjudicate the cause before it. The issue may be raised at any time and at any stage of an action. Dickens v. Louisiana Correctional Institute for Women, 2011-0176 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/14/11), 77 So.3d 70, 73.
Following the exhaustion of the ARP process, any offender who is aggrieved by an adverse decision by the DPSC of his administrative remedy procedure, excluding decisions relative to delictual actions for injury or damages, may, within thirty days after receipt of the decision, seek judicial review of the decision only in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court or, if the offender is in the physical custody of the sheriff, in the district court having jurisdiction in the parish in which the sheriff is located. La. R.S. 15:1177(A). However, an offender aggrieved by an adverse decision by the DPSC relative to his delictual actions for injury or damages, i.e, tort claims, may not seek judicial review under this Section. Instead, his delictual action for injury or damages shall be filed separately as an original civil action. La. R.S. 15:1177(C).
Thus, in this case, Mr. Hall was required to exhaust administrative remedies on his grievance before he filed a delictual action for injury or damages. An inmate has properly exhausted his available administrative remedies through his ARP if his ARP contained sufficient information to place a reasonable person on notice that he might pursue a delictual action related to the incident and the injuries caused by the incident. See Dupuis, 324 So.3d at 671 and Crooker, 343 So.3d at 805. Therefore, on review, we must determine if Mr. Hall's ARP contained enough information to place a reasonable person on notice that he might pursue a delictual action related to the June 11, 2018 incident, the alleged restricted access to medical care, and the injuries allegedly caused by the incident, i.e., his subsequent stroke, heart attack, and fall on June 26, 2018.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Pope v. State, 99-2559 (La. 6/29/01), 792 So.2d 713, the legislature amended La. R.S. 15:1172 and 15:1177(A) to exclude tort claims from judicial review. See 2002 La. Acts, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 89, § 2. Instead, the district court serves as a court of original jurisdiction for all delictual actions for injury or damages. See La. R.S. 15:1177(C). However, this does not relieve the offender from first filing an administrative claim (via ARP) pursuant to La. R.S. 15:1172. See Warren v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Correction, 2020-0247 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2/19/21), 320 So.3d 453, 455. Thus, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:1177(C) and 1184(F), after exhausting his administrative remedies, Mr. Hall was required to file any delictual action for injury or damages separately as an original civil action, not as an appeal for judicial review, in the mandatory venue of the parish where the prison was located as of the time the cause of action arose. See La. R.S. 15.1177(C) and 1184(F); Scott, 364 So.3d at 1157, citing Warren, 320 So.3d at 455-456.
In the instant case, Mr. Hall's ARP complained about an incident that occurred on June 11, 2018, at 10:19 p.m. where he alleged he was denied adequate medical attention for his elevated blood pressure and that he should have been transported to a nearby hospital "immediately" for emergency treatment. Although Mr. Hall complained in the ARP that Nurse Seay advised him that he had an appointment in two weeks on June 25, 2018, with Dr. Cleveland, his medical records indicate that he subsequently sought emergency and routine medical treatment twice on June 12, 2018, and also on June 13, and 14, 2018. Moreover, on June 15, 2018, he was transported to University Medical Center ("UMC") for an oral surgeon consult for nasal bone fractures sustained as a result of a fall. That same date, he was seen in the UMCNO Emergency Department and was diagnosed and treated for unspecified chest pain. Following his discharge, Mr. Hall saw Dr. Cleveland on June 19, 2018. Dr. Cleveland noted on that visit that Mr. Hall's blood pressure was elevated, but that Mr. Hall showed "very poor compliance." Mr. Hall again sought routine and emergency treatment on June 19 and 22, 2018, and twice on June 25, 2018. On June 26, 2018, Mr. Hall sought emergency medical treatment on two occasions, initially reporting weakness, dizziness, and a fall, and later reporting that he slipped and fell on a wet tier that had just been mopped.
Mr. Hall argues that his June 11, 2018 ARP was sufficient to alert defendants that he had "ongoing" problems with his blood pressure for which he was denied proper treatment, relying on Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004). In Johnson, the offender's grievance complained of the defendants' repeated failure to protect him over the course of eighteen months of "near- constant" sexual assault. Johnson, 385 F.3d at 518-519. The Johnson court found that the March 2001 "grievance alerted prison officials to the fact that Johnson was being subjected to repeated assaults" so long as he remained in the general population. Johnson, 385 F.3d at 520. (Emphasis added.) The court determined that Johnson's grievances were sufficient to exhaust claims arising out of the same general failure to protect. Johnson, 385 F.3d at 520. Johnson stands for the proposition that a prisoner can alert prison officials to circumstances that are ongoing and he can pursue his grievance without waiting for the objected-to behavior to cease.
We also look to Dupuis and Crooker. See infra pp. 8 and 9, In Dupuis, an inmate filed an ARP advising that he had been injured in a car accident and complaining of injuries to his neck and lower back, and explained that he was unsatisfied with the medical treatment he had received thus far. He received a First Step Response indicating that his ARP had already been granted because he had been seen by a medical provider twice since the date of the accident. Not satisfied, Mr. Dupuis proceeded to the second step stating that something was wrong with his neck and back and that medication was not relieving the pain. Following the denial of his second step, he filed a "petition for damages/van wreck." Dupuis, 324 So.3d at 670. Defendants argued that no portion of his ARP could reasonably be interpreted as indicative of his desire to address the possible pursuit of a delictual action related to injuries allegedly sustained in the accident. However, this court determined on appeal that Mr. Dupuis explained that he sought medical attention for injuries sustained in the accident and that the information Mr. Dupuis provided clearly pertained to the auto collision, which preceded the inadequate medical care. Finding that his ARP contained enough information to place a reasonable person on notice that he might pursue a delictual action related to the accident and the injuries or damages caused by the accident, this court found that, through his ARP, Mr. Dupuis properly exhausted his administrative remedies. Dupuis, 324 So.3d at 671.
In a similar case, Crooker, this court relied on Dupuis, and found that Mr. Crooker exhausted his administrative remedies when he alleged in his ARP that he suffered injuries in an auto accident, which preceded an alleged lack of adequate medical care. See Crooker, 343 So.3d at 805. Where he specifically alleged in his ARP that he suffered injuries in the accident and believed that the DPSC and RCC should be "held accountable for their lack of responsibility," this court determined that Mr. Crooker1 s ARP contained sufficient information to place a reasonable person on notice that he might pursue a delictual action related to the accident and injuries or damages allegedly sustained therefrom. Crooker, 343 So.3d at 805.
In the instant case, Mr. Hall's June 11, 2018 ARP "Complaint" involved the events of June 11, 2018, and his allegation of restricted access to medical treatment by a physician, Dr. Cleveland, for two weeks. Mr. Hall acknowledged that Dr. Cleveland ordered medication that was administered by Nurse Seay, but complained that he was denied adequate medical treatment, that he was not transported to an emergency hospital "immediately," and that he had to wait until his appointment on June 25, 2018, to see Dr. Cleveland. He further stated that he felt like his life was in danger, that he was "[denied] adequate medical attention," and that he wanted Dr. Cleveland investigated for "not taking [his] life serious." Like the plaintiff in Johnson, Mr. Hall brought a claim in his ARP that he was subjected to an ongoing failure to provide adequate care.
After a thorough review of Mr. Hall's ARP and his medical records, we find that Mr. Hall's ARP contained enough information to place a reasonable person on notice that he might pursue a delictual action for injuries allegedly sustained as a result Cf. Dupuis, 324 So.3d at 671 and Crooker, 343 So.3d at 805.
Importantly, we note that damages should not be conflated with the underlying complained-of conduct. For example, while a prisoner may file an ARP after an incident occurring at the facility, there is no requirement that he continue filing to document each stage of his recovery, or every element of his damages. Likewise, in tort suits, a plaintiff alleges those acts that caused him damage, even while the extent of those damages are unknown. Here, Mr. Hall filed an ARP to address his claim that he believed he was receiving, and would receive, inadequate care for high blood pressure. While the ARP addressed an ongoing problem, it was not open ended. The ARP looked back to June 11, 2018 and forward to June 25, 2018. He did not have to file a subsequent ARP once he suffered a stroke. Considering that any new filings would be placed in a queue, and could not be considered until the original ARP was exhausted, to require multiple ARPs related to the same conduct would improperly frustrate the complainant's ability to exhaust his original ARP.
In Mr. Hall's delictual action, he focuses on his stroke and resulting fall and negligent treatment of his pre-existing high blood pressure, which he alleges resulted from inadequate care dating back, at the very least to June 11, 2018. The alleged inadequate care was addressed in the ARP and has been exhausted. By our decision herein, we make no determination as to whether Mr. Hall will ultimately be able to prove that his damages are related to the improper care he complained of in his ARP, or that his care was actually improper, but he has certainly made that allegation, and the ARP was sufficient to place defendants on notice.
Peremptory Exception of Prescription
Defendants filed a peremptory exception of prescription with this court on appeal contending that all claims in Mr. Hall's medical malpractice suit are prescribed, except for the claims alleged against Nurse Seay arising from the events of June 11, 2018. We note that defendants initially filed a peremptory exception of prescription urging the same arguments in the district court, which that court declared moot by virtue of the amended judgment.
Considering our decision herein to reverse the amended judgment of the district court, and to the extent that resolution of the exception of prescription may or may not require the introduction of evidence to support or controvert the exception, we believe the interests of justice demand that we remand the matter to permit the parties, should they choose, to develop evidence and resolve the prescription issue. See La. C.C.P. art. 2164; Vanguard Vacuum Trucks, L.L.C, v. Mid-America Resources Corporation, 2017-0434 (La.App. 1st Cir. 11/1/17), 233 So.3d 87, 89.
See La. C.C.P. art. 931.
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, the September 8, 2023 amended judgment of the district court granting the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissing all claims for damages or acts of negligence that are not alleged to have occurred on June 11, 2018, with prejudice, is reversed. This matter is remanded to the district court for proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
Costs of this appeal in the amount of $1,858.00 are assessed against defendants/appellees, Nurse Alana Seay, the DPSC, and Dr. Robert Cleveland, Medical Director of Raybum Correctional Center.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
McClendon, J., concurring.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2163 provides that the appellate court may consider the peremptory exception filed for the first time in that court, if pleaded prior to a submission of the case for a decision, and if proof of the ground of the exception appears of record. In this matter, the peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription was originally filed at the trial court, and therefore is not properly before this court.
However, the record reflects that once the trial court granted the exception raising the objection of subject matter jurisdiction, it declined to consider the remaining exceptions of prescription and no right of action, finding them to be "moot." Because the trial court did not rule on the exceptions, I concur with the result reached by the majority.