Where an administrative order is against the manifest weight of the evidence or where the agency has acted arbitrarily or capriciously and has thereby abused the discretion vested in it, the courts should not hesitate to intervene." Southern Illinois Asphalt Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1975), 60 Ill.2d 204, 207, 326 N.E.2d 406, 408; see also, e.g., Rocke v. County of Cook (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 874, 875-76, 377 N.E.2d 287; Hall v. Board of Education (1977), 48 Ill. App.3d 834, 841, 363 N.E.2d 116, appeal denied (1977), 66 Ill.2d 630, cert. denied (1978), 434 U.S. 1056, 55 L.Ed.2d 757, 98 S.Ct. 1225. Whether the trial court should enter a mandatory injunction to specifically regulate or limit the manner in which IHDA reaches its financing decisions is, at most, only one of several remedies which the trial court could impose upon remand, assuming the neighbors prevail in their underlying causes of action and assuming they demonstrate that such relief would be appropriate.
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 122, pars. 34-18(7) and 34-8, respectively.) However, the power of the Board and its superintendent is not absolute. A court will interfere with the exercise of legislative powers and substitute its judgment when it appears that the Board has acted palpably arbitrarily, unreasonably or capriciously. Hall v. Board of Education (1977), 48 Ill. App.3d 834, 363 N.E.2d 116. See Byerly v. Board of Education (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 400, 382 N.E.2d 694; Cohn v. Board of Education (1970), 118 Ill. App.2d 453, 254 N.E.2d 803.