Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4798-13T3
08-03-2015
MARY F. HALL-DINGLE, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW and GEODIS WILSON USA, INC., Respondents.
Zachary R. Wall argued the cause for appellant (Wall & London, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Wall, on the brief). Joel Clymer, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent Board of Review, Department of Labor (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mr. Clymer, on the brief). Respondent Geodis Wilson USA, Inc., has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Ostrer, Hayden and Sumners. On appeal from the Department of Labor, Board of Review, Docket No. 008,402. Zachary R. Wall argued the cause for appellant (Wall & London, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Wall, on the brief). Joel Clymer, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent Board of Review, Department of Labor (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mr. Clymer, on the brief). Respondent Geodis Wilson USA, Inc., has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Claimant Mary Hall-Dingle appeals from a May 22, 2014 Board of Review (Board) final decision, which disqualified her from receiving unemployment benefits because she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work, N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). Because we find the Board's decision is not supported by credible evidence in the record, we reverse.
The record reveals that Hall-Dingle began working at Geodis Wilson USA (Geodis) on May 21, 2012. She took a leave of absence on March 31, 2013, due to her medical conditions, and was scheduled to return on August 5, 2013. However, on July 30, 2013, Hall-Dingle's adult son was involved in a motor vehicle accident, in which his car was totaled and a person died. He was taken by helicopter to the hospital, where he received treatment for multiple injuries including a broken jaw, bruises, and burns. At the time of his discharge the next day, his jaw was wired shut and he was on crutches. Due to his medical condition as well as his distressed mental state, Hall-Dingle contacted Geodis on August 5 and several times thereafter, through both phone calls and emails, to explain her absence and request her leave be extended for her to care for her son.
On August 29, 2013, Hall-Dingle sent another email to Geodis, reporting that she would be able to return to work on September 9, 2013 since the doctor was scheduled to remove the wiring of her son's jaw a few days earlier. Hall-Dingle sent a follow-up e-mail on September 6, 2013. In response, Geodis requested an answer to a previous letter it had mailed to her and added, "we ask that you refrain from contacting the Branch until you hear back from the Human Resources Department."
On September 19, 2013, Hall-Dingle faxed some documents explaining her son's accident. In response, Geodis sent the following e-mail:
I have received the fax document that you sent yesterday regarding your son's recent car accident. I am sorry to hear this news and I hope he is doing well. The document (newspaper article) that you provided is not considered "medical certification" that would require your extended absence from work. Will you be able to provide documentation from your son's physician stating his "serious health condition" at the time of the accident? Please let me know if this is something that you will be unable to provide.
Hall-Dingle responded by email:
Thank you for your reply. My son is doing much better thanks for asking.
I don't have any medical document, the only thing I have is $70,000 worth of medical bills. My son was hospitalize[d] overnight (because there were no beds available) and left the hospital with a broken jaw, bruised chest, knee, hip, ankle and on crutches under pain medications. Not to mention the physical pain, but [he] was very emotional for several weeks. I don't know what "medical certification" you need. If you want me to send you the medical bills I can. This is all I have. My son was in a serious accident and needed me and I was and will be there always.
On September 24, 2013, Hall-Dingle received another letter from Geodis containing a twelve-page disability packet. She filled out the paperwork and sent the medical paperwork she had, including letters from the hospital and surgeons, as well as medical bills. The record does not show any further communication from Geodis concerning the adequacy of this packet. On October 16, 2013, Hall-Dingle received a letter from Geodis, terminating her "due to insufficient medical certification." Hall-Dingle applied for unemployment benefits.
The letter was not included in the record.
When Geodis terminated her, it notified Hall-Dingle that it would not contest her benefits, and did not participate during the proceedings.
Initially, a deputy director found that Hall-Dingle was disqualified from benefits because she "quit her job voluntarily without good cause related to work." Hall-Dingle appealed this decision, and the Appeal Tribunal scheduled a hearing on March 28, 2014. At the hearing, Hall-Dingle testified and submitted into evidence the e-mail communications she had exchanged with Geodis, the son's doctor's notes, and a letter she wrote explaining the situation.
The Appeal Tribunal denied Hall-Dingle's appeal. It found that Geodis' request for Hall-Dingle to "provide some medical documentation to substantiate the need for that extension to be wholly reasonable and [Hall-Dingle's] failure to provide such documentation a lack of a 'sincere attempt to protect the job' and thus job abandonment as viewed by the [Board]." Therefore, it found that she was disqualified from benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) from August 5, 2013 because she "resigned without good cause attributable to the work."
Hall-Dingle appealed the Appeal Tribunal's determination to the Board. The Board affirmed the Tribunal, stating "[s]ince the appellant was given a full and impartial hearing and a complete opportunity to offer any and all evidence, there is no valid ground for a further hearing. On the basis of the record below, we agree with the decision reached."
Hall-Dingle filed the present appeal. Here, she argues that the Board erred in its decision because she did not voluntarily quit; rather, the record showed that Geodis terminated her. Additionally, Hall-Dingle contends, the Board erred because the record established that she was terminated when she was eligible for protected leave under the New Jersey Family Leave Act (NJFLA), N.J.S.A. 34:11B-1 to -16.
Under the NJFLA, an eligible employee of a covered employer may take up to twelve weeks of unpaid family leave to assist a family member with a serious health condition, and be protected from termination. N.J.S.A. 34:11B-3(g). The NJFLA does not cover medical leave for the individual worker. See N.J.S.A. 34:11B-4(a), (b). Thus, Hall-Dingle's request to take leave for the purpose of caring for her son was potentially protected by the NJFLA and the employer's obligation to make inquiries was triggered. D'Alia v. Allied-Signal Corp., 260 N.J. Super. 1, 9-10 (App. Div. 1992). We need not decide whether Hall-Dingle was eligible for the leave.
The scope of appellate review of an administrative agency's final determination is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). Agency decisions are given a strong presumption of reasonableness, and we will not reverse such a decision unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or not supported by evidence in the record. Thurber v. City of Burlington, 387 N.J. Super. 279, 301-02 (App. Div. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), aff'd, 191 N.J. 487, 502 (2007); see also In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007). We defer to fact-findings if reasonably based on the proofs. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). "'[T]he test is not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was its to make, but whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Ibid. (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)).
Thus, the issue is whether the factual findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence. Ibid. In making that determination, we also give due regard to the agency's credibility determinations. Logan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 346, 348 (App. Div. 1997). The court "may not vacate an agency determination because of doubts as to its wisdom or because the record may support more than one result," but is "obliged to give due deference to the view of those charged with the responsibility of implementing legislative programs." In re N.J. Pinelands Comm'n Resolution PC4-00-89, 356 N.J. Super. 363, 372 (App. Div.) (citing Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 281 (2003). That said, we do not simply act as a rubber stamp of the agency's decision. Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579 (1980).
N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) provides that a person is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits when he or she leaves work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work. Usually, the burden is on the claimant to demonstrate his or her eligibility for unemployment benefits. Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 218. An employee who chooses to terminate employment for personal reasons, however compelling, is disqualified from collecting unemployment benefits. Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 460 (1982). However, if the employer has a leave policy for which the employee would qualify, and the employee terminates employment without the employer offering leave, such circumstances would not be considered personal and "not attributable to the work." Hutchens, supra, 368 N.J. Super. at 13. In addition, leaving work if unable to work due to illness may not be considered a voluntary quit. Self, supra, 91 N.J. at 457. For example, in Delorenzo, v. Bd. of Review, 54 N.J. 361 (1969), the claimant lost her job because of illness unrelated to her employment. Id. at 362. The Court classified her leaving as involuntary because she did not intend to quit on account of her illness; she intended to work upon recovery. Id. at 363. The Court found this was not a voluntary quit as long as she did what was "calculated to protect the employment . . . ." Id. at 364.
Moreover, once an employee provides sufficient information to his or her employer to make it aware that the employee is potentially requesting Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601 to 2654, or NJFLA qualifying leave, the burden is on the employer to inquire into whether the employee is requesting protected leave. D'Alia, supra, 260 N.J. Super. at 9-10. In the context of a subsequent application for unemployment benefits, if an employee provides an employer sufficient notice that the employee is requesting potentially qualifying leave, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the leave was not eligible and that the employee is not entitled to unemployment compensation. See Hutchens, supra, 368 N.J. Super. at 14-15.
Employees need not "have an encyclopedic knowledge of their legal rights in order to invoke the benefits of family leave and job protection[,]" and in dealing with claims under the NJFLA, rather than focus on the employee, the focus is on whether the employer performed its obligations to notify employees of their rights. D'Alia, supra, 260 N.J. Super. at 9-10. --------
Here, viewing the record with all requisite deference, we find that it simply does not support the Appeal Tribunal's finding that Hall-Dingle abandoned her employment because she did not make a "sincere attempt to protect the job." It is undisputed that Hall-Dingle requested an extension of her leave by phone and by email. Geodis did not respond until after she notified it that she was ready and willing to return to work. Geodis then instructed her not to return to work. Thereafter, in a series of emails, Hall-Dingle provided numerous explanations and included some medical documentation and hospital bills. Although the documentation was ultimately deemed insufficient, there is no indication that Geodis provided an explanation or explained the insufficiency after reviewing her twelve-page disability application.
Under these unique circumstances, where Hall-Dingle immediately and timely applied for a continuation of leave, which potentially was available to her, the employer did not deny the leave or instruct her to return to work, provide an application for the leave or request medical certification during the period of the requested leave, and where she made several submissions attempting to provide the necessary information, we find that the Board's decision that she voluntarily quit her employment by not making a sincere attempt to protect her job is not supported by credible evidence in the record. Rather, the evidence shows that Geodis terminated Hall-Dingle. Consequently, we are constrained to reverse the Board's decision as it was not based on the evidence in the record and, thus, is arbitrary and capricious. See Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210.
Reversed and remanded for entry of an appropriate order awarding Hall-Dingle unemployment benefits. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION