Opinion
Civil Action No. 06-0376 Section P.
May 31, 2006
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or about March 3, 2006 by pro se petitioner Jeff Haggins. Petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. He is incarcerated at the Louisiana State Penitentiary, Angola, where he is serving a life sentence for murder.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for review, report, and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of the court. For the following reasons, it is recommended that the petition be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Background
Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder on November 7, 1996, in the Sixteenth Judicial District Court, St. Martin Parish. He was sentenced to life imprisonment on December 17, 1996. [doc. 1-3, pp. 1 and 6] His court-appointed counsel appealed his conviction to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals raising claims of (1) sufficiency of the evidence and (2) voir dire error. [doc. 5-2, Exhibit 1, pp. 1-7] His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal on October 8, 1997. See State of Louisiana v. Jeff Andrew Haggins, 97-00365 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/97), 701 So.2d 267 (unpublished). [See also doc. 5-2, Exhibit 2, pp. 8-23] Petitioner did not seek further direct review by filing an application for certiorari in Louisiana's Supreme Court. [doc. 1-1, p. 2; doc. 5-1, p. 2]On or about November 20, 1997 petitioner filed a pro se "Motion for Production of Trial Transcripts, Sentencing, Police Reports, and Verbatim Copies" in the district court. [doc. 5-2, Exhibit 3, pp. 24-29] His motion was denied on January 15, 1998 because he failed to show a "particularized need." [ id., at p. 29]
On April 23, 1998, petitioner filed a pro se "Motion for the Production of Complete Trial Transcript, Including Opening Statements, Closing Arguments, Voir Dire Examination, Initial Jury Charges, Pre-Trial Hearing Transcripts Relevant to All Proceedings, Copy of all Motion and Responses, Filed by Both State Prosecutors and Defense Attorney and Copy of the Docket Master." [doc. 5-2, Exhibit 5, pp. 49-62] This Motion was denied by the trial judge on May 18, 1998, again for the reason that petitioner failed to allege a particularized need for the documents requested. [doc. 5-3, Exhibit 6, p. 1]
Also on April 23, 1998, petitioner filed a pro se Application for Post-Conviction Relief in the Sixteenth Judicial District Court. Petitioner argued two claims for relief: (1) Insufficiency of the evidence to establish that petitioner had specific intent to kill because he was intoxicated and provoked when he stabbed the victim [doc. 5-2, Exhibit 4, p. 38]; and, (2) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel based upon counsel's failure to conduct pretrial discovery, his failure to file a motion to suppress confession/inculpatory statements, and his failure to object to the introduction of three knives into the evidence of the case. [ id., p. 44]
On some unspecified date in June 1998 petitioner filed a pro se application for "Writ of Certiorari from the 16th Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Martin, Docket No. 95-168,010." [doc. 5-3, Exhibit 7, pp. 2-5] Petitioner alleged, "The 16th Judicial District Court denied petitioner's motion and consolidated Post-Conviction Relief Application, by stipulating that the defendant failed to show a particularized need . . . Petitioner finally asserts that the District Court's denial of his Motion and Post Conviction Relief Application hinders petitioner from effectively petitioning the Courts. Petitioner has been denied the right to challenge and/or appeal his criminal conviction and sentence." [ id., p. 3] The writ application was lodged in the Third Circuit on June 26, 1998 and assigned Docket Number 98-00959. On December 18, 1998 the Third Circuit denied writs and noted:
Although the Relator asks this court to review the denial of his post-conviction relief application, the trial court addressed only the documents request in its ruling, and not the merits of the post-conviction relief application; thus, the only issue properly before this court is Relator's documents request. Relator has not shown a need for the transcripts he has requested. Any documents needed to resolve the merits of the Relator's post-conviction relief application can be obtained by the trial court upon consideration of the merits of the application. Accordingly, the Relator's request for documents is denied. [citation omitted] Relator should reassert his post-conviction relief application in the trial court and obtain a ruling on the application before seeking review of the merits with this court. [doc. 5-3, Exhibit 8, p. 6]
On January 9, 1999 the district court granted petitioner's request for trial transcripts and ordered petitioner's court-appointed trial counsel to provide the requested documents to the petitioner. [doc. 1-4, p. 3]
On August 16, 2000 petitioner "re-asserted" his Application for Post-Conviction Relief in the district court. [doc. 5-3, Exhibit 9, pp. 7-37] In this pleading petitioner argued the following claims for relief: (1) Unconstitutional grand jury foreperson selection process [ id., p. 15]; (2) defective indictment and unconstitutionality of Louisiana's "short form" indictment [ id., p. 19]; (3) trial court erred by allowing into evidence three knives [ id., p. 25]; (4) insufficiency of the evidence to establish specific intent due to petitioner's intoxication [ id., p. 27]; (5) ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure (a) to file motion to quash based on grand jury foreperson selection process, (b) to file a motion to quash the "short form" indictment, (c) to investigate, and (d) to object to the introduction of three knives. [ id., p. 33]
In this pleading petitioner alleged, "On December 18, 1998, petitioner's Motion for Production of Documents was denied, for reasons of failing to show a particularized need, however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal ordered petitioner to re-assert his Post Conviction Relief Application back into the District Court . . . The petitioner then wrote a letter to the Honorable Judge Anne L. Simon, presiding in this case requesting his trial transcripts. On January 9, 1999, the request was approved by the Honorable Judge which ordered petitioner's court appointed attorney to provide petitioner with the requested documents. After carefully scrutinizing the trial transcripts petitioner is now reasserting his Application for Post-Conviction Relief. There are no motions nor petitions pending in the State nor Federal jurisdiction challenging the conviction and sentence in the above captioned matter." [doc. 5-3, Exhibit 9, pp. 14-15].
Petitioner apparently misnumbered his claims. In the Memorandum support petitioner's application, "Claim No. 5" follows Claim 3 [doc. 5-3, Exhibit 9, p. 27]. Thus, petitioner raised only five claims in the pleading notwithstanding the fact that his final claim is designated as Claim No. 6.
On some unspecified date petitioner filed an application for writ of mandamus in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. On November 11, 2001 the Third Circuit granted petitioner's writ and directed the district court to render a decision. [doc. 1-4, p. 3] On December 5, 2001, the District Judge denied petitioner's Application for Post-Conviction Relief. The court found,
Petitioner filed a prior Post Conviction Relief Application in April 1998 and a Motion for New Trial in June 1999 that were denied by Judge Anne Simon. In this current application for post conviction, petitioner makes certain claims.
A successive application may be dismissed if it fails to raise a new or different claim. La.C.Cr.P. Art. 930.4(D) (West 2001). Although this application raises a new issue from the previous application filed in April, 1998, the issue concerning selection of grand jury foreman is not new to this Court. The petitioner in a motion for new trial brought forth this issue. The Court properly denied the motion because the defendant had failed to raise the issue by filing a pretrial motion to quash. See State ex rel. Roper v. Cain, 99-2173 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/26/99), 763 So.2d 1, La.C.Cr.P. Arts 533(1) and 535(D), Delouch [sic] v. Whitley, 96-1901 (La. 11/22/96), 684 So.2d 349. The issues of the admission of the knives, the insufficiency of the evidence, and the ineffective assistance of counsel issues are not new or different claims. As a result, these claims are hereby dismissed as being repetitive. A successive application may be dismissed if it raises a new or different claim that was inexcusably omitted from a prior application. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4(E) (West 2001). As far as the challenge to the constitutionality of the indictment, this issue should have been raised and is an inexcusable omission by the petitioner. [doc. 5-3, Exhibit 10, p. 38]
On January 10, 2002 petitioner filed a writ application in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Petitioner argued that the district court erred when it denied petitioner's application for post-conviction relief as a successive writ. [doc. 5-3, Exhibit 11, pp. 11-44] On October 11, 2002 the court granted in part and denied in part petitioner's writ application and remanded three of petitioner's claims to the district court for further consideration. The court noted:
There is no error in the trial court's ruling denying Relator's claim alleging discrimination in the grand jury foreman selection process. See Deloch v. Whitley, 96-1901 (La. 11/22/96); 684 So.2d 349. Further, although not successive, the Relator's contention that the short form indictment in his case was insufficient is without merit. See State v. Thibodeaux, 98-1673 (La. 9/8/99); 750 So.2d 916.
However, the trial court erred in ruling that Relator's claims that the admission of knives in his case was improper, that he was intoxicated at the time of the offense and therefore the evidence did not support his conviction, and that his attorney was ineffective in various instances were repetitive. Although Relator raised claims of insufficiency of the evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, the current application asserts different grounds, therefore, these claims are not repetitive. See La. Code Crim.P. art. 930.4(D). Accordingly, these claims are remanded to the trial court for consideration and a ruling thereon. See State of Louisiana v. Jeff Andrew Haggins, KH 02-00034 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/11/2002) [doc. 5-3, Exhibit 13, p. 46]
The matter was thus remanded to the district court, and, on April 22, 2003, the court granted the State's Motion and dismissed petitioner's Application for Post-Conviction Relief. [doc. 5-3, Exhibit 12, p. 45] Petitioner, however, claimed that he was not notified that his petition was denied. On July 19, 2004 petitioner inquired about the status of his post-conviction proceeding; on July 27, 2004, petitioner was informed of the April, 2003 denial. [ id., pp. 3-4; doc. 5-3, Exhibit 14, p. 47]
Petitioner did not provide a copy of the State's Motion upon which the judgment was based.
On August 11, 2004 petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Third Circuit seeking an order directing the trial court to furnish a copy of the April, 2003 judgment. [doc. 5-3, Exhibit 15, pp. 48-49] The mandamus was assigned docket number 04 01088-KH by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. [ id., p. 50]
On August 15, 2004 petitioner filed a notice of intent to seek writs in order to review the denial of his Application for Post-Conviction Relief in April, 2003. [doc. 5-3, Exhibit 16, pp. 51-52] On August 31, 2004 his writ application was filed in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. [doc. 5-3, Exhibit 17, pp. 53-59] Petitioner argued that the district court erred when it denied relief on claims 3, 5, and 6. With respect to Claim 3 he argued that the trial court erred when it permitted the knives to be admitted into evidence [ id., p. 55]; with respect to Claim 5 he argued that there was insufficient evidence to establish specific intent based upon his intoxication at the time of the offense [ id.]; with respect to Claim 6 he argued that his attorney was ineffective when he failed to file a motion to quash based upon the grand jury selection process, when he failed to file a motion to quash the "short form" indictment, and, when he failed to move for the suppression of the knives or object to their admission into evidence. [ id., p. 56] The writ application was assigned Third Circuit Docket Number 04-01187-KH. [ id., p. 60]
On September 18, 2004, the district court provided petitioner a copy of the April, 2003 judgment. On October 4, 2004, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals denied petitioner's application for mandamus noting that the district court had complied with petitioner's request. [See State of Louisiana v. Jeff Andrew Haggins, No. KH 04-01088 (La.App. 3d Cir. 10/4/2004); doc. 5-3, Exhibit 18, p. 61.]
On October 26, 2004, the Third Circuit denied petitioner's writ application and noted:
Relator contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Relator must allege and prove both that his attorney's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding. La. Code Crim. P. art. 930.2; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Relator failed to meet his burden.
Relator also argues that the trial court committed reversible evidence [sic] in allowing several knives into evidence. However, Relator failed to make a contemporaneous objection at trial. La. Code Crim. P. art. 841.
Relator further asserts that there was not sufficient evidence to overcome his intoxication defense. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the jury did not abuse its discretion in finding Relator's intoxication defense to be without merit. See State v. Carroll, 95-859 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/96), 670 So.2d 286. State of Louisiana v. Jeff Andrew Haggins, KH 04-01187 (La.App. 3d Cir. 10/26/2004) [doc. 5-3, Exhibit 19, p. 62]
On October 27 the Third Circuit prepared an amended ruling correcting the clerical error noted above. [doc. 5-3, Exhibit 20, p. 63]
On November 17, 2004 petitioner mailed his application for writ of certiorari to the Louisiana Supreme Court; the application was received and filed on December 21, 2004. Petitioner presented three issues for review. [doc. 1-3, p. 8] In Claim 1, petitioner alleged that "the Circuit Court erred when it denied petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel . . ." More specifically, petitioner argued:
Petitioner has alleged that counsel's performance was deficient by failing to file a Motion to Quash the Indictment based on discrimination in the selection process of the Grand Jury Forepersons . . . Petitioner further argues that he has alleged and proved that counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge the Constitutionality of the Short Form Indictment . . . Petitioner argues he has alleged and has proven counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to file a motion to suppress the three knives, and failed to object to the presentation, introduction, and admission of these knives as evidence." [doc. 1-3, pp. 9-10]
With respect to Claim 2, petitioner argued that "the Circuit Court erred when it denied petitioner's Claim #3 (Erroneous Admission of Evidence) for reasons set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 841 (failing to make a contemporaneous objection at trial) . . ." Petitioner claimed that he should have been excused from the procedural default since the cause of the default was ineffective assistance of counsel. [doc. 1-3, p. 12]
Finally, with respect to Claim 3, petitioner claimed that "the Circuit Court, the trial court, and the Jury abused its discretion in finding petitioner's intoxication defense to be without merit . . ." [ See also, doc. 1-3, pp. 1-15]
On November 29, 2005, the Supreme Court denied writs. [doc. 1-3, p. 16; see also State ex rel. Jeff Andrew Haggins, 2004-3165 (La. 11/29/05), 916 So.2d 154.]
Petitioner signed the instant federal habeas corpus petition on February 27, 2006. The petition raises the following claims for relief:
1. Insufficiency of Evidence — petitioner claims that there was insufficient evidence of his specific intent to kill due to petitioner's intoxication at the time of the offense and other factors [doc. 1-4, pp. 7-13];
2. Erroneous Admission of Evidence — petitioner claims that the trial court erred when it introduced three knives as evidence. Petitioner acknowledges that this claim was procedurally defaulted in the state courts, but argues ineffective assistance of counsel as the cause of the default. [ id., pp. 14-17]
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel based on counsel's — (A) failure to file a motion to quash based upon discriminatory selection process of the grand jury foreman [ id., pp. 18-20]; (B) failure to challenge the constitutionality of Louisiana's "short form" indictment [ id., pp. 20-22]; and (C) failure to file a motion to suppress three knives which were admitted into evidence [ id., pp. 22-24].
Law and Analysis 1. Procedural Default — Petitioner's Evidentiary Claim
The procedural default doctrine bars federal habeas corpus review when a state court declines to address a petitioner's federal claims because the petitioner has failed to follow a state procedural rule. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2553-54, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). "[I]n all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Id. at 750-51. This doctrine ensures that federal courts give proper respect to state procedural rules. Id.
Furthermore, the doctrine presumes that a state court's express reliance on a procedural bar functions as an independent and adequate ground in support of the judgment. Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 416 (5th Cir. 1996). However, a petitioner can rebut this presumption by establishing that the procedural rule is not strictly or regularly followed. Moore v. Roberts, 83 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 1996). The burden in on the petitioner to show that a state did not strictly and regularly follow the procedural bar at the time pertinent to his state court action. Stokes v. Anderson, 123 F.3d 840, 843 (5th Cir. 1999); Amos v. Scott, 61 F.3d 333, 342, (5th Cir. 1995); Sones, 61 F.3d at 416. In bearing the burden, the petitioner must demonstrate that the state failed to apply the procedural bar to claims which are identical or similar to the claims raised by him. Stokes, 123 F.3d at 860; Amos, 61 F.3d at 340.
Petitioner's second claim for relief — that the trial court erred when it introduced three knives as evidence — is identical to the claim raised in petitioner's final writ application to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
As noted above, citing La.C.Cr.P. art. 841, the Third Circuit refused to address the merits of this claim because petitioner ". . . failed to make a contemporaneous objection at trial . . ." [doc. 5-3, Exhibit 19, p. 62, State of Louisiana v. Jeff Andrew Haggins, KH 04-01187 (La.App. 3d Cir. 10/26/2004).]
Art. 841 provides, "An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after the verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence." The Louisiana courts have consistently and uniformly applied Louisiana's "contemporaneous objection rule" to bar review of untimely evidentiary challenges. State v. Nellon, 04-1253 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/26/05), 902 So.2d 434; State v. Jones, 2003-0829 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/15/04), 891 So.2d 760, writ denied, 2005-0124 (La. 11/28/05) 916 So.2d 140; State v. Adams, 2004-0482 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/29/04), 897 So.2d 629, writ denied, 2005-0497 (La. 1/9/06), 918 So.2d 1029; State v. Smith, 04-340 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/26/04), 888 So.2d 280; State v. Pickett, 2003-1492 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/26/04), 878 So.2d 722; State v. Millien, 2002-1006 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/14/03), 845 So.2d 506; State v. Lyons, 01-719 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/14/01), 802 So.2d 801; State v. Johnson, 2000-1528 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/14/01), 780 So.2d 1140, writ denied 807 So.2d 854; State v. Freeman, 2000-238 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/11/00), 770 So.2d 482, writ denied, 2000-3101 (La. 10/5/01), 798 So.2d 963; State v. Williams, 1998-1947 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/23/00), 769 So.2d 629; State v. Hollins, 99-278 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/31/99), 742 So.2d 671, writ denied, 1999-2853 (La. 1/5/01), 778 So.2d 587; State v. Cooks, 1997-0999 (La. 9/9/98), 720 So.2d 637, rehearing denied, cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1342, 526 U.S. 1042, 143 L.Ed.2d 505, rehearing denied 119 S.Ct. 1789, 526 U.S. 1128, 143 L.Ed.2d 816.
The last court to address the petitioner's evidentiary claim declined to review the merits of the claim and chose instead to invoke the petitioner's procedural default. Further, it is apparent that the courts of Louisiana regularly invoke the procedural default codified in La.C.Cr.P. art. 841. Federal habeas corpus review of this claim is therefore prohibited by the procedural default doctrine.
In order to overcome this procedural bar, petitioner must "demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991).
Petitioner elsewhere argues that the "cause" for his procedural default was the ineffective assistance rendered by his trial attorney. Although an attorney's failure to make timely objections may constitute "cause" for a procedural default, the petitioner must show that counsel's failure amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Cotton v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 746, 754 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, Cotton v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 1186, 124 S.Ct. 1417, 158 L.Ed.2d 92 (2004).
Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that "'cause' under the cause and prejudice test must be something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. at 753, 111 S.Ct. 2546. "Attorney ignorance or inadvertence is not 'cause' because the attorney is the petitioner's agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must 'bear the risk of attorney error.'" Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753, 111 S.Ct. 2546 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986)). While ineffective assistance of counsel is sufficient cause for excusing a procedural default, "attorney error short of ineffective assistance of counsel" in the constitutional sense "does not constitute cause for a procedural default . . ." Murray, 477 U.S. at 492, 106 S.Ct. 2639; see Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000). "In other words, ineffective assistance adequate to establish cause for the procedural default of some other constitutional claim is itself an independent constitutional claim," which generally must first be raised in state court. Id. (citing Murray, 477 U.S. at 489, 106 S.Ct. 2639).
In order to show prejudice both in this context, and, in the context of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, petitioner must establish that the attorney's errors were so deficient as to render the verdict fundamentally unfair or unreliable. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842-43, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). (See also Carter v. Johnson 131 F.3d 452, 163 (5th Cir. 1997) (In order to show "actual prejudice" a habeas petitioner "must show that the prejudice rendered the trial fundamentally unfair or unreliable.")
A showing of prejudice requires the petitioner to prove not merely that the omission created a possibility of prejudice, but that it worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982); Russell v. Collins, 944 F.2d 202, 205 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1278, 112 S.Ct. 30, 115 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991).
Since petitioner also raised this claim as a separate instance of ineffective assistance of counsel, his cause and prejudice claim will be addressed in that context.
2. The Merits of the Remaining Claims
_____ A habeas petitioner whose claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court is not entitled to relief in federal court unless he meets the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The remaining claims raised in this habeas petition were also raised in petitioner's Application for Post-Conviction Relief in the Sixteenth Judicial District Court and thereafter in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Claim One (sufficiency of evidence) and Claim Three (ineffective assistance of counsel) were adjudicated on the merits by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals when it denied petitioner's writ application on October 26, 2004.
Therefore, with respect to Claims One and Three, petitioner is not entitled to relief unless he can demonstrate that the state court's adjudication of his claims "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."
The phrase "clearly established" refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the United States Supreme Court as of the time of the state-court decision being scrutinized. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Thus, "clearly established Federal law" refers to the governing legal principle or principles set forth by holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court's decision. See id., at 405, 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002).
A state court's decision is ". . . contrary to [the Supreme Court's] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases" or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent." Williams v. Taylor, supra, at 405-406, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see also Bell v. Cone, supra, at 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843.
Additionally, with regard to the phrase "unreasonable application," federal habeas courts may grant the writ only if the state court identified the correct governing legal principle but then unreasonably applied that principle to the facts of the case. Id., at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. In other words, before relief may be granted, the habeas court must first conclude that the state court's application of federal law was more than merely incorrect or erroneous. Id., at 410, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495. The state court's application of clearly established law must have been objectively unreasonable. Id., at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495. ("Under § 2254(d)(1)'s 'unreasonable application' clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S., at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Instead, the application must be objectively unreasonable. Id., at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Bell v. Cone, supra, at 699, 122 S.Ct. 1843; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 27, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) ( per curiam).)
Petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence claim was denied by the Third Circuit after that court's review of the evidence convinced the court that petitioner's intoxication defense was without merit. Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims were denied by the Third Circuit because petitioner failed to establish that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding. [See doc. 5-3, Exhibit 19, p. 62, State of Louisiana v. Jeff Andrew Haggins, KH 04-01187 (La.App. 3d Cir. 10/26/2004).]
It is clear that the court relied upon the appropriate jurisprudential rules in both instances. The test referred to and cited in the Third Circuit's writ denial on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel is the test for ineffective assistance of counsel articulated over twenty years ago by the United States Supreme Court in the matter of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This "two-pronged test" as set forth in Strickland is clearly established federal law. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002); Pippin v. Dretke, 434 F.3d 782 (5th Cir. 2005). Petitioner has not demonstrated that the state courts unreasonably applied Strickland when they determined that petitioner failed to establish either deficient performance by his court-appointed trial counsel or prejudice.
Further, regardless of the State courts' findings and conclusions, it is clear from an examination of the record that petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, including his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as it relates to the procedural default discussed above, are without any basis in either fact or law.
a. Failure to File a Motion to Quash — Grand Jury Claims
Petitioner claims his court-appointed attorney was ineffective because he failed to file a motion to quash the grand jury based upon the allegedly discriminatory process employed to select the foreperson of the grand jury which indicted him.
Even if deficient performance is presumed based on counsel's failure to file a pre-trial motion to quash, it is abundantly clear that petitioner cannot demonstrate "prejudice." After reviewing the record submitted by the petitioner, there can be no doubt but that, if petitioner had been successful in having his indictment quashed, the State of Louisiana would have sought and obtained a second indictment based on the overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt — a person matching petitioner's description was observed by witnesses in the company of the victim just moments before his death; the victim's blood, confirmed by DNA testing, was discovered on petitioner's clothing; witnesses testified that petitioner had obtained a knife from a companion and threatened to kill the victim just moments before the stabbing occurred. See doc. 5-2, pp. 8-23, State of Louisiana v. Jeff Andrew Haggins, 97-00365 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/97), 701 So.2d 267 (unpublished). In Pickney v. Cain, 337 F.3d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 2003), the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed a similar grand jury related claim. In that case, the habeas corpus petitioner's failure to file a pre-trial motion to quash the grand jury resulted in the procedural default of his federal claim of discrimination. The Fifth Circuit engaged in the following analysis and concluded that petitioner's inability to show prejudice was fatal to his claim.
A habeas petitioner 'may overcome the state procedural bar only by demonstrating (1) cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law or (2) that failure to consider his claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.' Smith v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A defendant may show 'cause' by proving ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). 'In addition to cause, [a defendant] must show actual prejudice to overcome the procedural bar.' United States v. Guerra, 94 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). 'The movant makes this showing where he demonstrates that, but for the error, he might not have been convicted.' Id.
We need not address whether Pickney has made a showing of 'cause' because we are confident that he has not been prejudiced. United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, 234 (5th Cir. 1991). After reviewing the trial record, we have no doubt that, if Pickney had been successful in having his indictment quashed, the State of Louisiana would have sought and obtained a second indictment. Witnesses who knew Pickney placed him at the scene of the crime on the morning in question. Detective Hidalgo testified that he recovered clothing from Pickney's home similar to those worn by Scott's attacker. Scott also identified Pickney's voice as being that of her assailant in a line up only hours after the attack. Even more importantly, the state produced DNA evidence that pointed to Pickney as Scott's attacker. Given the strength of the State's case, a successful grand jury challenge would have served no purpose other than to delay the trial. Accordingly, Pickney has failed to prove actual prejudice. Pickney v. Cain, 337 F.3d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 2003) (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, like Mr. Pickney is unable to establish prejudice in this context and therefore his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.
b. Failure to File Motion to Quash — Short Form Indictment
Petitioner also faults his trial counsel for failing to quash the "short form" indictment used to institute prosecution in this second degree murder case. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 465(A)(32). In this instance, petitioner is unable to show either deficient performance or prejudice. The constitutionality of short form indictments has been consistently upheld by the Louisiana Supreme Court. See State v. Baylis, 388 So.2d 713, 718-719 (La. 1980); State v. Liner, 373 So.2d 121, 122 (La. 1979). It has also passed muster with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Liner v. Phelps, 731 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1984). Therefore, counsel cannot be faulted for failing to file a motion which was doomed to fail.
Further, had the indictment been quashed, the State would surely have filed a amended indictment containing all of the elements requested by petitioner. Cf. Pickney v. Cain, supra.
c. Failure to Object to the Introduction of Evidence
Finally, as discussed above, petitioner faults trial counsel for failing to object to the introduction into evidence of three knives which may or may not have been associated with the offense. Again, as shown above, even if such failure amounted to deficient performance, petitioner cannot establish that he suffered any prejudice as a result of this alleged failure. Petitioner cannot honestly contend that "but for" the introduction of this evidence the results of the trial would have been different given the evidence of his guilt. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As was shown above, and as is shown hereinafter, there was ample evidence of petitioner's guilt. The introduction of the complained of evidence, if error, was manifestly harmless. Petitioner's inability to demonstrate prejudice is likewise fatal to this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.d. Summary of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Finally, with respect to petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, even if he were able to show error on the part of the Louisiana court which reviewed his ineffective assistance claims, he has not shown, nor can he show, that the courts' application of Strickland to the facts of his case was "objectively unreasonable." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S., at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495.
e. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Petitioner argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he had specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm on the victim. Petitioner correctly seeks to apply the clearly established Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) standard for determining the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence on federal habeas corpus review. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal specifically applied this standard in reviewing petitioner's sufficiency of evidence claim on direct appeal. See State of Louisiana v. Jeff Andrew Haggins, 97-00365 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/8/97), 701 So.2d 267 (unpublished); See also doc. 5-2, Exhibit 2, pp. 8-23, at p. 16, "The law governing the sufficiency of evidence is found in the United States Supreme Court decision of Jackson v. Virginia (citation omitted.)" The Third Circuit implicitly relied upon Jackson v. Virginia in denying the subsequent collateral attack based on sufficiency of the evidence. See State of Louisiana v. Jeff Andrew Haggins, KH 04-01187 (La.App. 3d Cir. 10/26/2004); doc. 5-3, Exhibit 19, p. 62.
The question now is whether the Third Circuit's application of the Jackson v. Virginia standard was objectively unreasonable. See Williams, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389.
The critical inquiry under Jackson is whether, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Further, "a federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume . . . that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution." Id. at 326. The analysis is applied with "explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law." Id. at 324 n. 16.
The elements of second degree murder as they relate to petitioner's conviction were: (1) the killing of a human being (2) when the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. LSA R.S. 14:301.(A)(1). Specific criminal intent is "that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act". State v. Williams, 714 So.2d 258, 263 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1998). Specific intent is a question of fact which may be inferred from the circumstances and actions of the defendant. Id. at 263.
The Louisiana jurisprudence permits specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm to be inferred from the circumstances of the attack and the actions of the defendant. State v. Carney, 319 So.2d 400, 402 (La. 1975) ("[T]he numerous stab wounds furnished adequate evidence of the requisite 'specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm . . .'"); State v. Mackens, 35,350 (La.App. 2d Cir. 12/28/01), 803 So.2d 454, writ denied, 02-0413 (La. 01/24/03), 836 So.2d 37, cited in State v. Miller, 36,003 (La.App. 2d Cir. 07/25/02), 824 So.2d 1208, writ denied, 02-2480 (La. 06/27/03), 847 So.2d 1253; State v. Douglas, 39,036 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/29/04), 888 So.2d 982, (The number and nature of stab wounds permits a finding of specific intent to kill by the trier of fact.)
Here, petitioner contends only that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he was possessed of the requisite specific intent. He does not claim that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he was not the perpetrator of the crime.
The Third Circuit noted the following facts to establish specific intent:
The instant matter stems from the stabbing death of Carl Chastant. The alleged incident occurred in the early morning hours of September 10, 1995 at the Cypress Garden Apartments in St. Martinville, Louisiana. Dr. Emil Laga, the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy on Chastant, testified at trial that he identified five stab wounds, one of which was a fatal wound to the right lower neck. State v. Haggins, supra, at pp. 1-2 (emphasis supplied) [doc. 5-2, Exhibit 2, pp. 8-9]
The court further noted,
As previously stated, Yolanda Greig testified that she witnessed someone 'tap' Chastant from the back and then jump in front of him. She further indicated that she saw Chastant's hands go and that, after he fell, the young man ran away.
Finally, Benjamin and Scott Bienvenu testified that Thomas Arabie, who described himself as the defendant's best friend, came to their home to sleep the evening of the stabbing. Benjamin Bienvenu testified to the following:
Q. Can you tell us what happened when [Thomas Arabie] first got to your house?
A. He came to my house, knocked at the door. I let him in. He told me that he had just walked from whatever the apartment complex was, he walked from there. He told us that Jeff had stabbed somebody.
Q. What did you ask him then?
A. I didn't ask him anything.
Q. What else did he tell you?
A. He told me that Jeff had asked him for the knife, and he had cleaned it off and just gave it to him.
Finally, Scott Bienvenu also testified that Thomas Arabie arrived at their home that evening. He testified to the following:
Q. What did he tell you had happened?
A. He told me — let me make sure. I want to make sure I remember this correctly. He said that what happened was Jeff and him had went to the apartment complex, and that they were over there and they were together, and Jeff had went off and [Thomas] was by himself, and Jeff had come back and said, 'Give me a knife. I'm going to go kill me an M.F.' And [Thomas] said, 'Why you want to go kill someone?' He goes, 'Cuz this guy called me the 'N' word.' So what happened was [Thomas] said — this is what he's telling us. He said, 'Oh man, you don't want to kill no one. You don't want to kill no one.' Jeff said, 'Yeah, I'm going to kill me an M.F. Give me a knife.' So [Thomas] went ahead and he wiped his prints off the knife, and he gave it to him, and he said — this is exactly what he said, as he was giving him the knife he said, 'Man, you don't want to do this. You don't want to do this,' and he gave him the knife, . . .
Given the Bienvenu brothers testimony indicating that the defendant intended to kill Chastant and Greig's testimony that Chastant was struck from behind, we conclude that the jury did not err in finding specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, State v. Haggins, supra, at pp. 13-14 [doc. 5-2, Exhibit 2, pp. 20-21]
The undersigned, having examined the entire record submitted by the petitioner in support of his claims, must likewise conclude that (a) petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence claim was also adjudicated on the merits in the Louisiana courts; (b) the adjudications did not result in decisions which were contrary to or involved unreasonable applications of clearly established Federal law; and (c) the adjudications did not result in decisions that were based on unreasonable determinations of the facts.
In short, petitioner has not shown that findings of the Louisiana court were the result of an objectively unreasonable application of the Jackson v. Virginia standard.
Conclusion
Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts provides for prompt review and examination of habeas petitions by the court and further states, "If it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for its summary dismissal and cause the petitioner to be notified." Citing Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970), the Advisory Committee Notes following Rule 4 state, ". . . under § 2243 it is the duty of the court to screen out frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that would be placed on the respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer." As shown above, dismissal of this habeas petition under Rule 4 is appropriate. Petitioner's claims are manifestly without merit in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. Accordingly,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that this petition for habeas corpus should be DENIED AND DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts since it plainly appears from the face of the petition and exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b), parties aggrieved by this recommendation have ten (10) business days from service of this report and recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party's objections within ten (10) days after being served with a copy of any objections or response to the District judge at the time of filing.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and Recommendation within ten (10) days following the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. See, Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996).