As a result, the ALJ's conclusory finding is not a specific and legitimate basis on which to discount Dr. Naranja's opinion. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2014) ("an ALJ errs when he rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight while doing nothing more than ignoring it . . . or criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis for his conclusion"); Haggerty v. Astrue, 474 F. App'x 619 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that an ALJ provided valid reasons for discounting a medical opinion where the ALJ was "specific when he compiled a long list of [the claimant's] activities, which included driving, cooking, and volunteering at a fire department") (emphasis added). The ALJ also discounted Dr. Naranja's assessments by stating that "Dr. Naranja's own progress notes typically have [Plaintiff's] GAF score at 60, which is indicative of mild-moderate mental impairments."