Opinion
August 8, 1952. Rehearing Denied September 23, 1952.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, for Dade County, George E. Holt, J.
Alexander T. Hussey, New York City, and Felix, Taylor Kniskern, Miami, and Irving Cypen, Miami Beach, for appellants.
Mitchell D. Price, Zaring Florence, Miami, for appellees.
This is the second appearance of this particular litigation before this court. In Hagerty v. Hagerty, Fla., 52 So.2d 432, it was held, inter alia, that the appellee, Imelda M. Hagerty, was required to reimburse the estate of her deceased husband for her proportionate part of the federal estate tax previously paid by such estate including that portion of the tax assessed against the gross estate which was attributable to the so-called "artificial" estate, that is, that part of the estate owned jointly by the decedent and his widow as tenants by the entirety which came to her upon his death by right of survivorship rather than under the terms of his will. (It should be noted that the liability of this particular estate to the federal estate tax was fixed under the law as it existed prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1948, Section 812 (e), Title 26, U.S.C.A., so that the executors of the estate could not and did not take a "marital deduction" on such property, as now authorized by the Revenue Act of 1948, supra.)
The lower court entered its Supplemental Decree to conform with the mandate of this court in Hagerty v. Hagerty, supra, and upon the stipulation of the parties that the appellee's portion of the federal estate tax was 52.035 percent. The appellee was ordered therein to pay to the Estate of John J. Hagerty, deceased, the sum of $121,154.33, "together with interest thereon from the date of this decree."
The sole question here is whether the lower court erred in refusing to award interest on such amount from the date of payment of the federal estate tax out of the funds of the decedent's estate.
In the bill of complaint filed herein, the appellants made no specific demand for interest; nor does it appear that the executors demanded of the appellee that she pay her proportionate part of the tax prior to its payment by them. The appellee, in good faith, defended the suit in the belief that, under the terms of her deceased husband's will, she was expressly exempt from payment of that portion of the tax attributable to the "artificial" estate. The Chancellor determined that the appellants were not equitably entitled to interest except from the date of the Supplemental Decree, and there is nothing in this record to show that he erred in such determination.
While it would appear that, in a proper case, interest is allowable on tax payments made by the executor of an estate on behalf of beneficiaries thereof, Cf.: Industrial Trust Co. v. Budlong, 77 R.I. 428, 76 A.2d 600, and United States Trust Co. of New York v. Sears, D.C., 29 F. Supp. 643, we do not think it has here been made to appear that the Chancellor erred in withholding such interest.
For the reasons stated, the decree appealed from should be and it is hereby
Affirmed.
SEBRING, C.J., and TERRELL and HOBSON, JJ., concur.