See D.C. Code § 17-305 (2001). We examine the totality of the circumstances to determine the validity of a waiver with respect to rights accorded a suspect under Fed.R.Crim.P. 40(a), 5 and 5.1. Hagans v. United States, 408 A.2d 965, 967 (D.C. 1979). Fed.R.Crim.P. 40(a) specifies, in pertinent part, that a person arrested outside the district in which an offense is alleged to have occurred:
Moreover, and in spite of Appellant's perjorative reference to the bowels of the police station, we can find no constitutional requirement than when Miranda rights are given and waived, waiver of extradition can only be made in front of a judge and not a police officer. In Hagans v. United States, 408 A.2d 965 (D.C.App. 1979), the court reviewed the validity of the arrest in Maryland of the appellant therein pursuant to a warrant issued by the D.C. Superior Court. The court stated:
Since § 570.34 covers a procedure incident to the extradition proceedings, it need not be adhered to because defendant had voluntarily waived extradition. See Hagans v. United States, 408 A.2d 965 (D.C.App. 1979). Assuming, arguendo, that § 570.34 did apply, we find that it was not violated.
Thus, these jurisdictions opinions are only minimally persuasive because they lack the analysis and argumentation found in the cases cited above. See Hagans v. UnitedStates, 408 A.2d 965, 967 (D.C. App. 1979) (interpreting the Maryland UCEA in dicta as requiring an appearance before a judge). But see In re Patterson, 411 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1966) (holding one must always appear before a judge in the asylum state); In reKlock, 133 Cal. App. 3d 726, 184 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1982) (same).
While we have not addressed the issue, other state and federal courts have recognized the validity of extradition which did not occur in the presence of a judge. Commonwealth v. Green, 581 A.2d 544, 555 (Pa. 1990); State v. Hughes, 494 A.2d 85, 89-90 (R.I.) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1009, 106 S.Ct. 536, 88 L.Ed. 2d 466 (1985); Hagans v. United States, 408 A.2d 965, 966-67 (D.C. 1979). TheGreen court explained that "logic, common sense, and a plain and simple reading of the statute permits knowing, intelligent and voluntary and non-coercive waivers of extradition without a formal appearance before a judge in the asylum state."