Thus, it asserts that Cessna's appeal from the Board's decision regarding Counts I, III, VI, and XIII should be dismissed because those counts involve claims relating to the government's funding of its contractual obligations, and no private right of action exists under the Antideficiency Act with respect to such matters. Quoting from Hagan v. United States, 671 F.2d 1302 (Ct.Cl. 1982), the Navy argues that the Antideficiency Act "sets forth its own discipline and penalties, and does not rely on private enforcement through Tucker Act litigation." Id. at 1305.
Because the Tucker Act deals with claims for money against the government, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is implicated and suit will not lie except where the United States has consented to be sued. Thus the Court of Claims has correctly noted that consent is in that sense "jurisdictional" and, when a complainant sued at a point beyond the six year period during which the United States had consented to be sued, the Court of Claims dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hagan v. United States, 671 F.2d 1302, 1304 (Ct.Cl. 1982) (referring to "[o]ur jurisdictional 6-year statute of limitations ( 28 U.S.C. § 2501 . . ."); O'Callahan v. United States, 451 F.2d 1390, 1394 (Ct.Cl. 1971) ("Our statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2501, is jurisdictional and we cannot restructure it to satisfy our own ideas of what is right and just"); Mulholland v. United States, 361 F.2d 237, 245 (Ct.Cl. 1966) ("It has long been held that the 6-year statute of limitations relative to the institution of actions against the United States in this court is jurisdictional in nature and limits the jurisdiction of the court"); Japanese War Notes Claimants Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. United States, 373 F.2d 356, 358 (Ct.Cl. 1967) ("This court lacks jurisdiction to hear a claim that is not filed `within six years after such claim accrues'"). Thus both meanings are applicable to a situation in which a Tucker Act complaint, over which a court clearly has subject matter jurisdiction must nonetheless be dismissed because the period
Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that at the very least an implied-in-fact contract existed between Mr. Boger and the agency for his work on the platform study record data. See Fincke v. United States, 675 F.2d 289 (Ct.Cl. 1982); Hagan v. United States, 671 F.2d 1302 (Ct.Cl. 1982). This relationship was sufficient to constitute him an agency insider for purposes of the ex parte contacts rule.