Opinion
June 23, 1970.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Page 689
Johnson & McLachlan, Lamar, for plaintiff in error.
Carl M. Shinn, Lamar, for defendant in error.
Before COYTE, DUFFORD and PIERCE, JJ.
COYTE, Judge.
This case was originally filed in the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado and subsequently transferred to the Court of Appeals under authority vested in the Supreme Court.
The plaintiff in error, Rachel Hagaman, was defendant below and will be referred to herein by name and the defendant in error, plaintiff below, will be referred to by name.
The above parties were married in 1946 and divorced on April 27, 1967. Two boys had been born as the issue of this marriage; one boy was in the service and the other boy, whose custody was rewarded to Berton, was 16 years of age.
A hearing was held on division of property on May 31, 1967, and it is from the order of the trial court decreeing a division of property that this appeal is prosecuted.
A one-half interest in an irrigated farm where the parties had been living all their married life had been inherited by Berton from his parents. His brother owned the other one-half of the farm. The one-half interest in the farm had a value of approximately $9,250.00 at the time of the hearing and in addition the parties owned stock in a grazing association, machinery, livestock, furniture and fixtures, a pickup, a 1955 Chevrolet automobile, and $200.00 in cash, which Rachel had earned from her employment after the divorce.
The court found that the total assets of the parties were $21,827.00, and the total obligations of the parties were $20,549.00. Most of this money was owed to Farmers Home Administration, and both parties were liable on the obligation. The parties had a total net worth of $1,278.00. The family had been operating the farm and sharecropping two other small places. Berton had average annual earnings of $1.400.00 per year. Rachel had an income from wages of $2,700.00 per year. For the past number of years Rachel had been working outside the home and applied her earnings to family expenses.
The court in its findings stated:
'* * * that the present situation is but one more example whereby a family may have a respectable livelihood while working as a unit but where there is simply nothing to be divided when the family members conclude that they should live separate lives; * * *.'
It then decreed Rachel to be the owner of the 1955 Chevrolet automobile; allowed her to retain the $200.00 cash; and ordered Berton to pay $175.00 attorney fees to her attorney. The court further decreed that Berton was the owner of the balance of the property subject to encumbrances and ordered that Berton would hold Rachel harmless from any obligations of the parties existing at the time of the divorce. There was no dispute as to the property owned by the parties, the value of the property or the obligations of the parties.
Rachel claims that the court order did not constitute a division of property and was unconscionable, inequitable, and contrary to the law. However, the trial judge has wide discretion in ordering a division of property in divorce proceedings. Moats v. Moats, Colo., 450 P.2d 64; Nunemacher v. Nunemacher, 132 Colo. 300, 287 P.2d 662, 663. The court did divide what small equities the parties owned and we do not find any clear abuse of discretion under the circumstances in this case.
There is no completely satisfying solution to this type of situation. Our position is well state in Britt v. Britt, 137 Colo. 524, 328 P.2d 947, wherein the court stated:
'While we might not have made the identical order which was entered by the trial court, we cannot say that the trial court acted arbitrarily or abused its discretion in promulgating the decree, nor can we under the record presented make an 'adjustment and re-evaluation' as suggested by counsel * * *'
Judgment affirmed.
DUFFORD and PIERCE, JJ., concur.