Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County Super. Ct. No. SCVSS135251. Kurt J. Lewin, Judge. Retired judge of the L.A. Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.
David H. Ricks & Associates and David H. Ricks for Defendant and Appellant.
Robert J. Spitz Law Office and Robert J. Spitz for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MILLER J.
Plaintiff and respondent Ezzat Hafez sued defendant and appellant Kamal Batech alleging that Batech breached a promissory note, oral contract, and written contract. The trial court found in Hafez’s favor, and awarded him $90,000. Batech appeals the trial court’s judgment. Batech essentially contends substantial evidence does not support the finding that he is personally liable for the $90,000 debt. We affirm the judgment.
Respondent’s first and last names were transposed at the trial court. Respondent’s correct name is Ezzat Hafez, not Hafez Ezzat.
In his opening brief, Batech separates his argument into two sections: (1) an error of law, and (2) substantial evidence. In the heading of the first section, Batech writes that the trial court made an error of law; however, under that heading, he argues that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, we conclude Batech is making a single argument concerning substantial evidence.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Hafez and Batech were the only witnesses at trial. Hafez and Batech essentially agreed to the following: When Hafez and Batech were at a friend’s house, Batech mentioned that his brother was withdrawing from Batech’s corporation. Batech told Hafez that he needed money to keep his business, J & K Tobacco Corporation (J&K), operational. Hafez gave Batech $90,000 in seven installments: one installment of $30,000, and six installments of $10,000.
Hafez’s and Batech’s testimonies diverge as to the purpose of the $90,000. Batech claimed the money was an investment in his corporation, while Hafez claimed the money was a personal loan. We present both parties’ versions of the transaction.
Hafez testified that, when he was at the friend’s house with Batech, Batech asked for a loan of $100,000. Hafez stated that he understood Batech would repay the loan within one year, at the market interest rate. After approximately one and a half years, Hafez asked Batech to repay the loan. Batech told Hafez that his business had failed and he could not repay the loan.
Batech testified that his agreement with Hafez was for Hafez to pay $200,000 for a 20 percent interest in J&K. Batech stated that he deposited Hafez’s money into J&K’s corporate bank account, and that all the money was used for business purposes. Batech testified that Hafez was paid $29,000 in profits, as a result of his 20 percent interest in J&K; however, Hafez was not issued stock certificates because he had only paid $90,000, and the agreement was for $200,000. J&K failed after the State Board of Equalization seized its cigarettes.
Hafez offered into evidence seven receipts written by Batech. The receipts were written in Arabic; however, in English, the receipts reflected the following: “I, Kamal Batech agree and admit that I received from Ezzat Hafez [dollar amount] on [date] and I sign below.” Batech signed all seven receipts. The receipts were written on J&K’s corporate letterhead.
The trial court found in favor of Hafez. The court concluded that the testimony of Hafez and Batech “was entirely self-serving[,] diametrically opposite and of equal credibility.” The trial court noted that Batech produced no corporate records or other evidence showing that Hafez was purchasing an interest in J&K. The court reasoned that if the transaction were “analyzed as an investment, [Batech’s] failure to deliver the shares of stock he claimed to have been purchased would constitute a failure of consideration entitling [Hafez] to restitution of the consideration he paid.”
DISCUSSION
Batech contends that substantial evidence does not support the finding that he was personally liable for the $90,000 debt. We disagree.
Under the substantial evidence standard of review, a reviewing court “must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the judgment. [Citations.] [¶] It is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes in the evidence; that is the province of the trier of fact. Our authority begins and ends with a determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, in support of the judgment.” (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 630-631.) “‘The testimony of a single witness, even a party, is adequate to support the trial court’s findings. [Citation.]’” (Getty v. Getty (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d1159, 1177.)
“A loan of money is a contract by which one delivers a sum of money to another, and the latter agrees to return at a future time a sum equivalent to that which he borrowed.” (Civ. Code, § 1912.)
Hafez testified that Batech asked Hafez to lend him $100,000. Hafez said the loan terms were for the money to be repaid within one year, at the market interest rate. Receipts reflect that Hafez delivered $90,000 to Batech. Hafez said that Batech never characterized the transaction as a stock purchase, and that the money was lent to Batech personally, not to J&K. Hafez explained that the receipts were written on J&K’s letterhead because that was the only paper in Batech’s office when Hafez delivered the money.
In sum, the evidence reflects that Hafez delivered $90,000 to Batech, and Batech personally promised to repay the money, with interest, within a year. Hafez’s testimony is substantial evidence that the $90,000 was a loan between two individuals. The testimony is contradicted, but this court does not resolve such conflicts. Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Batech is personally liable for the debt.
Batech argues the evidence shows that Batech was acting as an agent for J&K, which was a disclosed principle. Batech contends Hafez cannot recover from Batech personally, because Hafez did not produce any evidence that Batech conducted himself in a manner that would expose him to agent liability. (Civ. Code, § 2343.) Having concluded ante that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the loan was between two individuals, we find Batech’s argument concerning agent liability to be unpersuasive, because Batech was not acting as an agent for J&K.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs on appeal.
We concur: RAMIREZ P. J., KING J.