She was paralyzed from the chest down and had only partial use of her arms and hands. Similarly, in Hafer v. Hafer, 3 Neb. App. 129, 524 N.W.2d 65 (1994), the recipient spouse contracted multiple sclerosis during the marriage and, as a result, was completely unemployable. The Court of Appeals determined that the recipient spouse should receive an alimony award of $300 per month until the death of either party.
She was paralyzed from the chest down and had only partial use of her arms and hands. Similarly, in Hafer v. Hafer, 3 Neb. App. 129, 524 N.W.2d 65 (1994), the recipient spouse contracted multiple sclerosis during the marriage and, as a result, was completely unemployable. This court determined that the recipient spouse should receive an alimony award of $300 per month until the death of either party.
Because the circumstances presented do not fit neatly into the calculation structure, a flexible application of the guidelines is justified. See, Hajenga v. Hajenga, 257 Neb. 841, 601 N.W.2d 528 (1999) ; Knippelmier v. Knippelmier, 238 Neb. 428, 470 N.W.2d 798 (1991) ; Hafer v. Hafer, 3 Neb.App. 129, 524 N.W.2d 65 (1994). See Gress v. Gress, 271 Neb. 122, 710 N.W.2d 318 (2006).
The record reveals that some of the real estate held by Union Oaks was income producing, and the possible transfer of these income-producing assets may alter the equities involved in the award of alimony. See, Ritz v. Ritz, 229 Neb. 859, 429 N.W.2d 707 (1988); Grams v. Grams, 9 Neb. App. 994, 624 N.W.2d 42 (2001); Hafer v. Hafer, 3 Neb. App. 129, 524 N.W.2d 65 (1994). Similarly, an award of attorney fees depends on a variety of factors, including the amount of property and alimony awarded, the earning capacity of the parties, and the general equities of the situation.
In In re Cantrell's Estate, 154 Kan. 546, 119 P.2d 483 (1941), this court considered an antenuptial contract where the spouse claimed that she had not been fully informed as to her husband's assets and stated: "`The mere fact that he may not have disclosed his assets and liabilities in detail to her, will not, in the absence of anything showing fraud or deceit, invalidate the contract, nor will it raise a presumption of fraudulent concealment; . . .'" 154 Kan. at 552 (quoting Hafer v. Hafer, 33 Kan. 449, 462-63, 6 P. 537 [1885]). See also Adams, 240 Kan. at 320 (holding that there had been adequate disclosure where wife had been "advised generally of the nature and extent" of her husband's assets and knew he was a multimillionaire where wife knew husband more than 20 years before signing agreement); In re Estate of Broadie, 208 Kan. 621, 627, 493 P.2d 289 (1972) (holding that the husband did not need to give a detailed disclosure of his property where his wife had a "general knowledge of the nature and extent" of his property interests); In re Estate of West, 194 Kan. 736, 745-46, 402 P.2d 117 (1965) (upholding marital agreement where party knew that future husband was wealthy but did not know the extent of his wealth, nor did she know the particular property interests held by him); In re Estate of Ward, 178 Kan. 366, Syl. ¶ 1, 371, 285 P.2d 1081 (1955) (holding that husband did not need to "disclose in detail" the "nature, extent and value of his property" to his wife prior to her signing the antenup
Agreements detailing the rights of the parties in their property upon the death of either spouse were favored by the law and liberally enforced. Hafer v. Hafer, 33 Kan. 449. Conversely, contracts containing terms conducive to or promoting divorce were held to violate public policy. Neddo v. Neddo, 56 Kan. 507, 44 P. 1 (1896).
Perhaps, but if so, the result is not changed as demonstrated by the line of cases wherein the contract has become executed by the death of one of the parties, and provision for property settlement in event of divorce or legal separation has been held merely incidental to the main purpose of the agreement as in Dunsworth. It appears from our cases that the words "after separation by death or otherwise", as premising language for scriveners in antenuptial contracts, have become more or less standard terminology since their use in the landmark decision of Hafer v. Hafer, 33 Kan. 449, 6 P. 537, a death case. There the identical phrase appeared in the contract, which contract was upheld by this court.
No claim is made that Mr. Broadie intentionally misrepresented any particular security or attempted to conceal the same from his wife. Antenuptial agreements are recognized as valid in this state and two parties contemplating a marriage have a right to make a binding agreement of this nature if the agreement is just and adequate in its provisions and is free from deceit and fraud. ( Hafer v. Hafer, 33 Kan. 449, 6 P. 537; In re Estate of Neis, supra; In re Estate of Cantrell, 154 Kan. 546, 119 P.2d 483.) Generally the relation of the man to the woman he is about to marry is a confidential relation which arises from the glow of that tender, trusting closeness which comes from courtship ending in a mutual declaration of love resulting in marriage.
Generally speaking, antenuptial contracts are not against public policy. The leading case in Kansas is Hafer v. Hafer, 33 Kan. 449, 6 P. 537. The court there said:
Appellant recognizes the general rule in this state that persons competent to contract may execute an antenuptial agreement and determine for themselves what rights they will have in each other's property during their marriage and after its termination by death, and such a contract will be upheld where it is fairly and understandably made, is just and equitable and is not obtained by fraud or overreaching ( Dunsworth v. Dunsworth, 148 Kan. 347, 81 P.2d 9; In re Estate of Schippel, 169 Kan. 151, 218 P.2d 192). The consideration for an antenuptial contract may be any valuable consideration, reciprocal stipulations or the marriage alone ( Hafer v. Hafer, 33 Kan. 449, 6 P. 537; In re Estate of Ward, 178 Kan. 366, 285 P.2d 1081). In Gordon v. Munn, 87 Kan. 624, 125 P. 1, this court held: