Husband argues the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Howell v. Howell, ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 197 L.Ed.2d 781 (2017) preempts New Mexico case law and prohibits the district court from ordering Husband to reimburse Wife for waived Retirement Pay. Although we agree with Husband that our contrary decision in Hadrych v. Hadrych , 2007-NMCA-001, 140 N.M. 829, 149 P.3d 593, is no longer controlling precedent after Howell , we nonetheless conclude there to be sufficient reason under still-applicable New Mexico precedent to deny retroactive application of Howell . We therefore affirm on grounds different than those relied on by the district court.

Id. at 1010. In Hadrych v. Hadrych, 2007 NMCA 1, ¶ 13; 140 NM 829, 833; 149 P.3d 593 (N.M. App. 2006), the New Mexico Court of Appeals, indicating that it was adopting the majority view, held that the lower court had properly ordered the military spouse to compensate his former spouse for the reduction in retirement benefits that occurred when the military spouse converted them to disability benefits. The lower court's ruling had not identified the disability benefits as being the source for the ordered compensation, leaving it to the military spouse to determine how to pay the compensation and utilize whatever assets he chose to satisfy the obligation.

As in our cases, these courts proceeded from the principle that it is inequitable to allow a veteran to diminish voluntarily the military retirement benefits owed to a spouse as part of a valid and enforceable divorce judgment. E.g. , In re Marriage of Krempin , 70 Cal.App.4th 1008, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 134, 143 (1999) ; In re Marriage of Warkocz , 141 P.3d 926, 929–30 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006) ; Black v. Black , 842 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Me. 2004) ; Shelton v. Shelton , 119 Nev. 492, 78 P.3d 507, 509–10 (2003) ; Whitfield v. Whitfield , 373 N.J.Super. 573, 862 A.2d 1187, 1192 (App. Div. 2004) ; Hadrych v. Hadrych , 140 N.M. 829, 149 P.3d 593, 597 (App. 2006) ; Resare v. Resare , 908 A.2d 1006, 1009–10 (R.I. 2006). Some courts distinguished pre-divorce and post-divorce waivers on the ground that Mansell 's holding, i.e ., that state courts may not "treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has been waived to receive veterans' disability benefits," 490 U.S. at 594–95, 109 S.Ct. 2023 (emphasis added), extended only to waivers known at the time of the divorce.

ates as so holding: In re Marriage of Howell (2015) 238 Ariz. 407, 410–411, 361 P.3d 936, 939–940, pet. for cert. filed Feb. 16, 2016; In re Marriage of Lodeski (Colo.Ct.App. 2004) 107 P.3d 1097, 1101 ; Blann v. Blann (Fla. App. 2007) 971 So.2d 135, 137 ; Perez v. Perez (2005) 107 Haw. 85, 90–91, 110 P.3d 409, 414–415 ; McHugh v. McHugh (1993) 124 Idaho 543, 545, 861 P.2d 113, 115 ; In re Marriage of Neilsen (2003) 341 Ill.App.3d 863, 869, 275 Ill.Dec. 369, 792 N.E.2d 844, 849 ; Bandini v. Bandini (Ind. App. 2010) 935 N.E.2d 253, 264 ; Black v. Black (Me. 2004) 842 A.2d 1280, 1285 ; Dexter v. Dexter (1995) 105 Md.App. 678, 686, 661 A.2d 171, 174 ; Krapf v. Krapf (2003) 439 Mass. 97, 108, 786 N.E.2d 318, 326 ; Megee v. Carmine (2010) 290 Mich.App. 551, 574, 802 N.W.2d 669, 682 ; Shelton v. Shelton (2003) 119 Nev. 492, 496 , 78 P.3d 507, 509, cert. den. (2004) 541 U.S. 960, 124 S.Ct. 1716, 158 L.Ed.2d 401 ; Whitfield v. Whitfield (2004) 373 N.J.Super. 573, 582–583, 862 A.2d 1187, 1192 ; Hadrych v. Hadrych (2006) 140 N.M. 829, 832, 149 P.3d 593, 596 ; Hillard v. Hillard (2012) 223 N.C.App. 20, 24–25, 733 S.E.2d 176, 180–181 ; Hayes v. Hayes (Okla.Civ.App. 2007) 164 P.3d 1128, 1130–1132 ; Hayward v. Hayward (Pa.Super.Ct. 2005) 868 A.2d 554, 559–560 ; Resare v. Resare (R.I. 2006) 908 A.2d 1006, 1009–1010 ; Hisgen v. Hisgen (S.D. 1996) 554 N.W.2d 494, 498 ; Johnson v. Johnson (Tenn. 2001) 37 S.W.3d 892, 897–898. One of the few out-of-state cases that the parties cite is Merrill v. Merrill (2012) 230 Ariz. 369, 284 P.3d 880, which followed the majority rule.

E.g., In re Marriage of Krempin, 70 Cal.App.4th 1008, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 134, 143 (1999); In re Marriage of Warkocz, 141 P.3d 926, 929-30 (Colo.Ct.App. 2006); Black v. Black, 842 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Me. 2004); Shelton v. Shelton, 119 Nev. 492, 78 P.3d 507, 509-10 (2003); Whitfield v. Whitfield, 373 N.J.Super. 573, 862 A.2d 1187, 1192 (2004); Hadrych v. Hadrych, 140 N.M. 829, 149 P.3d 593, 597 (N.M.Ct. App. 2006); Resare v. Resare, 908 A.2d 1006, 1009-10 (R.I. 2006). The Supreme Court in Mansell recognized that domestic relations are preeminently matters of state law, and state authority in this area will not be displaced unless preemption is "positively required by direct enactment."

Hall, 1992-NMCA-097, ¶¶ 38, 42. {8} The district court's order and judgment in the current case did not change any award of the assets or redistribute the property in a manner contrary to the terms of the amended MSA. Cf. id. ¶ 42. Rather, the district court's order simply enforces the terms of the amended MSA and guarantees that the parties' reasonable expectations with regard to the property at 1908 Carolina Way be satisfied in a more timely fashion, by preventing Petitioner from unilaterally delaying those expectations any further. See Hadrych v. Hadrych, 2007-NMCA-001, ¶ 18, 140 N.M. 829, 149 P.3d 593 (rejecting the husband's argument that the district court was modifying, rather than enforcing, the final decree by prohibiting his unilateral attempt to convert the wife's retirement benefits to disability benefits, where the decree was silent on the matter, and holding that the district court's "order simply enforces the division set by the final decree, guarantees that the reasonable expectations of the parties concerning the allocation of the retirement benefits would be protected, and ensures that [the h]usband's unilateral attempt to reduce [the w]ife's benefits would go unrewarded"); cf. Palmer v. Palmer, 2006-NMCA-112, ¶ 18, 140 N.M. 383, 142 P.3d 971 (holding that remedial enforcement against the diminishment of a spouse's entitlement to property "is not a modification seeking an additional or different value"). If we were to hold otherwise, then we would permit a mechanical application of either the merger doctrine or contractual silence to prevent the enforcement of a valid

"[F]ederal preemption is a legal question, which is reviewed de novo." Hadrych v. Hadrych, 2007-NMCA-001, ¶ 5, 140 N.M. 829, 149 P.3d 593. {16} Specifically, Appellants argue that a recent federal decision by the Tenth Circuit determined that our state courts are applying the unconscionability doctrine based on an impermissible "perceived inferiority of arbitration to litigation as a means of vindicating one's rights."

Defendant also contends that the district court erred in failing to consider recent Tenth Circuit authority addressing unconscionable contract provisions and the FAA. {7} The denial of a motion to compel arbitration and the issue of unconscionability of a contract are reviewed by this Court de novo. Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 11, 146 N.M. 256, 208 P.3d 901. We also review the interpretation of statutes, including the FAA, as well as federal preemption, de novo. Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 25; Hadrych v. Hadrych, 2007-NMCA-001, ¶ 5, 140 N.M. 829, 149 P.3d 593. In light of our Supreme Court's recent precedent established in Dalton, we reverse and remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings.

Likewise, this Court has applied a de novo standard to questions of federal preemption. Weise v. Wash. Tru Solutions, L.L.C., 2008-NMCA-121, ¶ 9, 144 N.M. 867, 192 P.3d 1244; Hadrych v. Hadrych, 2007-NMCA-001, ¶ 5, 140 N.M. 829, 149 P.3d 593. B. Federal Preemption Generally

However, other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have held that such limiting provisions do not violate the USFSPA. See Scheidel v. Scheidel, 129 N.M. 223, 4 P.3d 670 (Ct.App. 2000); and Hadrych v. Hadrych, 140 N.M. 829, 833, 149 P.3d 593, 597 (Ct.App. 2006). "Many jurisdictions have recognized that the USFSPA does not limit the equitable authority of a state court to grant relief to the nonemployee spouse when military retirement pay previously divided in a dissolution action is converted to disability pay.