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Hadley v. Joel Moranz, Individually & Paley & Superior Moving & Storage Co.

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Aug 20, 2018
No. 840 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2018)

Opinion

J-A10035-18 J-A10046-18 No. 842 EDA 2017 No. 840 EDA 2017

08-20-2018

GEORGE M. HADLEY v. JOEL MORANZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ELAINE MORANZ, DECEASED AND JANA S. PALEY AND SUPERIOR MOVING & STORAGE COMPANY, INC. APPEAL OF: SUPERIOR MOVING & STORAGE COMPANY, INC. GEORGE M. HADLEY v. JOEL MORANZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ELAINE MORANZ, JANA S. PALEY AND SUPERIOR MOVING & STORAGE COMPANY, INC. APPEAL OF: JANA S. PALEY


NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Judgment Entered February 10, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): December Term, 2014 No. 001620 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., DUBOW, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J. MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:

In these consolidated appeals, Appellant Superior Moving & Storage Company, Inc. ("Superior"), and Appellant Jana S. Paley ("Paley"), appeal from the Judgment entered against them jointly and severally after a non-jury trial. Following careful review, we reverse the Judgment as against Superior and affirm the Judgment as against Paley.

We have consolidated these appeals sua sponte.

The trial court's April 28, 2017 Opinion contains a detailed recitation of the relevant facts and procedural history, and, because the parties are well aware of them, we need not restate them at length here. See Trial Ct. Op., 4/28/17 at 1-21. Briefly, George Hadley ("Appellee"), initiated this action seeking to recover for Superior's and Paley's respective roles in his loss of a rare Rodin sculpture. Appellee sought to hold three defendants responsible—Superior, Paley, and Joel Moranz. Appellee alleged that: (1) Moranz was responsible because it was from his home that the sculpture went missing; (2) Paley was responsible because she converted the statue from the Moranz home and failed to assist in its recovery; and (3) Superior was responsible because it lost the sculpture after Paley placed it in its storage facility. The three defendants filed cross-claims, each seeking to hold the others fully responsible for losing the sculpture.

Appellee raised claims of Breach of Contract for Bailment, Negligent Bailment, Negligence, and Breach of Fiduciary Duty against Moranz; Conversion/Trespass to Chattel, Negligence, and Breach of Constructive Trust against Paley; and Negligence and Breach of Contract/Third Party Beneficiary against Superior.

On August 3, 2015, Paley filed a Joinder Complaint joining Karina Walton as a defendant, alleging that she played a role in the sculpture's ending up at Christie's in New York City for auction. However, after Walton filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection, the court severed Paley's joinder claims against Walton and permitted the matter to proceed against Moranz, Superior, and Paley. Walton and Appellee were involved in a separate litigation in New York arising from the disposition of the sculpture, which resulted in a settlement and release between Walton and Appellee. Walton is not a party to this appeal.

A five-day bench trial commenced on September 28, 2016. On October 21, 2016, the trial court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("FFCL"), and entered a verdict for Appellee, and against Superior and Paley, jointly and severally, in the amount of $729,920 plus interest. The court also assessed $1,000,000 in punitive damages against Paley. The court assessed an additional $129,849 plus interest against Paley for legal fees and prejudgment interest.

The court also found that Moranz was not liable to Hadley and entered Judgment in Moranz's favor. Trial Ct. Op., 4/28/17, at 28.

In particular, the court found Paley liable to Appellee for Conversion. FFCL, 10/21/16, at 9. The court further found that when Paley converted the sculpture, she became a constructive trustee with Appellee as the beneficiary. Id. at 11. With respect to Superior, the court found Superior liable to Appellee because Appellee is a "constructive beneficiary of the bailment between Superior and Paley." Id.

Superior, Paley, and Appellee filed timely Post-Trial Motions. On January 10, 2017, the court heard argument on the Motions. On January 27, 2017, Superior filed a Motion asking for permission to supplement its Post-Trial Motion to incorporate what it claimed was newly discovered evidence. The court denied the Motion on February 1, 2017. On February 6, 2017, the court denied the Post-Trial Motions of all parties.

These appeals followed. Superior, Paley, and the trial court all complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Superior raises the following nine issues on appeal:

1. Did the trial court commit an error of law when it articulated a theory of liability that was not asserted by [Appellee] and which does not exist under Pennsylvania law?

2. Did the trial court commit an error of law when, after erroneously conferring de facto third party beneficiary status upon [Appellee], it refused to follow Pennsylvania law requiring that the third party beneficiary be subject to any limitations found in the contract?

3. Did the trial court commit an error of law when it failed to give force to the federal Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, which preempted [Appellee's] claims against Superior?

4. Did the trial court commit multiple errors of law regarding the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102 ("Fair Share Act" or the "Act"), when it found: (1) the Act did not apply because one co-defendant was found to have committed an intentional tort, (ii) it was not required to apportion liability between Superior and Paley, and (iii) it could deny Superior the Act's mandate of separate and several liability solely because Paley committed an intentional tort?

5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it failed to apportion liability to settling defendant Karina Walton ("Walton"), despite overwhelming evidence of her wrongdoing?
6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it found that [Moranz] was not liable to [Appellee] in either Moranz'[s] individual capacity or in his capacity as executor of the estate of Elaine Moranz?

7. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it failed to allocate a percentage of liability to [Appellee] for his contributory negligence?

8. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining that the fair market value of the Rodin was $1,459,080[] when that finding was incompetent because it was speculative and not based on facts?

9. Did the trial court commit an error of law when it refused to allow Superior to supplement its Post-Trial Motion to consider newly acquired evidence regarding the arrest of Walton on federal criminal charges related to her involvement in the theft of the Rodin, when the criminal complaint was filed after trial of this matter and Superior attempted to bring it to the court's attention as soon as it became aware of it?
Superior's Brief at 5-7.

Paley raises the following eleven issues on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court committed legal error, made unsupported findings, disregarded binding evidence[,] and capriciously disbelieved testimony by entering a verdict against Paley for conversion where [Appellee's] evidence established Paley moved the statue as requested for safekeeping, had consent to retain the statue, was not requested to return the statue, would have returned the statue if asked[,] and had no intent other than to return the statue when requested?

2. Whether the trial court committed legal error and abused its discretion by imposing $1,000,000[] of punitive damages against Paley where the conversion verdict was unsound, the statue's move was not outrageous or conduct directed to [Appellee], the award was not based on post-incident activity and bad thoughts[,] and no one died or suffered a catastrophic injury?

3. Whether the trial court committed legal error and made unsupported findings by entering a verdict against Paley for violation of constructive trust where Paley did not take title to
the statue, did not have, or take advantage of, a confidential relationship or swindle anyone out of the statue[,] and the findings were contrary to the claim [pleaded] by [Appellee] and the trial court's 1925 [O]pinion?

4. Whether the trial court committed legal error and made unsupported findings by entering a verdict against Paley for negligence where the trial court included no finding of liability for negligence or analysis supporting the negligence claim?

5. Whether the trial court committed legal error by entering a verdict against Paley where the evidence did not establish Paley was the legal cause of [Appellee's] damages and revealed extraordinary conduct by Superior who sold or failed to protect the statue, Walton who stole and then lied about her title to the statute[,] and [Appellee] who consented to the statue's sale that superseded Paley's conduct and caused the complained of result?

6. Whether the trial court committed legal error by not marking [Appellee's] claims satisfied and/or released where [Appellee] released and paid the statue's thief and received the auction proceeds from Christie's?

7. Whether the trial court committed legal error by entering a verdict against Paley where [Appellee] consented to sale even though he could have saved it from auction without undue burden, expense[,] or humiliation?

8. Whether the trial court committed legal error by assessing prejudgment interest where interest is not recoverable for the claims asserted by [Appellee], damages for diminution in value were awarded[,] and the assessment dates were erroneous or absent?

9. Whether the trial court committed legal error by not adjudicating the cross-claims and apportioning liability among the parties and Walton?

10. Whether the trial court committed legal error by not adjudicating Paley's indemnity claim and failing to enter judgment for Paley and against Superior for the full extent of Paley's liability to [Appellee] where a right to indemnity existed?

11. Whether the trial court's treatment of the evidence and record has deprived Paley of a full and fair appellate review where it is
impossible to discern what material the trial court relied on for its verdict and the totality of the circumstances suggests the trial court's credibility determinations were colored by material not in evidence?
Paley's Brief at 2-7.

Superior's Appeal

Superior first claims that it is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") because the trial court erred in finding that it owed Appellee a duty as a "constructive beneficiary of the bailment contract" between Superior and Paley. Superior's Brief at 25 (citing Trial Ct. Op., 4/28/17, at 24). We agree.

We start by discussing those cases in which a trial court should enter a JNOV. The court shall enter JNOV if it reviews the record and concludes that even with all factual inferences decided adverse to the movant, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Southwestern Pennsylvania Regional Council , Inc. v. Gentile , 776 A.2d 276, 281 (Pa. Super. 2001). A court will also enter JNOV if it reviews the evidentiary record and concludes that the evidence was such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. Id.

On appeal, when reviewing a trial court's denial of a Motion for JNOV, we must consider whether there was sufficient competent evidence to sustain the verdict, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Buckley v. Exodus Transit & Storage Corp., 744 A.2d 298, 304-05 (Pa. Super. 1999).

"Questions of credibility and conflicts in the evidence are for the trial court to resolve and the reviewing court should not reweigh the evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court's determination will not be disturbed." Holt v. Navarro , 932 A.2d 915, 919 (Pa. Super. 2007). Our scope of review over questions of law, however, is plenary. Buckley , 744 A.2d at 305.

In this case, Superior argues that it is entitled to JNOV because the trial court erred in finding that Superior owed Appellee a duty because Appellee was a "constructive beneficiary of the bailment contract between Superior and Paley." Superior's Brief at 25 (citing Trial Ct. Op., 4/28/17, at 24). Superior avers that this theory does not exist under Pennsylvania law, Appellee did not plead it, and that the trial court erroneously misapplied and conflated the third-party beneficiary and constructive trust doctrines to confer de facto third-party beneficiary status on Appellee. Id. at 25-26, 28.

Superior further argues that even considering the theories of constructive trust and third-party beneficiary separately, those theories do not impose on Superior a duty to Appellee. Id. at 23, 26, 28-29.

We next turn to the trial court's analysis. The trial court found that Superior owed a duty to Appellee because Appellee was a "constructive beneficiary of the bailment contract between Superior and Paley." Trial Ct. Op. at 24. The trial court reasoned that, "Superior's duty [to Appellee] . . . arose from the bailment relationship." Id. at 22. The trial court then identified two bailment relationships. First, the trial court found that when Appellee lent the sculpture to Moranz, the parties created a bailment relationship. The trial court also identified a bailment relationship between Paley and Superior, created when Paley hired Superior to move her personal items and she "delivered" the sculpture to Superior for storage. The trial court connected these two separate and distinct bailment relationships to find that Appellee was the "constructive beneficiary of the bailment contract between [Superior] and Jana Paley." Trial Ct. Op. at 24.

As an initial matter, there is no legal support for a theory of a "constructive beneficiary of the bailment contract." There is, likewise, no legal basis to connect two separate and distinct bailment relationships.

Additionally, the trial court appears to be conflating two legal theories: constructive trusts and third party beneficiaries. Those theories, however, even considered individually, do not impose on Superior a duty to Appellee.

A constructive trust is a legal fiction that arises "when a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it." DeMarchis v. D'Amico , 637 A.2d 1029, 1036 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In this case, the trial court found, and we affirm, that Paley had committed the tort of Conversion when she took the sculpture from the Moranz home. FFCL at 9. See also Trial Ct. Op. at 23. However, since Paley converted the sculpture, she could not hold title to it. L.B. Foster Co. v. Charles Caracciolo Steel & Metal Yard , Inc., 777 A.2d 1090, 1095 (Pa. Super. 2001). Since Paley did not, and could not, hold title to the sculpture as its converter, the trial court had no legal basis to impose a constructive trust in Appellee's favor.

Paley challenges this conclusion in her first issue on appeal. We address the merits of Paley's claim infra.

Additionally, Superior never held legal title to the sculpture and, thus, there is no legal basis to impose a constructive trust on Superior for the sculpture in favor of Appellee.

Since there is no legal basis to impose a constructive trust on either Paley or Superior in favor of Appellee, Appellee could not be a "constructive beneficiary of the bailment contract" as the trial court concluded.

The theory of third-party beneficiary similarly does not impose upon Superior a duty to Appellee. Courts will confer third-party beneficiary status upon a person who is not a party to a contract if the contract between the parties contained an express intention to benefit that third party. Kirschner v. K&L Gates LLP , 46 A.3d 737, 762 (Pa. Super. 2012). Additionally, if the evidence establishes that both parties to the contract intended a third party to benefit from the contract at the time they formed it, she may be entitled to assert third-party beneficiary status despite the parties not having specifically named her in the contract. Burks v. Federal Ins. Co., 883 A.2d 1086, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2005).

It is undisputed that neither the language of the service contract between Superior and Paley nor the evidence of the parties' intent demonstrates that Superior and Paley intended that Appellee was a third-party beneficiary to their moving contract. In fact, there is no evidence that Superior had any knowledge that Paley was not the rightful owner of the sculpture. Thus, the theory of a third-party beneficiary, to the extent that the trial court relied upon it, does not impose a duty on Superior to Appellee.

Finally, we disagree with the trial court's application of the theory of common law conversion to Superior's role in this case. The trial court relies upon the principle that "the receiver of converted property is also a converter." Trial Ct. Op. at 24. This principle applies to a purchaser, not a receiver, of converted property. Underhill Coal Min. Co. v. Hixon , 652 A.2d 343, 345-46 (Pa. Super. 1994) (explaining that "a good faith purchaser of the goods from a converter is also a converter and must answer in damages to the true owner" and reiterating that "a bona fide purchaser from a thief gets nothing"). Since Superior did not purchase the sculpture from the Appellant, but rather was a bailee of the sculpture, the principle of common law conversion does not apply to Superior.

Therefore, we find as a matter of law that the trial court erred in finding that Superior owed a duty to Appellee and consequently, in entering Judgment against Superior and in favor of Appellee. Accordingly, we reverse the Judgment in Appellee's favor against Superior.

We note the trial court's outrage with the manner in which Superior handled the sculpture and Paley's other personal items and the trial court's determination that Superior performed those services negligently. It is more appropriate, however, for the trial court to address that issue when deciding Paley's cross-claim against Superior.

In light of this disposition, we need not reach Superior's remaining issues on appeal.

Paley's Appeal

Issue 1

In her first issue, Paley claims that the trial court erred in denying her Motion for JNOV because Paley is not liable to Appellee for Conversion of the sculpture.

To reiterate, the trial court shall enter JNOV if, after reviewing the record, it concludes that even with all factual inferences decided adverse to the movant, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or if it concludes that the evidence was such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. Gentile , 776 A.2d at 281.

Paley argues that she is not liable for Conversion because: (1) she moved the sculpture to fulfill Elaine Moranz's request; (2) Joel Moranz did not demand that she return the sculpture, and, in fact, agreed that Paley could keep it until Appellee resurfaced; (3) she would have returned the sculpture if Moranz had asked; and (4) she had no intent other than to return the sculpture to Appellee. Paley's Brief at 64-75.

We have thoroughly reviewed the certified record, the parties' Briefs, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned trial court Opinion, and conclude the trial court did not err as a matter of law in concluding that Paley converted Appellee's sculpture. The trial court ably disposes of this issue and we affirm on the basis of that Opinion. See Trial Ct. Op. at 25-26 (concluding that: (1) Paley did not receive permission to remove the sculpture from the Moranz home; (2) the trial court did not believe Paley's self-serving testimony that Elaine Moranz told Paley before Moranz's death to take possession of the sculpture and return it to Appellee; (3) the evidence indicated that Paley intended to keep the sculpture for herself; and (4) the existence of a demand to return the sculpture is not an element of Conversion and, in any case, there was no evidence to support Paley's claim that she would have returned it if asked).

Issue 2

In her second issue, Paley claims the trial court abused its discretion by imposing punitive damages of $1,000,000 against her.

The imposition of punitive damages is appropriate where the conduct at issue is "outrageous" and is "done with a bad motive or with a reckless indifferen[ce] to the interests of others." Sears , Roebuck & Co. v. 69th Street Retail Mall , L.P., 126 A.3d 959, 983 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). The purpose of punitive damages is to punish a tortfeasor and to deter future tortious conduct. J.J. DeLuca Co., Inc. v. Toll Naval Associates , 56 A.3d 402, 416 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).

This Court will only reverse an award of punitive damages if it is so excessive that it shocks the Court's sense of justice. Shared Communications Services of 1800-80 JFK Blvd. Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Properties Inc., 692 A.2d 570, 576 (Pa. Super. 1997). "The determination of whether a person's actions arise to outrageous conduct lies within the sound discretion" of the trial court, and this Court will not reverse a punitive damages award absent an abuse of that discretion. J.J. DeLuca , 56 A.3d at 416 (citation omitted).

In awarding punitive damages, the court should focus on "the act itself together with all the circumstances including the motive of the wrongdoer and the relations between the parties[.]" Chambers v. Montgomery , 192 A.2d 355, 358 (Pa. 1963). "[A] request for punitive damages does not constitute a cause of action in and of itself. Rather [it] is merely incidental to a cause of action." Grimm v. Grimm , 149 A.3d 77, 90 (Pa. Super. 2016).

Bootstrapping onto her first issue, Paley initially avers that the assessment of punitive damages was improper because the verdict based on conversion was invalid. Paley's Brief at 76. In light of our disposition of Paley's first issue, we do not agree.

In the alternative, Paley presents three other arguments in support of her claim of error. First, she argues that her conduct in moving the sculpture was not outrageous, and, thus, does not support the award of punitive damages. Id. Next, Paley avers that the award of punitive damages was improper because the court based them on Paley's conduct after the sculpture had been stolen from Superior. Id. at 79. Stated another way, Paley claims that the court erred because "the outrageous conduct used to impose punitive damages must be the same conduct as formed the basis for liability[,]" i.e., the conversion. Id. Last, Paley argues that the award is improperly excessive and shocks the conscience because "no one died or suffered catastrophic personal or emotional injury." Id. at 80.

We have thoroughly reviewed the certified record, the parties' Briefs, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned trial court Opinion, and conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Appellee punitive damages. The trial court ably disposes of this issue and we affirm on the basis of that Opinion. See Trial Ct. Op. at 32-33 (highlighting the evidence in the record that supported the award of punitive damages and explaining that the award was not excessive in light of Paley's reckless indifference to Appellee's rights and her lack of contrition, as well as the relative amount of compensatory damages awarded and Paley's personal wealth).

Issue 3

In her third issue, Paley claims the trial court erred in denying her Motion for JNOV because Appellee failed to establish that she breached a constructive trust. In support, she emphasizes that she did not obtain title to the sculpture, the court did not find that she and Appellee had a confidential relationship, and she did not derive an economic benefit from the sculpture. Paley's Brief at 81-84. We agree.

As explained supra , a constructive trust only arises when a person who holds legal title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another. DeMarchis v. D'Amico , 637 A.2d at 1036. Here, as a converter of Appellee's property, Paley did not hold title to it. L.B. Foster , 777 A.2d at 1095. Because Paley did not hold title to Appellee's property, the court erred in finding that Paley's possession of the sculpture created a constructive trust of which Appellee was the beneficiary. Accordingly, the court erred in entering a verdict in favor of Appellee on his Breach of Constructive Trust claim.

However, because the trial court entered verdict against Paley on other claims, this does not change the verdict or Judgment.

Issue 4

In her fourth issue, Paley claims that the trial court erred in failing to make a finding on Appellee's alternative claim of Negligence. Paley's Brief at 87. Paley avers that the trial court's failure to address this claim results in a de facto finding that she was not liable to Appellee in Negligence. Id. She suggests, therefore, that the trial court's findings and verdict should be "modified" to note that the court found in her favor as to Appellee's Negligence claim. Id. Paley has not developed this argument with citation to any case law to support this assertion and it is, thus, waived for appellate review.

It is well-settled that failure to argue and to cite any authority supporting an argument constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal. Jones v. Jones , 878 A.2d 86, 90 (Pa. Super. 2005); see Pa.R.A.P. 2101. This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. Bombar v. West American Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 78, 93 (Pa. Super. 2007). Paley's failure to develop this issue with citation to authority has substantially hindered our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review of this issue. Accordingly, this issue is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101. See also Bombar , supra at 95; Jones , supra at 90.

Issue 5

In her fifth issue, Paley challenges the denial of her Motion JNOV on the grounds that Appellee produced insufficient evidence that her conduct proximately caused his damages. Paley's Brief at 88. Paley argues that the conduct of Superior, Walton, and Appellee were "supervening" causes of Appellee's damages. Id.

Specifically, Paley avers that she could not have reasonably foreseen that contracting with Superior to move the sculpture would result in its theft or that Walton would place it for auction. Id. at 92. She also asserts that her conduct was not the legal cause of the diminution in the sculpture's market value, her conduct did not cause Appellee to incur expenses defending himself against the suit brought by Walton, and nothing she did caused Christie's delayed payment to Appellee after it auctioned the sculpture. Id. at 93-95.

We have thoroughly reviewed the certified record, the parties' Briefs, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned trial court Opinion, and conclude the trial court did not err denying Paley's Motion JNOV and in finding that Appellee presented sufficient competent evidence to support the trial court's finding that Paley's conduct proximately caused Appellee's damages. The trial court ably disposes of this issue and we affirm on the basis of that Opinion. See FF at ¶¶ 19-22, 30-38, 47, 50, 57-58.; Trial Ct. Op. at 25-26-(discussing the credible evidence presented by Appellee that showed that Paley's actions in converting the sculpture proximately led to it being stolen).

Issue 6

In her next issue, Paley avers that the trial court erred in rejecting her claim that the "doctrine of satisfaction and release" applied to the instant case and operated to satisfy or release Appellee's claims against her. Paley's Brief at 96, 98, 101. Paley asserts that Appellee's "claims against Paley were released by operation of law when [Appellee] released Walton[,]" because "the release of the primarily liable party extinguishes any claims against the secondarily liable party." Id. at 97, quoting Shaw v . Thomas Jefferson University , 80 A.3d 540, 545 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (citation omitted). We disagree.

Shaw is distinguishable from the instant action. In Shaw , a pedestrian filed an action against Thomas Jefferson University and the City of Philadelphia, alleging that she was injured as a result of a fall on a university sidewalk. The City filed a cross-claim against the university for contribution and indemnity. There, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the City—the secondarily liable party—after the university-the primarily liable party—had received judgment in its favor.

Paley's Brief also sets forth three variations on this theory of relief, which we also find meritless. See Paley's Brief at 98, 100.

Paley's argument that Walton was the primary tortfeasor is specious at best, and is belied by the evidence and the court's findings. In an effort to foist responsibility for Appellee's loss entirely onto Walton, Paley completely omits from her Brief any mention of the fact that the trial court found that she was responsible for the initial conversion of Appellee's property. It was Paley's tortious conduct in converting the sculpture in the first instance that triggered her liability, and not, as she argues, Walton's subsequent conduct.

Moreover, and contrary to Paley's claim, the Pennsylvania Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act ("UCATA") provides, in relevant part, that "[a] release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so provides[.]" 42 Pa.C.S. § 8326 (emphasis added). See also Baker v. AC&S , 729 A.2d 1140, 1147 (Pa. Super. 1999) (same). Paley does not allege that the release between Appellee and Walton contained any provisions releasing Paley from liability. Absent evidence that Appellee explicitly released his claims against Paley when he released Walton from liability, Paley's argument fails.

To the extent that Paley argues that the UCATA does not apply because this is "not an action for injury to . . . property," we disagree. See , e.g., 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(h) (defining injury to property as "[l]oss of real or personal property . . . or decrease in its value[.]"

Paley's last argument is based on a misstatement of fact, i.e., that Appellee had been fully satisfied by the release of the escrowed funds from Christie's as part of the settlement with Walton. Actually, the trial court found that, on the date of its removal from the Moranz home, the sculpture had a fair market value of $1,459,080, but that the escrowed funds released from Christie's to Appellee totaled only $729,160.08. The court further found that Appellee had incurred $129,851.40 in expenses to obtain the escrowed funds and to mitigate his losses. Thus, the credited evidence demonstrated that, contrary to Paley's contention, Appellee's settlement with Walton releasing the escrowed funds did not fully satisfy his claims. Accordingly, Paley is not entitled to relief on any of the alternative grounds she advances here.

Issue 7

In this issue, Paley asserts that the trial court erred in entering the verdict against her because Appellee had a duty to mitigate his damages but failed to do so. Paley's Brief at 102. Further, Paley claims that, in order to mitigate his damages: (1) Appellee had an obligation to pursue Christie's return of his sculpture to him; (2) "[b]y consenting to the sale, [Appellee] waived his claim for the return of the statue or to recover an amount higher than the auction price[;]" (3) Appellee could have prevented the sculpture's auction price from being deficient had he enjoined the sale of the sculpture or disputed its title; and (4) the trial court erred in finding that Appellee's settlement with Walton served to mitigate his damages because he was at risk of being sued by Walton because "[t]here was no legitimate basis for a claim against [Appellee] by Walton." Id. at 102-03.

Paley proposes no fewer than five ways that she believes Appellee could have mitigated his damages, and cites cases standing for the general propositions that a plaintiff has a duty to mitigate damages and cannot recover for damages that he could have prevented. Id. at 102-05. However, Paley has utterly failed to develop her argument with citation to relevant case law that would explain how the trial court's findings and ultimate conclusion were erroneous. Because Paley has failed to develop this issue, she waived it. See id. See also Bombar , supra at 95; Jones , supra at 90.

Issue 8

In her eighth issue, Paley claims the trial court erred in awarding Appellee prejudgment interest because "prejudgment interest is not recoverable in tort actions." Paley's Brief at 105. Thus, she concludes there is "no legal basis for recovery of prejudgment interest." Id. at 106. Paley also argues that the award of prejudgment interest was erroneous because the trial court did not make a finding that Appellee had demanded the return of the sculpture, and that the date from which the court assessed prejudgment interest was "demonstrably erroneous." Id. at 106-07. Paley asserts a similar argument with respect to the assessment of interest on the attorney's fees and costs paid by Appellee. Id.

The premise underlying this issue is Paley's assertion that "prejudgment interest is not recoverable in tort actions." Paley does not, however, support this proposition of law with citation to any authority. Similarly, with respect to her argument concerning the trial court's erroneous "assessment dates," Paley has again failed to cite any authority supporting her claim that the trial court used incorrect dates when calculating the prejudgment interest owed to Appellee. This issue is, therefore, waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101. See also Bombar , supra at 95; Jones , supra at 90.

Moreover, we note that, while generally prejudgment interest is not recoverable in tort cases where the damages sought are unliquidated, in tort actions a plaintiff may recover prejudgment interest in the form of delay damages. See Robert Wooler Co. v. Fidelity Bank , 479 A.2d 1027, 1034 (Pa. Super. 1984) (explaining that, "[t]o the extent that prejudgment interest is recoverable in tort cases, it is more accurately identified as compensation for delay). See also Pa.R.C.P. No. 238 ("Damages for Delay in Actions for [] Property Damages.").

Issue 9

In her ninth issue, Paley alleges that the trial court committed legal error by not adjudicating the cross-claims and apportioning liability among her Superior, and Walton. Paley's Brief at 107.

Given our disposition of Superior's appeal in which we found that the trial court erred as a matter of law in entering a Judgment against Superior and in favor of Hadley, we find this issue moot as to Superior. Paley does not set forth any argument in her Brief as to why the court erred in not apportioning liability to Walton. We find, therefore, that Paley has abandoned this claim as to Walton.

Issue 10

In her penultimate issue, Paley claims that the court erred in not ruling on her cross-claim against Superior for indemnification. Id. at 108-10. She avers that she is entitled to indemnity from Superior because Superior breached its contract with her by failing to secure the sculpture. Id.

In light of our finding that the trial court erred in entering Judgment against Superior and in favor of Hadley, we agree. We, therefore, remand this case for the trial court to hold a hearing, if necessary, and make findings of fact regarding Paley's cross-claim for contribution and indemnity from Superior.

Issue 11

In her last issue, Paley concludes that she "cannot receive a fair review on appeal" because the trial court grossly mishandled the record. Id. at 110-11. She avers that Appellee's "counsel did not properly move [Appellee's] exhibits into evidence" and the court "admitted as evidence exhibits never referenced during trial." Id. at 115-16. Paley argues that it "is impossible to figure out what the trial court actually reviewed and relied on as the source of its verdict and opinion." Id. at 118. She concludes that she "cannot obtain a fair appellate review on the basis that the trial court's many credibility determinations were an abuse of discretion absent an accurate accounting of what the trial court considered." Id. Paley asserts, therefore, that she is entitled to either Judgment entered in her favor, or a new trial. Id.

The trial court filed a supplemental Opinion addressing this claim of error. Following our thorough review of the record, the trial court's supplemental Opinion, and the parties' Briefs, we conclude that this issue lacks merit. The trial court ably disposes of this issue with citation to the record and we affirm on the basis of that Opinion. See Trial Ct. Op, 10/3/17, at 1-10 (explaining that: (1) Paley did not object to the admission into evidence of Appellee's exhibits at the conclusion of trial; (2) Paley did not raise any objection to the court's reliance on disputed exhibits in her Post-Trial Motion; (3) Paley did not raise any claim of error regarding the exhibits received by the court in her 1925(b) Statement; and (4) once the court discovered that the parties' exhibit binders were missing, it endeavored to assemble the record and assure its completeness and accuracy for appellate review).

Judgment as against Superior reversed. Judgment as against Paley affirmed. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum, including disposition of Paley's cross-claim against Superior. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 8/20/18

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Summaries of

Hadley v. Joel Moranz, Individually & Paley & Superior Moving & Storage Co.

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Aug 20, 2018
No. 840 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2018)
Case details for

Hadley v. Joel Moranz, Individually & Paley & Superior Moving & Storage Co.

Case Details

Full title:GEORGE M. HADLEY v. JOEL MORANZ, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE…

Court:SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date published: Aug 20, 2018

Citations

No. 840 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2018)