Opinion
Civ. No. AW-98-1108.
October 27, 1999.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or a New Trial, and Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expert Witness Fees. A hearing was held on these motions on October 18, 1999. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.). Upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, the arguments of counsel at the hearing, and the entire record, for the reasons stated below, the Court will deny Defendant's motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or a New Trial; grant in part Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees; and deny Plaintiff's Motion for Expert Witness Fees.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to Title VII and the Montgomery County Code alleging that Defendant, Progressive Beauty System, Inc. ("Progressive"), discriminated against her due to her pregnancy, child birth, or related medical conditions. Plaintiff brought six counts in her Complaint outlining discrimination in the denial of medical benefits, demotion, and unlawful termination. She sought punitive and compensatory damages, back pay, front pay, and reasonable attorneys' fees. On August 13, 1999, the case was submitted to the jury, and a verdict was returned. The jury determined that the Defendant demoted Haddock in violation of Title VII and/or the Montgomery County Code and awarded her compensatory damages in the amount of $10,000.00 and $200,000.00 in punitive damages, finding that Progressive had acted with "malice or reckless indifference" in demoting Ms. Haddock. The jury found that Defendant did not unlawfully deny medical benefits and that Defendant did not terminate Plaintiff's employment unlawfully in violation of Title VII and/or the Montgomery County Code. Thus, the jury awarded damages for two of Plaintiff's six counts. Thereafter, the Court reduced the damages amount, as required by the Title VII cap on damages, and entered judgment for Ms. Haddock in the amount of $59,900.00. Defendant now moves for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively, a new trial. Plaintiff now moves for attorneys' fees and expert witness fees.
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant's Motion For Judgment as a Matter of Law, and Motion for a New Trial
Judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 50(a) may be entered only if, "viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to" the non-moving party, "there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Shetterly v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 117 F.3d 776, 781-82 (4th Cir. 1997). The Court does not "weigh the [credibility of the] evidence, or appraise the credibility of the witnesses." Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 1992); Ford v. Rigidply Rafters, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 647, 649 (D. Md. 1998). Instead the Court asks whether "a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). See also, Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545 (1990); Shetterly, 117 F.3d at 781; United States v. Vanhorn, 20 F.3d 104, 109 (4th Cir. 1994).
If an alternative motion for a new trial is made, the Court has the discretion to order a new trial rather than grant judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b)(1); Ford, 999 F. Supp. at 649. The Court must determine whether the verdict reached by the jury was consistent with the weight of the evidence. See Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 1984). If a Court concludes that it cannot render a reasonable reading of a verdict consistent with the evidence, a new trial should be ordered. See Atlas Food Sys. Serv., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 598-99 (4th Cir. 1996); Meadows v. State University. of New York at Oswego,, 160 F.R.D. 8 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). Unlike the case with motions for judgment as a matter of law, courts may consider the credibility of the evidence, and the court has wide discretion in making its determination. See Ford, 999 F. Supp. at 649 (citing Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 895 F.2d 159, 162 (4th Cir. 1990). "The proper remedy for an inconsistent verdict is to grant a new trial; however, the Court must determine whether the jury's verdict can be sustained or reconciled on any reasonable theory." Id.
Defendant claims that the jury's verdict was inconsistent in that it conflicts with Plaintiff's stated theory of the case and the evidence presented. It notes that the Plaintiff sought to show that the Defendant had a plan or scheme to deny the Plaintiff medical benefits, demote her, and ultimately terminate her, but that the jury returned a verdict for the Plaintiff on the demotion claim, rendering it inconsistent with Plaintiff's theory. With respect to the award of punitive damages, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish the requisite "malice or reckless indifference" to federally protected rights required for such damages. Moreover, Defendant also contends that the evidence did not show conduct so extreme and outrageous as to amount to intentional infliction of emotional distress under Maryland law warranting compensatory damages.
These arguments are without merit. Defendant has not shown that the jury's verdict is inconsistent with the plaintiff's theory or evidence. See Hines v. IBG Int'l, Inc., 813 F.2d 1331, 1334 (4th Cir. 1987) (variance between two verdicts on separate causes of action is not grounds for a new trial). The fact that the jury was persuaded that the demotion was discriminatory is not at odds with the Plaintiff's theory or the evidence. The Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to issue the verdict that it did. This Court believes that it was clear from the testimony that Ms. Haddock lost her management position, and inferences concerning the scheme or plan to demote her because of her pregnancy were reasonable. With respect to the Defendant's arguments that Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages, the Court finds that punitive damages are proper under Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 2126 (1999). In Kolstad, the Supreme Court resolved a conflict among the courts of appeals as to the proper standard for punitive damages. The Court rejected the argument that punitive damages are available only upon a showing of egregious conduct of intentional discrimination. Id. at 2124. Instead, the evidence need only show that an "employer . . . act[ed] with `malice or with reckless indifference to [the plaintiff's] federally protected rights.'" Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)). Applying Kolstad to the facts in the case at bar, the vindictive and discriminatory remarks made by persons at Progressive are sufficient to lead a reasonable jury to find that Progressive was aware that it violated Ms. Haddock's rights. Furthermore, Plaintiff presented evidence of Progressive's reckless indifference to those rights. Finally, on the issue of emotional distress damages, Plaintiff must only show that mental anguish occurred, and that it was proximately caused by the conduct of the Defendant. See Hanna v. Emergency Medicine Assocs., 551 A.2d 492, 499 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1989) and Montgomery County Code, § 27-19(a), 27-18(g), and 27-20. Such a showing was made by Ms. Haddock in this case. Accordingly, for these and all other reasons stated on the record during the motions hearing, the Court will deny both Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Defendant's Motion for a New Trial.
II. Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expert Witness Fees
Plaintiff, as the prevailing party, requests attorneys' fees and expert witness fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, § 42, and Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 54(d). These provisions allow costs and fees to be awarded to the prevailing party absent special circumstances. Plaintiff requests $150,433.08 in attorneys' fees and $1,578.55 in expert witness fees against Defendant Progressive. The Court is vested with discretion in awarding reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to a prevailing Plaintiff in an employment discrimination matter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
To calculate an award of attorneys' fees, a district court should "determine a lodestar figure by multiplying the number of reasonable hours expended times a reasonable rate." Brodziak v. Runyon, 145 F.3d 194, 196 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1077 (4th Cir. 1986)). The award of attorneys' fees is within the Court's discretion. In making the determination of the reasonableness of attorneys' fees, the Court should consider the factors set out in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) and reaffirmed in EEOC v. Service News Co., 898 F.2d 958, 965 (4th Cir. 1990). Factors to be considered include:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases.Id. The most important factor, however, is the relatedness between the amount requested and the degree of success attained by the prevailing party. See Hensley v. Echerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983) (the degree of success obtained is the "most critical factor"); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992); McDonnell v. Miller Oil Co., 134 F.3d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 1998).
A total of six attorneys and two paralegals worked on some aspect of this case for the Plaintiff. "[The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. The award requested by the Plaintiff includes a rate of $225 per hour for the partner, Mr. Bartos, $175 per hour for associates, $95 per hour for one paralegal, and $85 per hour for the other. The rate ranges set by Maryland District Court Local Rules guidelines is $190-$225 for attorneys admitted to the bar for more than eight years, $135-$170 for attorneys admitted for less than eight years, and $65 for paralegals. Plaintiff's request exceeds the guidelines set forth in the Local Rules. Weighing the years of experience for the attorneys, the Court considers the rate of $225 for Mr. Bartos to be reasonable and the $140 rate to be appropriate for each of the associates' time. The guidelines rate of $65 for paralegals is also reasonable.
Plaintiff's lead counsel, Mr. Bartos is a partner at the law firm of Guerrieri, Edmond Clayman, P.C. and has been admitted to the bar for 9 years. Associates who assisted Mr. Bartos have been admitted for 3-6 years.
The next variable in the lodestar calculation is the reasonableness of the hours expended. The Court believes that some of the hours expended were excessive and redundant. There appears to be an overlapping of tasks among some of the attorneys that is unnecessary for this case. Attorneys should exercise billing judgment and avoid the unnecessary duplication of effort. Id. at 434. From the billing records, it is clear that Plaintiff's case was heavily staffed, and in some instances, several attorneys were unnecessarily present for conferences or worked on one discreet task, leading to excessive and redundant fees. In addition, several billing entries are not sufficiently detailed to identify the specific tasks for which fees were charged. "Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly." Id. at 433. The Court finds that based on the time records that have been submitted, the 308 hours reported for Mr. Bartos are reasonable, and fees for those hours will be awarded at the requested rate of $225 an hour. The court, however, will exclude hours not reasonably expended by the associates, leaving a fee for 100 hours of associate work at the rate of $140. Finally, with respect to fees for paralegal services, the Court will award the full number of hours documented, 59 hours, at the guidelines rate of $65. This amounts to a lodestar amount of $87, 135. However, in consideration of the Johnson factors the Court will further reduce the fee award.
Applying the factors relevant to this case, Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees documents the hours and time spent on the case. The Court may consider the complexity of the issues raised in this case in assessing the reasonableness of attorneys' fees. The questions presented in this Title VII/Montgomery County Code case for pregnancy discrimination were not particularly novel or difficult to litigate. No specialized skills were required to successfully litigate the case. It is undisputed that Plaintiff's counselors have a good reputation, experience and ability, and they did an excellent job on the Plaintiff's behalf in this case. In addition to these factors, the Court recalls the concern expressed by it and the Magistrate Judge handling the discovery phase in this matter that Defendants were less than cooperative during the discovery phase, employing delay tactics with regard to discovery orders. Such conduct extended the time and preparation expended by the Plaintiff's attorneys, and the Court will factor these observations into the adjustment of attorneys' fees.
The Supreme Court has held that the fee "should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff has failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. However, here, the fact that the Plaintiff prevailed in only two of six counts gives the Court some reason for a reduction from the full requested amount. See Ford, 999 F. Supp. at 651 (reducing the requested attorneys' fees from the requested amount of $56,343.00 to $20,000.00 where the Plaintiff prevailed on only two of the eight original claims). Although the Supreme Court has rejected an approach sole relying on a pure mathematical comparison regarding the number of claims brought and number prevailed upon, this Court is vested with the discretion to determine the relationship between successful and unsuccessful claim and award fees accordingly. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37. When a party's successful claims are related to the unsuccessful claims, attorneys' fees may be awarded for the unsuccessful claims. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 (if "plaintiff's claims for relief . . . involve a common core of facts or [are] based on related legal theories . . . it is difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim by claim basis"). Id. However, even if the claims are interrelated and the Plaintiff achieves only limited or partial success, a full award of attorneys' fees may be excessive. Id. While all of the Plaintiff's claims stem from the same set of facts, this case is composed of distinct claims for demotion, denial of medical benefits, and termination. Furthermore, Plaintiff achieved only partial success by prevailing on two of her six claims. Therefore, the Court will make a downward adjustment to the requested attorneys' fees amount. The lodestar amount calculated by the Court is disproportionate considering the Johnson factors, particularly Plaintiff's limited degree of success. Accordingly, considering all the information available to the Court, including documents submitted by the parties, and the court's own knowledge of attorneys' fees charged in this jurisdiction, the Court finds that $60,000.00 is an appropriate attorneys' fee award in this case.
Plaintiff also requests expert witness fees in the amount of $1578.55. Plaintiff bases her request for expert witness fees on the "interrelated claims" theory, and argues that while the expert, Dr. Roth, testified on the issue of lost wages in connection with the termination claim, that claim is linked to the successful demotion claim, and fees should be awarded. The Court, however, finds that the testimony of this expert concerned the termination issue exclusively and that it was unrelated to the jury verdict. In fact, the expert's testimony, though heard by the jury, should have been given only to the judge outside the presence of the jury, and perhaps after a jury verdict was rendered. In sum, the evidence presented through this expert had little probative value. Therefore, all costs associated with this expert will be denied.
Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of laws or for a new trial will be denied, Plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees will be granted in part, and the Court will award a total of $60,000.00 in attorneys' fees to Plaintiff. No expert witness fees will be awarded. Plaintiff's pending Bill of Costs [37-1], will be handled by the Court's Pro Se Unit following the issuance of this Opinion and Order. A separate Order consistent with this Opinion will follow.