Opinion
Civil Action No. 3: 03-CV-2311-B.
March 25, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion of the Defendant, Mentor Texas, L.P., incorrectly sued as Mentor, H/S, Inc. ("Mentor") for Summary Judgment, filed July 23, 2004. The Plaintiff, Linda Haddock, filed her Response on August 27, 2004, two weeks past the due date. Mentor filed a motion to strike Haddock's untimely response, and the Court denied Mentor's motion to strike on September 30, 2004. After the close of discovery on November 1, 2004, Mentor filed a "Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support Thereof," which the Court construes as a Supplement to its original summary judgment motion still pending before the Court. To date, Haddock has not responded to Mentor's motion to supplement. Having reviewed the pleadings and evidence on file, the Court GRANTS the Defendants' motion for summary judgment for the reasons that follow.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The facts are derived from the parties' pleadings and on the evidence contained in the summary judgment record. Unless characterized as a contention by one of the parties, these facts are undisputed.
Haddock filed this products liability lawsuit against Mentor on August 29, 2003 in the 134th Judicial Court in the District of Dallas County. (Plaintiff's Orig. Pet.). Mentor removed the action to this Court on October 3, 2003 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Briefing was completed on Mentor's motion for summary judgment in August, before the November 1, 2004 discovery cut-off in the Scheduling Order, and Mentor moved to supplement to its summary judgment motion on November 22, 2004, with no response from Haddock.
B. Factual Background.
Haddock underwent plastic surgery to remove the breast implants she had received in 1983 and replace them with the saline implants at issue on August 19, 1998. (MSJ at 2; Haddock Dep. at 9). Specifically, Haddock underwent bilateral implant surgery using "Style 1600 Smooth Surface saline breast implants manufactured by Mentor." (Supp. MSJ at 2; Plaintiff's Interrog. Answer No. 18; Wyatt Aff. ¶ 3). Almost five years later, on July 17, 2002, Haddock underwent another surgery to remove the implants, and the surgeon performing the procedure, Dr. Patrick L. Hodges, discovered that the right implant had "deflated." (Hodges Dep. at 30). Dr. Hodges performed both the 1998 and 2002 surgeries, and has testified that he has no opinion regarding the cause of the right implant deflation. (Haddock Dep. at 25-26, 34).
In her Original Petition, Haddock alleges that Mentor "was negligent of the manufacture and the design of the implants. [Haddock] also alleges that [Mentor] failed to properly warn [Mentor] of the implants," and that "[a]s a result [Haddock] has had deflation of her breast, more surgery, and pain that could have been prevented by the manufacturer." (Plaintiff's Orig. Pet. at 2). Because of the alleged acts of Mentor, Haddock asserts that she was forced to "endure surgery, deformity, and scars," and that she "incurred medical expense, and pain and suffering," and she seeks to recover actual damages of $100,000.00. (Plaintiff's Orig. Pet. at 2).
The Court entered a Scheduling Order on November 6, 2003. The parties acknowledge that the discovery period has ended, yet the only discovery that has taken place is the exchange of initial disclosures, the deposition of Haddock and Dr. Hodges by Mentor, and responses to Mentor's interrogatories supplied by Haddock. Mentor now moves for summary judgment in its favor on Haddock's claims against it.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards.
1. Summary Judgment Standard.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and record evidence show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). Only disputes about material facts will preclude the granting of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The burden rests on the movant to prove that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Latimer v. Smithkline French Lab., 919 F.2d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 1990). If the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the summary judgment movant need not support its motion with evidence negating the non-movant's case. Rather, the movant may satisfy its burden by pointing to the absence of evidence to support the non-movant's case. Id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
Once the movant meets its burden, the non-movant must show that summary judgement is not appropriate. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). "This burden is not satisfied with `some metaphysical doubt as to material facts,' . . . by `conclusory allegations,' . . . by `unsubstantiated assertions,' or by only a `scintilla' of evidence." Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). The non-moving party must "come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (emphasis in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). To determine whether a genuine issue exists for trial, the court must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, and the evidence must be sufficient such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 302 (5th Cir. 2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
2. Mentor's Product Liability Claim.
Mentor has moved for summary judgment on Haddock's claims against it, asserting that there is insufficient evidence to support Haddock's product liability claims. ( See generally, MSJ). Specifically, Mentor asserts that Haddock's claims fail because she has not introduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that (1) there was a defect in the implant when it left Mentor's control, and (2) that Mentor "failed to warn of foreseeable risks of harm presented by the product." Additionally, Mentor asserts that Haddock's claims fail as a matter of law because she has neither introduced direct evidence of a defect or, if she intends to rely on circumstantial evidence, shown that "(1) the character of the injury is such that it would not have occurred in the absence of negligence, and that (2) the product [was] under the sole control of the defendant." (MSJ at 6).
It is unclear from Haddock's pleadings whether her claims arise under strict products liability, negligence, or both. Regarding products liability claims, the Texas legislature has adopted section 402A of the Restatement of Torts. Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 85 S.W.3d 323, 329 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002), providing for strict liability. "The essential elements of a strict liability case are (1) a product defect; (2) that existed at the time the product left [the] manufacturer's hands; (3) the defect made the product unreasonably dangerous; and (4) the defect was a producing cause of [the] plaintiff's injuries." Id. (citing Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 801 (Tex. 1975). In order to prove a products liability claim based upon a theory of negligence, a Haddock must demonstrate that Mentor owed Haddock a duty which it breached — thereby injuring Haddock, and that Mentor's breach proximately caused Haddock's injury. McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., Inc., 245 F.3d 403, 430 (5th Cir. (Tex.) 2001) (citations omitted). Haddock has not pleaded any allegations that Mentor owed a duty to Haddock or that Mentor breached any duty, nor does she allege any facts which would support such a claim. See generally (Plaintiff's Orig. Pet.).
Under the law of this Circuit, a party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claim. Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). In Haddock's scant three page response to Mentor's motion for summary judgment, she fails to designate any specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial, and merely points the Court to a list of citations to her appendix in support of her Response. Nor does she cite any authority supporting her position. The law is clear that it is not the Court's duty to sift through the record in search for evidentiary support for a party's opposition to summary judgment.3 Id. As discussed above, Mentor has moved for summary judgment asserting that Haddock does not have evidence sufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding certain essential elements of her claims, including causation of the rupture, demonstration of Mentor's control over the allegedly defective implant ( Parsons, 85 S.W.3d at 329) and Mentor's failure to warn. Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978); Chandler v. Gene Messer Ford, Inc., 81 S.W.3d 493, 500-504. Because Haddock has failed to point to evidence supporting a genuine issue of material fact as to any of these elements of Mentor's claims, and because "[t]he Court has no duty to search the record for triable issues," the Court GRANTS Mentor's motion for summary judgment and finds that the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Spinks v. Trugreen Landcare, LLC, 322 F. Supp.2d 784, 794 (S.D. Tex. 2004); Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458 (same).
3. Federal Preemption of Haddock's Claims.
In its supplemental motion for summary judgment, Mentor raises the issue of federal preemption. See generally, (Supp. MSJ). According to Mentor, the saline breast implant in question is a "Class III medical device which received premarket approval (PMA) from the FDA," and Haddock has not disclosed either an expert or other evidence demonstrating that "Mentor's manufacturing, design and/or labeling processes were not in accordance with the [PMA] standards set by the FDA." ( Id. at 4; Wyatt Aff., Supp. MSJ. Exh. B). In Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2001), the Fifth Circuit examined the viability of strict product liability and negligence claims regarding another Class III medical device that had received PMA approval from the FDA. The Court found that the claims were preempted by the Medical Device Amendments ("MDA") to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a), which prohibits states from changing the requirements applicable to the devices under that chapter which "relat[e] to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter." Martin, 254 F.3d at 585, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). Specifically, the Court stated as follows:
We therefore reaffirm that a medical device manufacturer's compliance with the FDA's PMA process will preempt state tort law claims brought with respect to that approved device and relating to safety, effectiveness or other MDA requirements when the substantive requirements imposed by those claims potentially conflict with PMA approval. Thus, the plaintiffs' tort law claims relating to design, manufacturing process, and failure to warn are preempted by the MDA.Martin, 254 F.3d at 585. Mentor argues that the instant case is indistinguishable from Martin, and the Court agrees. The implant at issue is a Class III Medical device given PMA approval by the FDA, and the claims asserted by Haddock, relating to the design and manufacture of the product and an alleged failure to warn by Mentor are similarly preempted by the MDA. See Martin, 254 F.3d at 585. Moreover, Haddock neither alleges that the implant does not comply with the PMA process nor proffers evidence in support of such an allegation. Martin, 254 F.3d at 585 (noting that claims of failure to comply with the PMA process are not preempted by federal law). Therefore, for the reasons discussed, the Court grants Mentor's motion for summary judgment as a matter of law on the additional ground that Haddock's claims are preempted by the MDA. Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 306k(a).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this order, it is ORDERED that the Mentor's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. Judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant.SO ORDERED.