Haddad v. Pulaski

6 Citing cases

  1. Sperounes v. Farese

    449 Mass. 800 (Mass. 2007)   Cited 20 times
    In Sperounes, 449 Mass. at 801, 873 N.E.2d 239, we considered whether a judge has discretion to permit an action to proceed where the judge concludes that there is no reasonable likelihood the action will not exceed the statutory limit.

    Under this system, both the Superior and District Court Departments had jurisdiction over matters involving any amount of damages and the District Court was able to award more than $25,000 in damages, just as the Superior Court could award less. See Haddad v. Pulaski, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 964 (1994); Perlin, supra, § 2.3, at 39-40 n. 7. The remand-removal system was created because civil juries were historically unavailable in the District Court and the Massachusetts Constitution provides for the right to a jury trial in certain types of civil cases.

  2. Beaulieu v. Bell

    41 Mass. App. Ct. 145 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 6 times

    Section 104 governs removal of cases from the District Court to the Superior Court. See, e.g., Haddad v. Pulaski, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 964 (1994). Although the Boston Municipal Court is administratively separate from the District Court, it operates functionally as a District Court so far as the remand and removal system is concerned.

  3. Noonan v. Thermo Consulting Engineers

    660 N.E.2d 699 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 2 times

    A defendant should not be in a worse position than a plaintiff who may have waived his right to a Superior Court retrial when he filed his complaint, before he knew of his own exposure under a counterclaim. See Haddad v. Pulaski, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 964 (1994). The revived right was again waived when the plaintiff failed to remove the case to the Superior Court by filing a claim therefor within twenty-five days after service of the counterclaim.

  4. Riggieri v. Cove, No

    No. 01-259-B (Mass. Cmmw. May. 2, 2001)

    Finally, the plaintiff argues that the defendant revived the plaintiff's right to jury trial in Superior Court when he filed a counterclaim. See G.L.c. 231, § 103; Haddad v. Pulaski, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 964, 965 (1994). While the counterclaim of $700 was clearly less than the $25,000 required by the first paragraph of G.L.c. 231, § 104, which governs this removal procedure, the plaintiff relies on the provisions of the second paragraph of § 104. That states, in pertinent part, that "[a] party who would have been entitled to remove the case for trial in the [S]uperior [C]ourt as hereinabove provided but for the fact that the amount of the . . . counterclaim . . . does not exceed [$25,000] shall if he desires . . . file an entry fee of [$50] and bond [in the penal sum of $100] within thirty days after notice of the decision or finding."

  5. Chapian v. Car Wash Systems, Inc.

    1996 Mass. App. Div. 98 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 1 times

    both defendants were instead entitled to await the conclusion of the District Court trial and to file their request for a jury trial within thirty days after entry of the District Court judgment. G.L.c. 231, § 104.Byrnes v. ITM, Inc., 396 Mass. 303, 304 (1985); Haddad v. Pulaski, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 964 (1994). In violation of G.L.c. 231, § 13B, the plaintiffs included in their complaint specific claims for monetary damages.

  6. Grant v. Dibitetto

    1996 Mass. App. Div. 56 (Mass. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

    Thayer v. Clerk of Dist. Court ofBarnstable, 421 Mass. 1001, 1001-1002 (1995); Hart v. Frost, 1993 Mass. App. Div. 185. The defendant's counterclaim, however, effectively "revived" the plaintiff's right to such jury trial. Haddad v. Pulaski, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 964 (1994). Section 103 of G.L.c. 231 provides, in relevant part: