While it appears that the Second Circuit has not explicitly addressed the issue, other courts have ruled that Heck "is not an evidentiary doctrine" and therefore "cannot bar evidence in a § 1983 action." Hackworth v. Rangel, 482 F. App'x 299 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Simpson v. Thomas, 528 F.3d 685, 696 (9th Cir. 2008)); Melton v. Murphy, No. 05-cv-366, 2008 WL 2697333, at *2, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52627, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 9, 2008). Given that the focus of Heck and related Supreme Court cases is on "whether a claim itself is viable, not whether evidence is admissible," Simpson, 528 F.3d at 695, the Court is inclined to agree.
. 1:06-cv-0773 RC, 2013 WL 3815882, at *4-5, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102266, at *11-16 (E.D. Cal July 22, 2013) (holding that disciplinary conviction for attempted battery did not preclude claim that defendant responded with excessive force even though plaintiff denied the attempted battery); Shelton v. Chorley, No. 1:07-cv-0560-MHM, 2011 WL 1253655, at *4, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35053, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2011) (holding that attempted battery and excessive force were not mutually exclusive because it was "possible that Plaintiff attempted to batter Defendant and that Defendant used excessive force in subduing Plaintiff" (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)); Puckett v. Agboli, No. 2:14-cv-2776 JAM DMC P, 2019 WL 426146, at *5, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17667, at *15-16 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2019) (finding that defendants used excessive force "would not necessarily mean plaintiff did not also commit a willful battery on defendants . . . because the two are not mutually exclusive"); Hackworth v. Rangel, 482 F. App'x 299 (9th Cir. 2012) (vacating district court's grant of summary judgment because success on excessive force claim would not necessarily invalidate disciplinary conviction). The court notes that although defendant cites a number of cases in support of this position, ECF No. 33-1 at 6, several of the cases he cites are distinguishable from this case because an element of the plaintiffs' underlying offenses in those cases was that the defendants had been engaged in the lawful performance of their duties and therefore did not use excessive force, seeBeets v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2012); Ortega v. Mattocks, No. 13-cv-6016 JSC, 2014 WL 7275372, at *3, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176396, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2014); Muhammad v. Garrett, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1291 (E.D. Cal. 2014). The remaining cases defendant relies on, which found excessive force claims barred by disciplinary convictions for resisting a peace officer resulting in the use of force, battery, and attempted battery, a
"[S]uccess on the merits of [Plaintiff's] excessive force claim does not necessarily imply the invalidity of his rule-violation conviction." Hackworth v. Rangel, 482 F. App'x 299 (9th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff alleges he was thrown to the ground, kicked, and placed in a wrap so tightly that he could not breathe and was bruised.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has considered this very issue in another case filed by Hackworth. In Hackworth v. Rangel, 482 Fed.Appx. 299 (2012), the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment against Hackworth, noting that "success on the merits of Hackworth's excessive force claim does not necessarily imply the invalidity of his rule-violation conviction." While Defendants argue that a favorable ruling for Plaintiff on his excessive force claim would necessarily invalidate the RVR finding against Plaintiff for attempted battery, the Court finds no basis in the law to support such a conclusion.