We begin our analysis by examining the plain language of the statute. Hackley v. State, 161 Md.App. 1, 11, 866 A.2d 906 (2005). "In fact, all statutory interpretation begins, and usually ends, with the statutory text itself, for the legislative intent of a statute primarily reveals itself through the statute's very words." Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221 (2003) (citations omitted).
There are a number of sources from which we can obtain definitions of the word "transfer" and it is proper to consult a dictionary or dictionaries for a term's ordinary and popular meaning. State Dep't of Assessments and Taxation v. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Comm'n, 348 Md. 2, 14, 702 A.2d 690, 696 (1997) ("[I]n deciding what a term's ordinary and natural meaning is, we may, and often do, consult the dictionary."); Hackley v. State, 161 Md.App. 1, 14, 866 A.2d 906, 914 (2005). The Court of Special Appeals looked at two different sources for definitions:
Moreover, a prior assault of a victim is relevant to demonstrating the course of conduct that must be shown to satisfy the elements of stalking. See Hackley v. State, 161 Md. App. 1, 20, aff'd, 389 Md. 387 (2005). Accordingly, we hold that the portion of the Protective Order that referred to an assault committed by appellant was highly probative to two separate offenses with which appellant was charged.
The intermediate appellate court agreed that "approaching or pursuing" was an element of the offense but affirmed the conviction on the ground that Hackley's conduct amounted to approaching or pursuing his victim. Hackley v. State, 161 Md.App. 1, 866 A.2d 906 (2005). We granted Hackley's petition for certiorari to consider the two questions he raised in the Court of Special Appeals. Although we believe that the Court of Special Appeals misconstrued the statute and shall hold that the crime of stalking does not require that the defendant approach or pursue his victim, its erroneous interpretation does not assist Hackley.
Granted June 9, 2005. 161 Md.App. 1, 866 A.2d 906. Petition for writ of certiorari granted.
Legislative history "consists of the hearings, committee reports, and debate leading up to the enactment in question." Id. ; see also Hackley v. State , 161 Md. App. 1, 14, 866 A.2d 906 (2005), aff'd , 389 Md. 387, 885 A.2d 816 (2005) (legislative history refers to " โthe derivation of the statute, comments and explanations regarding it by authoritative sources during the legislative process, and amendments proposed or added to itโ ") (quoting Boffen v. State , 372 Md. 724, 736-37, 816 A.2d 88 (2003) ). By contrast, statutory history consists of the "statutes repealed or amended by the statute under consideration."
In other words, "[i]f the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ends and we need investigate no further, but simply apply the statute as it reads." Hackley v. State, 161 Md. App. 1, 11, aff'd, 389 Md. 387 (2005) (quoting Gillespie v. State, 370 Md. 219, 222 (2002)). Based on the plain language of Section 3-819(e), the juvenile court was not required to award custody of T.M. to his father once it sustained the allegations of neglect against his mother.
"Legislative history includes 'the derivation of the statute, comments and explanations regarding it by authoritative sources during the legislative process, and amendments proposed or added to it. . . ." Hackley v. State, 161 Md. App. 1, 14 (2005) (quoting Boffen v. State, 372 Md. 724, 736-37 (2003)). In the instant case, the personnel officer declared that "[i]t is uncontroverted that the intent of this addition to the Pay Plan in 2007 was to treat Appellant like members of Local 3085."
Appellant's prior actions placing Ms. Godfield in fear of imminent bodily harm and assaulting her were of significant probative value to the question whether appellant knew or reasonably should have known that his actions would alarm Ms. Godfield and place her in reasonable fear of bodily injury. Moreover, a prior assault of a victim is relevant to demonstrating the course of conduct that must be shown to satisfy the elements of stalking. See Hackley v. State, 161 Md. App. 1, 20, aff'd, 389 Md. 387 (2005). Accordingly, we hold that the portion of the Protective Order that referred to an assault committed by appellant was highly probative to two separate offenses with which appellant was charged.
Consequently, in order to determine the plain meaning of "marking," "[w]e may consult a dictionary to discern the generally understood meaning of a word." Hockley v. State, 161 Md.App. 1, 14, 866 A.2d 906, aff'd., 389 Md. 387, 885 A.2d 816 (2005). A dictionary definition of "marking" is as follows: