Opinion
C076745
11-22-2017
DEBRA LYNN HACKETT et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. SILVA TRUCKING, INC. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 34201200128931CUPAGDS)
In this personal injury case in which defendants conceded negligence and causation, the jury awarded plaintiffs Debra Lynn Hackett and William Hackett more than $34 million -- far in excess of their $12.5 million pretrial settlement offers (Code Civ. Proc., § 998) that were rejected by defendants Silva Trucking, Inc. and truck driver Elaine R. McDonold [sic]. Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise set forth.
Defendants appeal from the trial court's postjudgment order denying their motion to strike or tax section 998 costs claimed by the Hacketts. Defendants argue the 998 offers were invalid because (1) they exceeded defendants' financial ability to pay and (2) contained a condition (that defendants file acceptance in the trial court) not required by statute.
We reject defendants' contentions and affirm the order.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff Debra Hackett was severely injured in an October 2010 motor vehicle collision between the bus she was driving and a tractor-trailer owned by defendant Silva Trucking and driven by its employee, defendant McDonold. At trial, defendants admitted negligence and causation.
Before filing suit, the Hacketts' lawyer Eliot Reiner on December 16, 2011, sent a letter (not the 998 offer) to defense counsel Kevin Cholakian, stating in part: "Assuming that within two weeks of the date of your preliminary acceptance of this demand plaintiff can confirm that no more than $5 million in insurance exists [$1 million primary plus $4 million excess coverage] with nothing above that amount being available, plaintiff and the [workers'] comp carrier [which to date had paid $640,000] are willing to accept this sum as a total resolution of the entirety of the case as against Silva Trucking (and Ms. McDon[o]ld), providing that you agree to pay the total limits within thirty days of the date of this letter as the parties hope to avoid having to file suit . . . ." Plaintiffs would work out the allocation with the workers' compensation carrier and secure a Medicare set-aside if needed. The letter contained other conditions.
Attorney Ralph Zappala, on behalf of the insurer, wrote on January 17, 2012, that Lexington Insurance Company (LIC) was unable to comply with the condition that proceeds be structured exclusively by a representative of plaintiffs' choosing. Because of the Medicare and workers' compensation contingencies, counsel suggested they draft a Global Settlement Agreement to settle all claims within the policy limits without the need for a lawsuit. The letter requested various disclosures and documentation.
On January 18, 2012, plaintiffs sent a letter listing items required "before this matter can globally resolve for the $5 million" policy limits.
Although defendants assert they provided all of the requested information, the case did not settle, and the Hacketts filed their lawsuit in July 2012.
A couple of months before trial, plaintiffs on September 10 and 13, 2013, served section 998 offers to settle the case for $12.5 million, with each side to bear their own costs. There were two offers: One was to take judgment against Silva Trucking and dismiss with prejudice the claims against McDonold, and the other to take judgment against McDonold and dismiss with prejudice the claims against Silva Trucking. Plaintiffs would satisfy any workers' compensation liens.
Defendants did not accept either offer.
After trial, the jury returned a special verdict that, as instructed, answered "yes" -- "based on Defendants' stipulations" -- to the questions whether defendants were negligent and a substantial factor in causing harm to Debra Hackett. The jury awarded the Hacketts $34,921,215: Almost $32 million to Debra, and $3 million to William for loss of consortium. The award to Debra included $1,176,069 for past economic loss; $16,745,146 for future economic damages; $5 million for past noneconomic loss and $9 million for future noneconomic loss.
Judgment was entered on December 9, 2013.
The Hacketts filed a cost memorandum on December 24, 2013, claiming entitlement to recovery of expert witness fees and costs and prejudgment interest under section 998 and Civil Code section 3291.
Defendants filed a motion to strike or tax costs on various grounds. The only ground at issue on appeal is defendants' argument that the offers were not made in good faith in that they exceeded the amount of insurance money available, and the Hacketts knew defendants lacked financial ability to pay, and therefore the offers carried no reasonable prospect of acceptance.
The Hacketts opposed the motion, arguing their offers complied with section 998 and the verdict of nearly triple the amount of the offers was prima facie evidence the offers were reasonable; defendants failed to meet their burden to show bad faith; and the offers were not conditioned on defendants' satisfaction of the judgment, such that inability to pay did not render the offers unreasonable.
Additionally, the Hacketts' attorneys expressed the belief that the insurer might be liable in excess of the policy limits. Attorney Eliot Reiner attested defense counsel "was advised on numerous occasions that I believed (and continue to believe) that the carriers are responsible for any judgment in excess of the policy limits prior to the filing of the lawsuit and service of the Section 998 Offers. Plaintiffs' position in this regard was well known by [defense counsel] and both the primary and excess insurance carriers." Mr. Reiner made no reference to any supporting evidence for a bad faith claim against the insurer. However, a declaration from Hacketts' lawyer Robert Buccola states: "As trial approached, and after expert discovery had commenced, [defense counsel] Mr. Cholakian contacted me to see if Plaintiffs would be interested in negotiating a damages amount that would be reduced to a stipulated judgment. We had not received Defendants' Life Care Plan for Mrs. Hackett, which had been requested on numerous occasions, so we were unwilling to negotiate without an idea of what the Defendants felt was appropriate in terms of Mrs. Hackett's future medical costs. The issue remained unresolved through until trial. No specific offer was ever communicated to the Plaintiffs."
Defendants' reply brief did not dispute plaintiffs' factual assertions but said there was no basis for the alleged insurance bad faith claim at the time of the section 998 offers, which was the pertinent time for determining validity of section 998 offers. The reply brief argued that the Hacketts' point -- about the offer not being conditioned on satisfaction of the judgment -- rendered the offer invalid because the offer did not expressly promise not to go after defendants themselves.
Defendants' reply brief raised for the first time a new argument that the offers were invalid on their face because they contained an "acceptance caveat" not contained in section 998, requiring defendants to file a notice of acceptance with the trial court (whereas the statute just says the acceptance is to be filed in court). Both offers stated: "In order to accept this Offer to Compromise, you must sign the accompanying Notice of Acceptance, and file the Notice of Acceptance with the court within ten days prior to commencement of trial or within 30 days after the offer is made, whichever occurs first, or else it will be deemed withdrawn." Defendants cited Perez v. Torres (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 418 as prohibiting an offeror from imposing additional conditions not found in the statute, and sought judicial notice of an unpublished case (Arreola v. Napole, B239467, filed Oct. 15, 2013, nonpub. opn.), but the trial court declined to take judicial notice.
The Hacketts filed a written objection to defendants' raising a new argument in their reply brief.
On February 21, 2014, the trial court orally and in a written order taxed certain costs not at issue on appeal but otherwise denied the motion to strike or tax the section 998 costs. The trial court found the Hacketts' offers were made in good faith. They were aware the insurance policy limits were $5 million; Silva Trucking attested its ability to contribute to the $7.5 million balance was at most a few hundred thousand dollars; and McDonold was a seasonal driver who had not worked since the accident and had no means to contribute significantly. The court concluded "where a plaintiff's Section 998 offer . . . significantly exceeds the policy limits of the defendant's insurance coverage and the defendant otherwise lacks assets sufficient to satisfy the excess judgment over coverage, the offer is not per se made in 'bad faith' upon the ground that it is not reasonable to expect the defendant to accept such an offer."
The trial court said "it appears undisputed that at the time of the Plaintiff's offer, the Defendants possessed sufficient evidence regarding Plaintiff's circumstances to enable a reasonable estimation and assessment of Plaintiff's potential damages at trial. As the jury's verdict in excess of $34 million . . . indicates, a settlement figure of $12,500,000 was well within the ballpark and reasonably predictable. So, the question becomes why would it be unreasonable to expect Defendants to seriously contemplate accepting such an offer solely because it would potentially leave Defendants liable for $7,500,000 of uncovered liability that the Defendants' remaining assets could not satisfy? Why would it be more reasonable to expect Defendants to reject such an offer with the potential that they could subsequently be liable for $30,000,000 of uncovered liability after a prolonged expert intensive trial where liability and causation were already conceded [italics added] and the potential for interest and additional fees would increase a potential judgment? What would make the latter result so much more reasonable and attractive than the former, that it would absolutely dictate the Defendant's rejection of the Section 998 offer? [¶] When the uncertainty of the pre-action policy limits demand and purported insurer rejection are added into the analysis, the Plaintiffs' 'lid off' approach to the Section 998 offer calculation becomes even more reasonable at the time of the offer."
As to defendants' new argument in the reply brief -- that the offers exceeded section 998 by requiring them to file acceptance in the trial court -- the trial court found defendants forfeited the point by failing to raise it in their moving papers but "the result would be the same" on the merits. The trial court declined to take judicial notice of the unpublished opinion and noted Perez v. Torres, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th 418, involved a 998 offer that completely failed to contain the written provision for acceptance required by the statute and held an offer is not valid when it omits an acceptance provision or any other statutorily-required provision. Defendants' belated objection was not that the offer failed to contain an acceptance provision but that it added a filing requirement. The court noted the Hacketts' offer was "consistent with the standard form provided in California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Chapter 520, Part IV., section 520.110. Although the presence of this form in a widely used practice guide does not legalize or immunize the acceptance condition, it does indicate the potential that it is a widely used provision."
After taxing costs not at issue on appeal, the trial court awarded the Hacketts a total of $4,664,330 -- $339,467 as costs and $4,324,862 as prejudgment interest. (§ 998; Civ. Code, § 3291 [judgment bears prejudgment interest from date of 998 offer].) The court directed the Hacketts to prepare a revised judgment reflecting that the interest was not subject to compounding post-judgment interest accrual.
The revised judgment was filed April 16, 2014.
On June 12, 2014, defendants filed their notice of appeal from "An order after judgment . . . ." On its face, the notice of appeal raises a question, not addressed by the parties, as to whether the June 2014 appeal from the February 2014 order is timely. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104.) It appears the notice of appeal is timely because the record contains no "notice of entry" of that order other than the court clerk's proof of service that both the order and revised judgment were served on the parties by mail on April 17, 2014. (Rule 8.104(a)(1)(C) and (c) [appeal must be filed within 180 days after entry or 60 days after notice of entry, whichever comes first].)
DISCUSSION
I
Good Faith
Defendants argue the Hacketts' offers were invalid 998 offers not made in good faith, because there was no reasonable expectation that defendants would accept the offers, given defendants' inability to pay. The argument is without merit.
Section 998 provides in part: " . . . [¶] (b) Not less than 10 days prior to commencement of trial . . . , any party may serve an offer in writing upon any other party to the action to allow judgment to be taken or an award to be entered in accordance with the terms and conditions stated at that time. The written offer shall include a statement of the offer, containing the terms and conditions of the judgment or award, and a provision that allows the accepting party to indicate acceptance of the offer by signing a statement that the offer is accepted. Any acceptance of the offer, whether made on the document containing the offer or on a separate document of acceptance, shall be in writing and shall be signed by counsel for the accepting party or, if not represented by counsel, by the accepting party. [¶] (1) If the offer is accepted, the offer with proof of acceptance shall be filed and the clerk or the judge shall enter judgment accordingly. . . . [¶] (2) If the offer is not accepted prior to trial or arbitration or within 30 days after it is made, whichever occurs first, it shall be deemed withdrawn . . . ."
Section 998, subdivision (d), provides: "If an offer made by a plaintiff is not accepted and the defendant fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award in any action or proceeding other than an eminent domain action, the court or arbitrator, in its discretion, may require the defendant to pay a reasonable sum to cover postoffer costs of the services of expert witnesses, who are not regular employees of any party, actually incurred and reasonably necessary in either, or both, preparation for trial or arbitration, or during trial or arbitration, of the case by the plaintiffs, in addition to plaintiff's costs. . . ."
As summarized in Aguilar v. Gostischef (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 475, 480 (Aguilar):
" ' "The purpose of section 998 is to encourage the settlement of litigation without trial. [Citation.] To effectuate the purpose of the statute, a section 998 offer must be made in good faith to be valid. [Citation.] Good faith requires that the pretrial offer of settlement be 'realistically reasonable under the circumstances of the particular case. . . .' [Citation.] The offer 'must carry with it some reasonable prospect of acceptance. [Citation.]' [Citation.]" [Citation.] [¶] Whether the offer is reasonable "depends upon the information available to the parties as of the date the offer was served." [Citation.] Reasonableness generally "is measured, first, by determining whether the offer represents a reasonable prediction of the amount of money, if any, defendant would have to pay plaintiff following a trial, discounted by an appropriate factor for receipt of money by plaintiff before trial, all premised upon information that was known or reasonably should have been known to the defendant," and "[i]f an experienced attorney or judge, standing in defendant's shoes, would place the prediction within a range of reasonably possible results, the prediction is reasonable." [Citation.] [¶] "If the offer is found reasonable by the first test, it must then satisfy a second test: whether [plaintiff's] information was known or reasonably should have been known to [defendant]. This second test is necessary because the section 998 mechanism works only where the offeree has reason to know the offer is a reasonable one. If the offeree has no reason to know the offer is reasonable, then the offeree cannot be expected to accept the offer." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Aguilar, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 480.)
We review de novo legal questions on interpretation of section 998, but we review for abuse of discretion a trial court's resolution of the factual dispute as to whether an offer was a good faith reasonable offer. (Rouland v. Pacific Specialty Ins. Co. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 280, 285-286, fn. 3 (Rouland).)
On appeal, defendants do not dispute that the offers were reasonable as measured by a reasonable prediction of an ultimate money judgment discounted by an appropriate factor for receipt of money by plaintiff before trial. (Aguilar, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 480.)
Instead, defendants claim the trial court abused its discretion by evaluating the offers in hindsight based on the verdict ultimately entered, rather than evaluating the offers at the time they were made. However, the judgment itself, which far exceeded the offer, is prima facie evidence the offer was reasonable, and the burden is on the offeree to show otherwise, based on what the parties knew or should have known at the time the offer was made. (Adams v. Ford Motor Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1484.)
Defendants argue the offers had no reasonable chance of being accepted at the time they were made, because defendants did not have financial ability to pay. However, defendants cite no authority that a tortfeasor's financial status determines reasonableness of an offer which is supposed to compensate for injuries sustained by the tort victim. A money judgment is good for years, even decades (§§ 683.010-683.220), and defendants' present finances are not destiny. Leaving aside future finances, it is not bad faith for plaintiffs to seek amounts commensurate to their loss. Indeed, a defendant who perceives himself or herself as judgment-proof might not mind entry of an uncollectible judgment against him or her in a settlement amount likely to be less than a jury award, particularly where, as here, the defendant admits negligence and causation.
In opposing the motion to tax costs, the Hacketts recognized their potential inability to collect from defendants themselves. Contrary to defendants' view, the Hacketts' recognition of this fact does not constitute a promise not to execute on the judgment against defendants themselves, nor does it mean that the Hacketts' offers were invalid for omitting an express promise not to execute.
Regarding plaintiffs' belief that defendants' insurers might be responsible for any excess judgment such that defendants might accept the offers, defendants' reply brief on appeal admits that plaintiffs' belief "may be true from [plaintiffs'] perspective" but plaintiffs did not show it was true from defendants' perspective. Defendants cite the insurer's letter about settling within policy limits as evidence that defendants did not believe the insurers would be liable in excess of the policy limits. However, that letter indicates nothing about excess liability and in any event was in January 2012, before the lawsuit was filed in July 2012, and before the events described in Buccola's declaration: "As trial approached, and after expert discovery had commenced, [defense counsel] Mr. Cholakian contacted me to see if Plaintiffs would be interested in negotiating a damages amount that would be reduced to a stipulated judgment. We had not received Defendants' Life Care Plan for Mrs. Hackett, which had been requested on numerous occasions, so we were unwilling to negotiate without an idea of what the Defendants felt was appropriate in terms of Mrs. Hackett's future medical costs. The issue remained unresolved through until trial."
Defendants argue that the belief of the Hacketts' attorneys -- that insurers might be liable in excess of policy limits -- is meaningless because the offers did not include either a stipulation to limit recovery to amounts available from insurers or an assignment of the Hacketts' potential claims against the insurers. We disagree.
Aguilar, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th 475 rejected an argument that a plaintiff "could not have made the [$700,000] offer in good faith because there was no reasonable anticipation of acceptance of the offer by [the defendant], who lacked the financial means to pay, and no reasonable expectation [the defendant's insurer] could be liable for the amount of the section 998 offer in light of the $100,000 policy limit." (Id. at p. 479.) The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding that the 998 offer (which was less than one-third of the ultimate $2.3 million verdict) was in good faith. (Id. at pp. 477-478, 481-482.) The appellant was the defendant's insurer (Farmers Insurance Exchange), which had intervened in the action. (Id. at pp. 477-479.) Before filing suit, the plaintiff on three occasions sought disclosure of the policy limits in order to make a policy limits demand, which the plaintiff was prepared to accept, but Farmers did not respond. (Id. at pp. 477-478.) After the plaintiff filed suit, Farmers offered to pay the $100,000 policy limit to settle the case and said the insured defendant (Larry Gostischef) lived on Social Security and had no real property assets. The defendant/insured then presented a section 998 offer for $100,000. (Id. at p. 478.) The plaintiff did not accept and responded that Farmers would be liable for an excess judgment because it ignored three attempts to settle the matter within policy limits. (Ibid.) The plaintiff then made a section 998 offer for $700,000, which was not accepted. (Ibid.) After the jury verdict, the plaintiff sought section 998 costs, and the trial court denied the motion to tax costs filed by the insured defendant (not Farmers). (Ibid.)
The Aguilar court assumed Farmers could pursue the appeal even though it did not move to tax costs or make any argument at the hearing in the trial court. (Id. 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 479, fn. 2.) On appeal, Farmers argued that "Aguilar could not have made the offer in good faith because there was no reasonable anticipation of acceptance of the offer by [the insured defendant], who lacked the financial means to pay, and no reasonable expectation Farmers could be liable for the amount of the section 998 offer in light of the $100,000 policy limit." (Id. at p. 479.) The latter point was being litigated in separate litigation, and the Aguilar court was asked to determine only whether the plaintiff's offer was reasonable when made. (Id. at pp. 479-480.)
Aguilar concluded Farmers failed to show it was unreasonable for the plaintiff to believe Farmers may be liable for a judgment in excess of its policy limits. (Id. 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 481.) The plaintiff's last letter could be interpreted as a genuine offer to settle, and an insurer could be liable for an excess judgment absent a formal settlement offer under limited circumstances, including perhaps the delay in disclosing policy limits. (Ibid.) Aguilar's letter stating he would settle for policy limits reasonably could be understood as a settlement opportunity, regardless of whether it was ultimately determined to be such. (Ibid.) Farmers failed to show Aguilar could have no reasonable expectation of acceptance of his $700,000 offer, so as to show abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding of good faith. (Id. at pp. 481-482.)
As to the information known to Farmers (which Farmers did not address), the parties' correspondence showed Aguilar revealed his position that Farmers may be liable for an excess judgment well in advance of his section 998 offer. (Aguilar, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 482.) Thus, although Farmers vigorously disputed the excess claim and might prevail in the separate litigation, Farmers had not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding Aguilar acted in good faith in requesting $700,000. (Ibid.) In a footnote, Aguilar noted: "Because we conclude Aguilar's belief Farmers may be liable for an excess judgment was reasonable, we need not consider whether it was reasonable to expect [the insured defendant] himself would accept the offer irrespective of coverage of his insurer. . . ." (Id. at p. 482, fn. 4.)
Though the Hacketts and the trial court discussed Aguilar, defendants' opening brief on appeal fails to mention it. Their reply brief just says Aguilar is distinguishable because that court considered the actions of the intervenor/insurer, not the defendant/insured.
Here, we need not and do not express any view of insurer excess liability. It suffices to say that defendants fail to show it was unreasonable for the Hacketts to believe the insurer might be liable for an amount exceeding policy limits. Moreover, based on the entire record -- including defendants' concession of negligence and causation, the severity of Mrs. Hackett's injuries, and the unlikelihood that defendants themselves would be out of pocket (except for Silva Trucking's few hundred thousand dollars, which would be a bargain for Silva Trucking) -- it was reasonable at the time of the offers to expect defendants to accept the offer, regardless whether the insurer would end up paying in excess of the policy limits.
On appeal, defendants cite no authority that their inability to pay meant the Hacketts had no reasonable expectation that defendants would accept the offer. Defendants merely cite authority that offers must be clear and specific so as to allow the offeree to engage in meaningful evaluation and a reasoned decision as to whether or not to accept the offer. None of the cases helps defendants here. Berg v. Darden (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 721 at page 727, said an offer that failed to say how the case would be resolved (by entry of judgment or dismissal) was valid because the statute provides for entry of judgment. Burch v. Children's Hospital of Orange County Thrift Stores, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 537 at pages 543 to 548, and Taing v. Johnson Scaffolding Co. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 579 at page 585, held plaintiffs' unapportioned offers to multiple defendants jointly did not trigger section 998 penalties. Barella v. Exchange Bank (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 793 at page 801, held a defendant's offer to settle a defamation suit conditioned on confidentiality was ineffective under section 998 because it was impossible to evaluate the monetary worth to the plaintiff of public vindication.
We conclude defendants fail to show abuse of discretion in the trial court's findings that the offers were made in good faith, were reasonable under the circumstances, and carried reasonable prospects of acceptance.
II
Procedural Defect Meritless
Defendants argue the offers were procedurally defective because they included a requirement not contained in section 998 -- that defendants file acceptance with the trial court. The statute just says "If the offer is accepted, the offer with proof of acceptance shall be filed and the clerk or the judge shall enter judgment accordingly." (§ 998, subd. (b)(1).)
Assuming defendants have not forfeited this contention by failing to raise it until their reply brief in the trial court, defendants make no persuasive argument on the merits. We apply de novo review to the question of the statute's applicability but agree with the trial court that defendants' cited authority -- Perez v. Torres, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th 418 -- is inapposite because it involved a 998 offer that omitted a written provision for acceptance required by the statute, and held an offer is not valid when it omits a statutorily-required provision.
Here, the Hacketts' offer did not omit anything required by the statute but simply told defendants to file acceptance in the trial court. Perez noted its bright-line rule "will not eliminate all potential issues regarding acceptance provisions. Section 998 does not require a particular form of acceptance provision and there 'is room for interpretation as to how an appropriate statement regarding acceptance might be phrased.' [Citation.] We simply [conclude] that to be valid a section 998 offer must include some indication of how to accept the offer. [Citation.]" (Perez v. Torres, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at pp. 425-426, fn. 6.)
Rouland, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th 280, held insurers' offers satisfied section 998's acceptance provision requirement because they informed the offerees how to accept the offers (file Notice of Acceptance with the trial court), which satisfied the statute's requirements for a valid acceptance (a writing signed by the insureds' counsel). (Id. at pp. 285-289.) The offers implicitly required compliance with the statutory requirement for written acceptance signed by counsel because any acceptance the offerees sought to file in court would be in writing signed by their attorney. (Ibid.)
Defendants cite (without discussion) other cases as supposed support, but none helps defendants. The offer in Marina Glencoe, L.P. v. Neue Sentimental Film AG (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 874 at pages 879-880, was invalid because it contravened section 998 by requiring acceptance in fewer than 30 days. Hurlbut v. Sonora Community Hospital (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 388, held it could not be determined whether the plaintiffs obtained a judgment more favorable than their offer, because the offer included an annuity but there was no evidence of its value. (Id. at pp. 409-410.)
We decline to take judicial notice of the unpublished opinion, Arreola v. Napole, supra, which in any event does not address the issue we face in this appeal.
We conclude defendants fail to show grounds for reversal.
DISPOSITION
The February 21, 2014, order denying defendant's motion to strike or tax costs and awarding section 998 costs to the Hacketts, as reflected in the April 16, 2014, revised judgment, is affirmed. The Hacketts shall recover costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)-(2).)
HULL, Acting P. J. We concur: MURRAY, J. DUARTE, J.