Hackett v. Hackett

20 Citing cases

  1. Matter of Richardson

    29 Misc. 367 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1899)   Cited 10 times

    There are many cases in point in other States, where the same doctrine is discussed and the rule upheld. Durell v. Hayward, 9 Gray (Mass.), 248; Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281; Weld v. Walker, 130 id. 422; Burney v. Children's Hospital, 169 id. 57; Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307; S.C., 50 N.W. 238; S.C., 14 L.R.A. 85, and note; Hackett v. Hackett, 18 R.I. 155; S.C., 49 Am. St. Rep. 762, and note. The moving affidavits also show that the husband, prior to his death, made a promise to purchase a lot in Woodlawn cemetery; that the question of his place of burial was talked over by him with his wife and with some of his associates, and that seems to be the place of interment which had been selected by him.

  2. Sullivan v. Catholic Cemeteries, Inc.

    113 R.I. 65 (R.I. 1974)   Cited 10 times
    Acknowledging that remains are not property in the true sense of the term, but quasi-property "to which are attached certain rights," like burial, which nonetheless diminish once the body is laid to rest

    Pierce also recognized that although a dead body is not classified as "property" in the true legal sense of that term, it has a status of "quasi property," to which are attached certain rights. Later, in Hackett v. Hackett, 18 R.I. 155, 26 A. 42 (1893), this court first laid down the rule that ordinarily a widow has, as against the next of kin, the primary right to control the burial of her husband, but then went on to emphasize that there was a substantial diminution of that right once the body has been laid to rest. In Hackett it was held that in all cases where a claim is made after burial, the controlling element is whether prior to the burial the consent of those "most interested" had been obtained.

  3. McGann v. McGann

    66 A. 52 (R.I. 1907)   Cited 8 times
    In McGann v. McGann, 28 R.I. 130, it was held that the primary right to control the burial of a husband is with the widow who, as the administratrix, having obtained permission to expend the money of the estate for erecting a monument, has the right to erect such monument as she chooses with such inscription thereon as she may deem appropriate, subject to the rules of the cemetery and the right of the lot owners and such reasonable control as a court of equity should exercise to prevent infraction of the recognized rules of property.

    It has been decided in this State that, "as a general rule, the primary right to control the burial of a husband should be with the widow, in preference to the next of kin," for the same reasons and on the same grounds that in case of the death of a wife such right of control belongs to the husband, under ordinary circumstances. Hackett v. Hackett, 18 R.I. 155, 158. If, then, the widow has such right of control, and, being also administratrix, has obtained authority to expend the money of the estate for erecting a monument, she must, as a matter of course, have the right to erect such a monument as she chooses, within the limits of expenditure authorized, with such inscription thereon as she may deem appropriate, subject to such reasonable rules and regulations as may be imposed by the authorities in control of the cemetery; subject also to the rights of the owner of the lot, where, as in this case, the interment is made in a lot owned by a third person; and further subject to such reasonable control, regarding the character of the monument and its inscriptions, as shall prevent any such infraction of those recognized rules of propriety as would shock the sense of the community or show disrespect or contempt for the dead, or in any real sense do injury to the feelings of the surviving relatives.

  4. Steagall v. Doctors Hospital

    171 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1948)   Cited 19 times

    1891, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238, 14 L.R.A. 85, 28 Am.St.Rep. 370. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Welch, 5 Cir., 1936, 82 F.2d 799; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lindsay, 7 Cir., 1934, 69 F.2d 627; Gahn v. Leary, 1945, 318 Mass. 425, 61 N.E.2d 844; Teasley v. Thompson, 1942, 204 Ark. 959, 165 S.W.2d 940; Simpkins v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 1942, 200 S.C. 228, 20 S.E.2d 733; Alderman v. Ford, 1937, 146 Kan. 698, 72 P.2d 981; Pollard v. Phelps, 1937, 56 Ga. App. 408, 193 S.E. 102; Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of the S.H. of J. and M., 1933, 262 N.Y. 320, 186 N.E. 798 (two cases); Streipe v. Liberty Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1932, 243 Ky. 15, 47 S.W.2d 1004; Thompson v. Pierce, 1914, 95 Neb. 692, 146 N.W. 948; Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 1904, 207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878, 64 L.R.A. 179, 99 Am.St.Rep. 795; Hackett v. Hackett, 1893, 18 R.I. 155, 26 A. 42, 19 L.R.A. 558, 49 Am.St.Rep. 762. See also Notes and Comment, 19 Corn.L.Q. 108 (1933).

  5. Previty v. Cappuccio

    266 A.2d 39 (R.I. 1970)   Cited 4 times

    Such consent was vitiated when the widow, with justification, came to fear that she would be refused burial beside her husband. Compare Hackett v. Hackett, 18 R.I. 155. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the trial justice was in error in concluding that the body had been removed "illegally * * * contrary to law."

  6. Lonardo v. Quaranta

    205 A.2d 837 (R.I. 1964)   Cited 3 times

    We think their position correctly states the law in this jurisdiction. They are content, however, to rest on the proposition that plaintiff's bald allegation that she, being the eldest daughter, possessed the right of burial, is insufficient. They contend that where a claim is made after burial, the controlling element is that of consent, citing Hackett v. Hackett, 18 R.I. 155, and Gardner v. Swan Point Cemetery, 20 R.I. 646. These, however, are causes in equity and are concerned, as are the cases cited therein, with the ex post facto enforcement of rights cognizable in equity.

  7. In re Kyle's Autopsy

    309 P.2d 1070 (Okla. 1957)   Cited 3 times

    The right of the surviving husband or wife, or, if there be none, of the next of kin, to have the custody of the body of the deceased person and decide upon the place of its final burial is supported by the better reasoning and by the almost unanimous voice of the authorities. See Hackett v. Hackett, 18 R.I. 155, 26 A. 42, 19 L.R.A. 558; McEntee v. Bonacum, 66 Neb. 651, 92 N.W. 633, 60 L.R.A. 440; Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238, 14 L.R.A. 85; Perley, Mortuary Law, 27; Hadsell v. Hadsell, 7 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 196; Durell v. Hayward, 9 Gray, Mass., 248. Larson v. Chase, supra, is a leading case on the subject and has been followed and approved many times. See note thereto.

  8. Silvia v. Helger

    75 R.I. 397 (R.I. 1949)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that co-tenant heirs take lots with right of burial "in the order in which they deceased" and if there is not a sufficient number of lots for all heirs, "the last members of the family to die would thereby lose their right to be buried therein"

    In Gardner v. Swan Point Cemetery, supra, the court, at page 648, stated the rule in the following language: "The principle of all the cases seems to be that the buried body shall remain undisturbed, and that the right and duty falls to the next of kin to see that its repose is duly protected. This right `after burial,' was referred to in Hackett v. Hackett, 18 R.I. 155, as one to be distinguished from right of custody and disposal of the body at the time of burial, when other considerations than kinship may often arise."

  9. Goldman v. Mollen

    168 Va. 345 (Va. 1937)   Cited 17 times

    As between them, the wishes of the widow should prevail. Bonaparte v. Fraternal Funeral Home, et al., 206 N.C. 652, 175 S.E. 137; Hackett v. Hackett, 18 R.I. 155, 26 A. 42, 19 L.R.A. 558, 49 Am.St. Rep. 763; Moore v. Sheafer, 282 Pa. 360, 127 A. 784; Curlin v. Curlin (Tex. Civ. App.) 228 S.W. 602, 21 A.L.R. 653; O'Donnell v. Slack, 123 Cal. 285, 55 P. 906, 43 L.R.A. 388. Indeed this primary right of the widow, in the absence of special circumstances, is almost everywhere recognized, but, as we shall see, when the choice has once been made, when this right has once been exercised, other considerations enter into any change proposed. [2-4] In a commercial sense, there are no property rights in the bodies of the dead, but their survivors have a right to their possession and the right to make final disposition thereof, decently and in order.

  10. Vaughan v. Vaughan

    294 Mass. 164 (Mass. 1936)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that wife had standing to seek disinterment where death of husband occurred prior to entry of decree of divorce

    Weld v. Walker, 130 Mass. 422. Durell v. Hayward, 9 Gray, 248. Sheehan v. Commercial Travelers Mutual Accident Association of America, 283 Mass. 543, 553. To the same effect see Hackett v. Hackett, 18 R.I. 155; Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Penn. St. 313, 319; Neighbors v. Neighbors, 112 Ky. 161; Toppin v. Moriarty, 14 Dick. (N.J.) 115; 33 Am. L.R. 1427, 1432. Compare Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 42 Penn. St. 293, 82 Am. Dec. 506, to the effect that a court of equity may refuse to grant removal where the motives are not laudable or meritorious.