Hack v. Concrete Wall Co.

7 Citing cases

  1. Tebo v. Havlik

    418 Mich. 350 (Mich. 1984)   Cited 116 times
    Rejecting the argument that precedents of the Court of Appeals, not being decisions by the Supreme Court, cannot properly be relied upon

    In Jones v Keetch, 388 Mich. 164; 200 N.W.2d 227 (1972), this Court rejected the argument that a decision of the Court of Appeals could become the law of the case and thereby bind the Supreme Court if the losing party in the Court of Appeals opted to proceed on remand rather than to seek review in the Supreme Court. See also Hack v Concrete Wall Co, 350 Mich. 118, 130; 85 N.W.2d 109 (1957). Thus, whether a losing party in the Court of Appeals does not appeal or this Court denies an application for leave to appeal, the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not preclude review by this Court at a subsequent stage of the proceedings.

  2. Worthington Corporation v. Lease Mgmt., Inc.

    352 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1965)   Cited 4 times

    "The next is that the substantive rights and liabilities of all present parties are determinable properly according to the law as it stood when the causes alleged by the two plaintiffs accrued in 1959. At that time, and quite aside from the remedies equity then provided (and yet provides despite the `merger' of law and equity) for reimbursement, subrogation, exoneration and indemnity (see authorities considered in Hack v. Concrete Wall Co., 350 Mich. 118 at 123, 124, 125, 126, 85 N.W.2d 109; Hack Inv. Co. v. Concrete Wall Co., 356 Mich. 416, 421-422, 423, 97 N.W.2d 106, and Ellis v. Phillips, 363 Mich. 587, 110 N.W.2d 772), the only remedy available to a joint tortfeasor against his brother in guilt was by chancery action for contribution taken in pursuance of the act of 1941 (C.L. 1948, § 691.561 et seq. [Stat.Ann. 1959 Cum.Supp. § 27.1683 (1)]). The act of 1941 was changed in minor degree (to accommodate the new procedure only and not to change the substance) and re-enacted as section 2925 of the Revised Judicature Act of 1961 (C.L.S. 1961, § 600.2925 [Stat.Ann. 1962 Rev. § 27A. 2925]).

  3. Husted v. Consumers Power Co.

    376 Mich. 41 (Mich. 1965)   Cited 89 times
    In Husted, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that an employer is not liable for contribution if his employee is injured through the concurrent negligence of the employer and a third party.

    The next is that the substantive rights and liabilities of all present parties are determinable properly according to the law as it stood when the causes alleged by the two plaintiffs accrued in 1959. At that time, and quite aside from the remedies equity then provided (and yet provides despite the "merger" of law and equity) for reimbursement, subrogation, exoneration, and indemnity (see authorities considered in Hack v. Concrete Wall Co., 350 Mich. 118 at 123-126; Hack Investment Co. v. Concrete Wall Co., 356 Mich. 416, 421-423, and Ellis v. Phillips, 363 Mich. 587), the only remedy available to a joint tort-feasor against his brother in guilt was by chancery action for contribution taken in pursuance of the act of 1941 (CL 1948, § 691.561 et seq. [Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 27.1683(1) et seq.]). The act of 1941 was changed in minor degree (to accommodate the new procedure only and not to change the substance) and re-enacted as section 2925 of the revised judicature act of 1961 (CLS 1961, § 600.2925 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.2925]).

  4. Ellis v. Phillips

    110 N.W.2d 772 (Mich. 1961)   Cited 8 times
    In Ellis v. Phillips, 363 Mich. 587, 110 N.W.2d 772 (1961) the receiver of a subcontractor on a building project brought suit against the building contractor for the unpaid balance owed by the contractor under the subcontract.

    Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Coumbe, 47 Mich. 358; 50 Am Jur, Suretyship, § 221. Justice BLACK, writing in Hack v. Concrete Wall Company, 350 Mich. 118, 125, quotes with approval from 5 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed), Equitable Remedies (2d ed), § 920, p 5183, as follows: "Subrogation. — When an obligation is discharged by one not primarily liable for it, but who believes himself to be acting either in performance of a legal duty, or for the protection of a legal right, or at the request of the party ultimately bound, and even in certain other cases, favored by public policy, where none of the above circumstances may be present, the party thus discharging the obligation is entitled in equity to demand, for his reimbursement, and subject to any superior equities, the performance of the original obligation, and the application thereto of all securities and collateral rights held by the creditor.

  5. American Alloys Sales Co. v. Grier

    108 N.W.2d 831 (Mich. 1961)   Cited 5 times

    Would our orders denying leave foreclose ultimate review of that which we at the time determined not to review? The answer is found in Malooly v. York Heating Ventilating Corp., 270 Mich. 240; Great Lakes Realty Corp. v. Peters, 336 Mich. 325, and the opinion signed by Justices SMITH, EDWARDS, VOELKER, and BLACK, in Hack v. Concrete Wall Co., 350 Mich. 118, 129, 130. I would dismiss plaintiff's appeals for want of application and grant of leave.

  6. Hack Investment Co. v. Concrete Wall Co.

    97 N.W.2d 106 (Mich. 1959)   Cited 7 times
    In Hack Investment Co. v. Concrete Wall Company (1959), 356 Mich. 416, plaintiff sued to obtain contribution from defendant.

    Based on the conclusion that under the record made plaintiffs had failed to sustain the burden of proof resting on them to show their freedom from concurrent negligence, judgment was entered for the defendant. On appeal said judgment was affirmed here by an evenly divided Court. Hack v. Concrete Wall Company, 350 Mich. 118. A motion for rehearing was denied. Thereupon plaintiffs instituted the present action at law, asserting the right to recover contribution from defendant.

  7. Hack v. Standard Accident Insurance

    88 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1958)

    One Evelyn Livingston Smith sued the present plaintiffs (Leonard Hack, Morton Hack and Nathan Hack, individually and as copartners doing business as Hack Investment Company, and the said corporation, Hack Shoe Company), together with Honey Homes, Inc., and Concrete Wall Company, a Michigan corporation (and other defendants), for damages resulting from negligence causing her building to collapse. For further details having to do with Miss Smith's action, see Hack v. Concrete Wall Co., 350 Mich. 118. Standard Accident, defendant here, duly appeared in the suit and took charge of the defense so far as its named insured (Hack Shoe Company) was concerned. Standard Accident succeeded, unlike certain other defendants in the suit, in obtaining judgment for Hack Shoe Company on verdict directed against Miss Smith. The judgment against Miss Smith, in favor of Hack Shoe Company, became final.