In YMCA v. Dept. of Rev., 268 Or 633, 635 n 1, 522 P2d 464 (1974) (YMCA I) the court referred to a use of property that "substantially contributes" to furtherance of the overall goals of the charitable organization, apparently paraphrasing the "reasonably necessary" test articulated in Multnomah School of the Bible. In Habitat for Humanity v. Dept. of Rev., 360 Or 257, 264-66, 381 P3d 809 (2016), the court again applied the "reasonably necessary" test. As an important limitation within the property use test, longstanding Oregon precedent declares that if the primary use of the subject property is to make money to fund charitable operations occurring on other properties, the connection to the organization's charitable purpose is too attenuated to support exemption of the subject property.

When construing tax exemption statutes, Oregon follows a rule of "strict but reasonable construction." Habitat for Humanity of the Mid-Willamette Valley v. Dept. of Rev., 360 Or. 257, 261 n1, 381 P.3d 809 (2016) (citations omitted). "In other words, the court starts by attempting to ascertain legislative intent because 'the intention of the legislature must be the primary objective sought.'

(Id., ¶ 6.) On September 15, 2016, our Supreme Court decided the unrelated case of Habitat for Humanity of the Mid-Willamette Valley v. Department of Revenue, 360 Or. 257, 381 P.3d 809 (2016). The court held that vacant lots may qualify for tax exemption under ORS 307.130(2)(a) when they are owned by a charity with a primary charitable purpose "to acquire vacant lots and to build housing on those lots for sale to low-income families at below market prices."

Because charitable use depends on "the nature of the work that a taxpayer carries on and the relationship between that work and the property at issue, " the same use may qualify one institution's property for exemption but not another's. Compare Habitat for Humanity v. Dept. of Rev., 360 Or. 257, 264, 381 P.3d 809 (2016) (holding vacant lot was exempt use where institution's articles identified land acquisition and development among its purposes) with Eman. Luth. Char. Bd. v. Dept. of Rev., 263 Or. 287, 502 P.2d 251 (1972) (holding vacant lot was not exempt use where hospital's charitable work was providing medical, research, and teaching services). In determining what an incorporated institution's primary purposes are, courts look to its articles and bylaws as prima facie evidence.

When examining the use of a property, the court must consider how that use fits within the taxpayer's entire enterprise. See Habitat for Humanity v. Dept. of Rev., 360 Or. 257, 267, 381 P.3d 809 (2016) (applying ORS 307.130). In this case, both parties acknowledge that the use of the subject property changed in August 2015 when Life Bible Church stopped operating its school there.

We do so by examining the text and context of the statute, along with any pertinent legislative history, resorting to general maxims of statutory construction only if the legislature’s intent remains unclear. Habitat for Humanity v. Dept. of Rev. , 360 Or. 257, 261, 381 P.3d 809 (2016). There is no dispute that defendant’s prior conviction is within the category of prior convictions admissible to impeach under OEC 609 ; however, such a conviction "is not admissible if *** [a] period of more than 15 years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date ***."

Tax Court Rule 47 C; Habitat for Humanity of the Mid-Willamette Valley v. Dept. of Rev., 360 Or. 257, 261, 381 P.3d 809 (2016).

The court will construe the statutes supporting exemption strictly but reasonably. See Habitat for Humanity v. Dept. of Rev., 350 Or 257, 261 n 1, 381 P3d 809 (2016) (citing Eman. Luth. Char. Bd. v. Dept. of Rev., 263 Or 287, 291, 502 P2d 251 (1972)). VI. ANALYSIS

Charitable use depends on "the nature of the work that a taxpayer carries on and the relationship between that work and the property at issue." Habitat for Humanity v. Dept. of Rev., 360 Or. 257, 264, 381 P.3d 809 (2016). Certain uses may qualify one institution's property for exemption but not another's, depending on the specific charitable purpose of each institution.

Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly discussed whether education is a charitable purpose, it has held educational institutions entitled to tax exemption under ORS 307.130. See Multnomah Sch. of the Bible v. Multnomah Co., 218 Or 19, 36-37, 343 P2d 893 (1959) (describing exempt charitable institution as "institution of learning"); Willamette Univ. v. State Tax Comm'n, 245 Or 342, 343, 422 P2d 260 (1966), discussed in Habitat for Humanity of the Mid-Willamette Valley v. Dept. of Rev., 360 Or 257, 263, 381 P3d 809 (2016) ("Because the university was in the process of constructing buildings intended to advance its educational purposes, there was no dispute that the property * * * was 'being prepared to carry out the purposes of the exempt charity.' ") The Regular Division of this court has also allowed a tax exemption under ORS 307.130 to an organization with an educational purpose. See Lewis &Clark Coll. v. Comm'n, 3 OTR 429 (1969) (accepting parties' agreement that college was exempt institution under ORS 307.130).