Under these circumstances, plaintiffs should have been permitted to pursue their pendent state claims in the federal actions. A number of district courts have held that a pendent state law claim should be retained when there is a substantial possibility that a subsequent state court suit on the claim may be time-barred. See Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire Marine Ins. Co., 74 F.R.D. 151, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Haber v. County of Nassau, 411 F. Supp. 93, 99 (E.D. N.Y. 1976); Knuth v. Eri-Crawford Dairy Cooperative Ass'n, 326 F. Supp. 48, 57 (W.D. Penn. 1971), modified, 463 F.2d 470 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 913, 93 S.Ct. 966, 35 L.Ed.2d 278 (1973). See also McLaughlin v. Campbell, 410 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (D.Mass. 1976), where the district court dismissed plaintiff's pendent claims when he dismissed plaintiff's § 10(b) claim, but only upon the proviso "that these counts may still be brought in state court."
Many courts have recognized that if the plaintiffs will be barred by the statute of limitations applicable to the state law claims from instituting actions in state court based on those claims that courts should exercise their discretion and retain pendent state claims. See, e.g., Meyerhoff v. Empire Fire Marine Inc. Co., 74 F.R.D. 151, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Haber v. County of Nassau, 411 F. Supp. 93, 99 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); McLaughlin v. Campbell, 410 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (D.Mass. 1976); Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Cooperative Ass'n, 326 F. Supp. 48, 57 (W.D.Pa. 1971), modified, 463 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 913, 93 S.Ct. 966, 35 L.Ed.2d 278 (1973). Cf. Ondis v. Barrows, 538 F.2d 904, 908 (1st Cir. 1976).
It has been clearly established that a county is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 36 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973); Schrank v. Bliss, 412 F. Supp. 28 (M.D.Fla. 1976); Haber v. County of Nassau, 411 F. Supp. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). Therefore, Plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed insofar as it seeks recovery against the County under § 1983.
Applying these principles to the first two categories of defendants — the governmental units — the Town of Hempstead and the County of Nassau can not qualify as "persons" in a § 1983 action. See Haber v. County of Nassau, 411 F. Supp. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Walsh v. City of Long Beach, 379 F. Supp. 954 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). The outcome as to the state, county and local civil service commissions, however, is not as immediately clear.
Prior to the trial the defendant County of Nassau moved to dismiss all three claims on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. This Court granted said defendant's motion as to the first claim but denied it as to the second and third claims under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction ( 411 F. Supp. 93 (E.D.N Y 1976)). Subsequent to the trial and verdict in this case the United States Supreme Court has in another case held the latter part of the Court's decision to be in error and that plaintiff's second and third state law claims are "without the statutory jurisdiction" of this Court.