Opinion
EP-20-CV-00247-FM
10-12-2022
NANCY HAAS, individually and as representative of the ESTATE OF WILLIAM HAYNES HAAS, Plaintiff, v. PILOT TRAVEL CENTERS, LLC d/b/a FLYING J TRAVEL PLAZA #728, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FRANK MONTALVO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the court are “Defendant's Motion for Final Summary Judgment” (“Motion”) [ECF No. 34], filed March 24, 2022, by Pilot Travel Centers, LLC (“Defendant”) and “Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Final Summary Judgment” (“Response”) [ECF No. 39], filed April 11, 2022, by Nancy Haas (“Plaintiff”). After due consideration of the Motion, Response, and applicable law, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On May 27, 2019, Plaintiff and her husband, Mr. William Haas, went to Defendant's gas station and travel center (“the Premises”) so Plaintiff could get a haircut. In addition to a hair salon, the travel center also featured a convenience store, which could be accessed on the north side of the Premises, and a Denny's Restaurant, which was accessible on the west side (see below). Two handicap ramps with solid yellow sections provided access to the northwestern portion of the sidewalk that encircled the Premises.
“Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint with Jury Demand” (“Comp.”) 2, ECF No. 22, filed Aug. 10, 2021; “Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Final Summary Judgment” (“Resp.”), Ex. A, “Oral and Videotaped Deposition of Nancy Haas” (“Haas Dep.”) 43, ECF No. 39-1, filed Apr. 11, 2022.
Haas Dep at 45; “Defendant's Motion for Final Summary Judgment” (“Mot.”), Appendix 32, Ex. B, “Overhead Image,” ECF No. 34-2, filed Mar. 24, 2022 (cropped and rotated).
Overhead Image.
(Image Omitted)
In front of the western entrance was a large section of parkinglot marked with yellow diagonal striping (see below).
Id.
Id.; Resp., Ex. B, “Affidavit of Jason T. English, M.S., CSP, P.E.” (“English Report”) 4, “View of Curb,” ECF No. 39-2, filed Apr. 11, 2022.
(Image Omitted)
Plaintiff and Mr. Haas had been to the Premises numerous times, and when they had, Plaintiff almost always parked in one of the handicap spaces immediately adjacent to the handicap ramps for the benefitof Mr. Haas, who had multiple sclerosis (“MS”) and was wheelchair-bound.Regardless of where they parked, Plaintiff and Mr. Haas almost always entered and exited the Premises through the convenience store on the north side; although they occasionally did so through the Denny's, on the west side.
View of Curb.
Haas Dep. at 34-35; Compl. at 2.
Id. at 35-36.
On the day in question, none of the parking spots they usually used were open, so Plaintiff was forced to park in the spot immediately adjacent to and north of the large yellow striped section in front of the Denny's, which she had never done before. Mr. Haas exited their van via its extendable side ramp, which deposited him somewhere in the yellow striped section. He then maneuvered his wheelchair around the van and toward the westernmost handicap ramp, up the ramp, and into the convenience store.
Mot., Appendix at 31; see Overhead Image; Haas Dep. at 42.
Haas Dep. at 25, 40.
Id. at 45.
At some point while Plaintiff was getting her hair done, Mr. Haas exited the Premises through the Denny's entrance, drove straight toward the striped yellow section, and careened over the curb (“the Accident”). Mr. Haas was ejected from his wheelchair onto the parking lot pavement. Plaintiff finished her hair appointment, went outside, found her husband on the ground, and called an ambulance; when it arrived, Emergency Medical Technicians helped Mr. Haas back into his wheelchair. Plaintiff and Mr. Haas then drove to a scheduled doctor's appointment, at which point Mr. Haas told his doctor he hurt his legs in the fall. X-rays were taken, revealing Mr. Haas had suffered fractures to both legs. He underwent surgery to insert metal rods in the lower legs to repair and support the fractures. Although some complications arose with his incisions, by October 2019 they had healed and his post-surgical care terminated.
Id. at 47-48; Mot., Appendix at 31.
Haas Dep. at 48.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 63; Mot., Appendix 50, Ex. E, “Report and CV of Robert C. Bux, M.D.” (“Bux Report”), ECF No. 34-2, filed Mar. 24, 2022.
Haas Dep. at 91.
Id.
In March 2020, Mr. Haas suffered a stroke due to atrial fibrillation (i.e., irregular heart rhythm) and “new onset seizures,” which “likely related to his stroke” and MS. Doctors implanted a pacemaker. He was admitted to the emergency room at least six times after the stroke, suffering from fevers, recurrent urinary tract infections (“UTIs”), breakthrough seizures, altered mental status, aspiration pneumonia (i.e., fluid in the airways), and decubitus ulcers (i.e., bedsores).
Bux Report at 50; Haas Dep. at 88; Resp., Ex. C, “Oral Deposition of Daryl D. Dichoso, M.D.” (“Dichoso Dep.”) 57, 78, ECF No. 39-3, filed Apr. 11, 2022.
Haas Dep. at 90.
Bux Report at 50; Haas Dep. at 88-90.
His health continued to decline following the stroke, and in January 2021 he was admitted to the ER after his caregivers found him with decreased responsiveness. Doctors discovered he was suffering from sepsis (i.e., a bacterial infection of the bloodstream), likely caused by UTIs, which in turn were connected to his MS. He was placed in hospice care and passed away on February 3, 2021. The cause of death was listed as MS. He was 72 years old.
Bux Report at 51.
Id.
Id.
Dichoso Dep. at 62.
Haas Dep. at 8.
B. Procedural Background
Before he died, Mr. Haas commenced this action in state court in February 2020, alleging Defendant was negligent in failing to adequately warn him of the dangerous curb over which he fell. Defendant removed in September 2020. After Mr. Haas passed away, Mrs. Haas took over as Plaintiff. In her amended complaint, she added two causes of action: wrongful death and survival.
“Index of State Court Documents” 7, ECF No. 2, “Plaintiff's Original Petition with Jury Demand and Request for Disclosure,” filed Sept. 24, 2020.
“Defendant's Notice of Removal,” ECF No. 1, filed Sept. 24, 2020.
“Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Substitution of Parties and Leave to File Plaintiff's Amended Complaint,” ECF No. 12, filed Mar. 2, 2021.
“Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint with Jury Demand” 4-5, ECF No. 19, filed June 24, 2021.
C. Parties' Arguments
Defendant filed its Motion in March 2022, arguing the curb was 1) not unreasonably dangerous, 2) open and obvious, and 3) known to Mr. Haas at the time. Additionally, it argues it cannot be liable for Mr. Haas' death, which was not caused by the Accident.
Mot. at 11, 8, 10.
Id.
Plaintiff counters that the curb was dangerous because it was deceptive. Further, she contends the Accident proximately caused Mr. Haas' death because it was the “inciting event” leading to his decline and eventual passing.
Resp. at 4, 11.
Id. at 24.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits demonstrate that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A dispute over a material fact is genuine “when there is evidence sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Substantive law defines which facts are material.
Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. When considering only admissible evidence in the pretrial record, the court will “view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and draw all factual inferences in the nonmovant's favor. If the moving party cannot demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment is inappropriate.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Fowler v. Smith, 68 F.3d 124, 126 (5th Cir. 1995).
Cheatham v. Allstate Ins. Co., 465 F.3d 578, 582 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. The nonmoving party's burden is not satisfied with “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.” The court does not, “in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.” When reviewing the parties' submissions, the court does not “weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses.”Once the nonmovant has had the opportunity to make this showing, summary judgment will be granted “if no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id. at 1075 (emphasis removed).
Caboni v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts three causes of action: negligence, wrongful death, and survival.Defendant moves for summary judgment on each claim.
Compl. at 3-5.
See generally Mot.
A. Negligence
Landowners have “a duty to make safe or warn against any concealed, unreasonably dangerous conditions of which the landowner is, or reasonably should be, aware but the invitee is not.” However, a landowner generally has no duty to warn of unreasonably dangerous conditions “that are open and obvious or known to the invitee.” Defendant contends 1) the curb over which Mr. Haas fell was not unreasonably dangerous; 2) “the lack of a ramp was open and obvious” to Mr. Haas”; and 3) Mr. Haas knew the curb lacked a ramp. Absence of a genuine issue of material fact on any one of these contentions is grounds for summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claim in favor of Defendant.
Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 465 S.W.3d 193, 203 (Tex. 2015).
Id. at 204. There are two exceptions to this general no-duty rule: when the unreasonable danger is foreseeable criminal activity and when the unreasonably dangerous condition must necessarily be used. Id.
Id. at 11.
Mot. at 8.
Id.
a. Unreasonably Dangerous
“A condition is unreasonably dangerous if ‘there is a sufficient probability of a harmful event occurring that a reasonably prudent person would have foreseen it or some similar event as likely to happen.'” “The extent to which a condition is unreasonably dangerous is ordinarily a fact question.” Courts often consider, “among other things, (1) whether the condition was clearly marked; (2) the height of the condition; and (3) whether the condition met applicable safety standards.” Defendant has failed to demonstrate the curb was not unreasonably dangerous.
United Supermarkets, LLC v. McIn tire, 646 S.W.3d 800, 803 (Tex. 2022) (citation omitted).
Cohen v. Landry's Inc., 442 S.W.3d 818, 827 (Tex. App. 2014).
Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
First, citing Brinson Ford, Inc. v. Alger, Defendant argues the curb was “easily perceivable” due to the parking lot's yellow striping, “which has been recognized as an approved method by the Texas Supreme Court to indicate the presence of an elevation change,” and therefore is not unreasonably dangerous. But the Court in Brinson Ford held that a ramp, which was outlined in yellow striping, was not unreasonably dangerous because it met safety standards in ramp design. Indeed, Mr. Haas exclaimed after the fall that he “thought [the curb] was ramped” because of the yellow striped markings. As such, the parking lot's yellow stripes arguably made the unmarked curb less discernable.
Mot. at 12 (citing Brinson Ford, Inc. v. Alger, 228 S.W.3d 161, 163 (Tex. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Brinson Ford, 228 S.W.3d at 163.
Haas Dep. at 65.
Next, Defendant points to a report by its expert architect, Mr. DiNicola's, which concluded “the curb and parking lot follow typical design standards.” Relatedly, it asserts it is under no obligation to paint or otherwise identify the curb. Yet other evidence suggests the curb failed to comply with relevant building codes, which prohibit “small vertical changes in elevation less than 12 [inches]” because they are difficult to perceive. The curb at issue is 5.25.”
Id., quoting id., Appendix, Ex. G, “DiNicola Report” 25, ECF No. 34-2, filed Mar. 24, 2022.
Mot. at 13 (citing DiNicola Report at 25).
Id. at 11.
DiNicola Report at 4.
Finally, Texas law points to denial of summary judgment on the issue of whether the curb was unreasonably dangerous. In Christus Health Southwest Texas v. Wilson, the plaintiff misperceived and fell over an unpainted landing at a garage stairway entrance. There had been no reported incidents of falls in the garage stairwells, which complied with building codes.Nevertheless, the court concluded there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find the stairwell was unreasonably dangerous since the landing and the garage floor were of similar-looking materials.
Christus Health Sw. Tex. v. Wilson, 305 S.W.3d 392, 395 (Tex. App. 2010).
Id. at 396-97.
Id. at 399.
Burns v. Baylor Health Care Systems concerned a curb in front of elevators in a parking garage; “the curb top was painted yellow and the parking garage floor had a section of diagonal yellow stripes marking the area in front of the elevators.” Reversing summary judgment, the court found both the curb and garage floor “were painted in such a manner as to create the illusion that there was no curb.” Thus, there was a fact issue as to whether the condition was unreasonably dangerous.
Burns v. Baylor Health Care Sys., 125 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Tex. App. 2003).
Id.
Id. at 599.
Here, the curb-like those in Wilson and Burns-could have given the impression of transitioning seamlessly into the yellow striped section of the parking lot (see image above).Indeed, Plaintiff's safety engineering expert, Mr. Jason English, concluded the curb “deceptively appears to be on the same level as the parking lot as if it were sloped to meet flush at the same level,” especially upon exiting the Denny's. Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact about the visual perception of the curb and, by extension, whether it was unreasonably dangerous.
See View of Curb.
English Report at 5, 9.
b. Open and Obvious Danger
Defendant argues it cannot be liable for Mr. Haas' injuries as “the lack of a ramp was open and obvious.” “Whether a danger is open and obvious is a question of law determined under an objective test. The question is whether the danger is so open and obvious that as a matter of law the plaintiff will be charged with knowledge and appreciation thereof.”
Mot. at 8.
Los Compadres Pescadores, L.L.C. v. Valdez, 622 S.W.3d 771, 788 (Tex. 2021) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (cleaned up).
Defendant first asserts the curb was open and obvious because the “weather was clear, and Mr. Haas had an unobstructed view of the curb.” However, as discussed above, the appearance of the curb may have been deceptive, giving the impression of transitioning seamlessly, irrespective of the weather or an unobstructed view.
Mot. at 11.
Next, Defendant contends the curb was open and obvious because the yellow striping in front of the curb looked “vastly different” from the handicap ramps, which include a solid yellow section. The court cannot conclude, however, that the handicap ramps and the striped section at issue looked so different that, as a matter of law, Mr. Haas should be charged with knowledge of their functional difference.
Mot. at 11; see Overhead Image.
In fact, yellow striping without a solid yellow section appears to be a typical means of identifying handicap ramps elsewhere. Recall that in Brinson Ford, a ramp was found not unreasonably dangerous since it was outlined in yellow striping, which is standard in ramp design. Also, Plaintiff noted a nearby grocery store used yellow striping for its handicap ramp, which may have contributed to Mr. Haas' confusion. Mr. English, meanwhile, asserted the yellow striping could reasonably have been perceived as an accessible handicapped route because it led “into the parking lot from a primary building exit.” Therefore, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the curb was clearly and obviously not ramped.
Brinson Ford, 228 S.W.3d at 163.
Haas Dep. at 58-59.
English Report at 11.
c. Known Danger
Even if the curb was unreasonably dangerous, but not open and obvious, Defendant contends Mr. Haas' knew about the absence of a ramp in that area due to his “familiarity and prior experience with the Premises, including its handicap ramps[, and] his actual experience with the striped area and the curb” on the day of the Accident. Specifically, Defendant points out Mr. Haas “exited his vehicle directly into the striped area that Plaintiff claims is deceptively painted[.] . . . Because there was no ramp in that area, Haas had to drive his motorized wheelchair through the parking lot to reach one of the concrete handicap ramps.” “This,” Defendant contends, “is direct and conclusive evidence showing that, on the date of the [Accident], Haas was aware that the striped area did not contain a handicap ramp.”
Mot. at 11.
Id. at 10.
Id.
By way of comparison, Defendant cites Chavez v. United Medical Centers. In that case, a plaintiff could not recover for injuries sustained after tripping over a speed bump since she testified that on the day of the accident, and on past visits to the premises, “she was aware-and wary-of the speed bump.” But Chavez is inapposite: nowhere in the record does Mr. Haas admit ever having been aware of the curb outside Denny's. And while it is true Mr. Haas had been to the Premises numerous times, there is no evidence he had ever previously interacted with the striped area in front of the curb.
Mot. at 10 (citing Chavez v. United Med. Ctrs., No. 04-02-00675-CV, 2003 WL 22438304, *1 (Tex. App. Oct. 29, 2003)).
Chavez, 2003 WL 22438304, at *1.
Haas Dep. at 35.
Additionally, although Mr. Haas exited the van somewhere in the striped area on the day of the Accident, it is unclear where exactly. The striped area is large; he may not have exited the van near enough to the curb to become aware of it. Furthermore, the fact he then chose to use the handicap ramp is not dispositive since it may have simply been habitual: Plaintiff almost always parked alongside the handicap ramps. Moreover, Mr. Haas almost always entered the facility through the convenience store entrance by way of the ramps, which he also did on this occasion.Finally, Defendant offers no theory for why Mr. Haas, if he was aware of the curb, nevertheless drove over it. Mr. Haas had been in a wheelchair for almost thirty years; he undoubtedly would have known it could not be driven over such a curb. Therefore, whether Mr. Haas knew about the curb is a question of fact better left to the jury.
Id. at 38, 45.
In sum, the court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that the curb was 1) not unreasonably dangerous, 2) open and obvious, or 3) known to Mr. Haas. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claim is denied.
B. Wrongful Death and Survival
Death of a victim does not abate a cause of action for personal injury as such an action “survives to and in favor of [the victim's] heirs, legal representatives, and estate.” But “a plaintiff seeking to recover under Texas's wrongful death statute must demonstrate that the defendant's wrongful actions more likely than not caused the decedent's death-not just that they reduced the decedent's chance of survival by some lesser degree.” Thus, “where preexisting illnesses or injuries have made a patient's chance of avoiding the ultimate harm improbable even before the alleged negligent conduct occurs-i.e., the patient would die or suffer impairment anyway-” recovery is barred. Meanwhile, “proof of mere possibilities will not support submission of an issue to the jury . . . plaintiff must rule out other plausible causes of the injury.”
Slade v. City of Marshall, Tex., 814 F.3d 263, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Kramer v. Lewisville Memorial Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 404 (Tex. 1993)).
Kramer, 858 S.W. at 400.
Christus St. Mary Hosp. v. O'Banion, 227 S.W.3d 868, 874 (Tex. App. 2007).
Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue for trial concerning her wrongful death and survival claims. The undisputed record shows Mr. Haas' chronic medical afflictions contributed to his death, but that his leg fractures did not.
Mr. Haas had long suffered from “severe” and progressive MS-a neurological disorder- and had been wheelchair-bound since 1993. As a result, he required private nursing care for help showering and dressing. Sometime around 2006 he was diagnosed with type 2 diabetes. He developed a neurogenic bladder (i.e., a lack of bladder control due to his MS) and had a catheter inserted in 2011. He also developed “hypertension, hypothyroidism, dyslipidemia, [and] sleep apnea.”
Bux Report at 51; Haas Dep. at 44, 81, 10.
Id. at 83.
Id.
Bux Report at 49.
Id. at 49.
Following the Accident, Mr. Haas underwent surgery to repair his tibial and fibular fractures on March 31, 2019. Although his incisions healed poorly, and required referral to an orthopedic doctor; by October 2019, the doctor noted the incisions had healed properly, and Mr. Haas was advised merely to “continue[] with home exercise therapy.”
Id. at 50.
Haas Dep. at 91; id. at 50.
In March 2020, Mr. Haas suffered a stroke and “new onset seizures,” likely due to his MS. Doctors implanted a pacemaker. He was admitted to the emergency room several times following the stroke, suffering from fevers, UTIs, seizures, altered mental status, aspiration pneumonia, and bedsores. His health continued to decline. In January 2021, doctors discovered he was suffering from sepsis, likely related to his MS. He was placed in hospice care and passed away on February 3, 2021 at the age of 72. Doctors listed the cause of death as MS.
Bux Report at 50; Haas Dep. at 88; Dichoso Dep. at 57, 78.
Haas Dep. at 90.
Bux Report at 50; Haas Dep. at 88-90.
Bux Report at 51.
Id.
Id.; Haas Dep. at 8.
Dichoso Dep. at 62.
According to a report by Dr. Bux, one of the doctors who reviewed Mr. Haas' medical records, any deterioration he experienced after the Accident “was the result of his worsening multiple sclerosis, urinary tract infections and the . . . stroke . . ., which resulted in progressively increasing debility. The bilateral tibial fractures and left fibular fracture neither caused his death nor were contributing factors to his death.” Dr. Cuda, who also reviewed Mr. Haas' records, concluded his
Bux Report at 51-52.
other comorbidities were far more serious and ultimately led to issues related to urosepsis and overwhelming systemic sepsis as the probable [and] most reasonable cause for his ultimate death....There is simply no evidence in the medical record to support that the orthopedic injury was a significant factor or, for that matter, any factor at all in the ultimate deterioration in Mr. Hass' [sic] condition and subsequent
death.
MSJ, Appendix 69, Ex. F, “Report and CV Darryl D. Cuda, M.D.,” ECF No. 34-2, filed Mar. 24, 2022
Nonetheless, Plaintiff asserts a connection between Mr. Haas' leg injuries and his eventual passing, testifying in her deposition that his “health really declined” after the Accident, which she felt “added to his demise.” She claims vaguely that he “just seemed weaker” afterwards, that his caretakers “just had to do a little more” to help him with feeding and bathing. She acknowledges, however, that most of the decline seemed to follow his stroke.
Haas Dep. at 110, 93.
Id. at 111, 114.
Id. at 114.
Plaintiff's expert witness, meanwhile, opined the Accident was an “inciting event,” which related to Mr. Haas' overall decline. He concluded that, “had this event not occurred, . . . [Mr. Haas] would have lived at least another three to five years with a much better quality of life.”When pressed, however, he acknowledged that 1) Mr. Haas died of UTI sepsis, with his stroke being a “major contributing factor”; 2) leg fractures do not cause UTIs or strokes; and 3) progressive MS would have inevitably led to a decrease in Mr. Haas' medical condition irrespective of any leg fractures. Furthermore, when challenged, he was unable to point to any scholarly or experiential basis to support his belief that lower leg injuries cause decline in wheelchair-bound MS patients. Instead, his impression of Mr. Haas' decline after the Accident was based entirely on Plaintiff's deposition. Finally, he testified that he did not disagree with anything in the reports by Drs. Bux and Cuda.
Dichoso Dep. at 68, 63.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 56, 58.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 67-68, 117.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 98, 102.
Although Plaintiff and her expert witness contend the Accident contributed to Mr. Haas' medical decline, the “scintilla of evidence” they bring to bear is conclusory and unsubstantiated.Moreover, even if Mr. Haas' health did decline as a result of the Accident, his subsequent stroke was clearly a superseding event, breaking any causal connection between the Accident and his death. Thus, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant's alleged negligence “more likely than not caused [Mr. Haas'] death,” as required under Texas' wrongful death statute. Instead, preexisting illnesses made his chance of avoiding death improbable irrespective of Defendant's alleged negligence.
See Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
See Stolt Achievement, Ltd. v. Dredge B.E. LINDHOLM, 447 F.3d 360, 367-68 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The superseding cause doctrine applies where the defendant's negligence in fact substantially contributed to the plaintiff's injury, but the injury was actually brought about by a later cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable.”).
See Slade, 814 F.3d at 264-65.
See Kramer, 858 S.W. at 400.
Accordingly, even when “view[ing] all facts in the light most favorable to” Plaintiff and drawing all factual inferences in her favor, there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning Plaintiff's wrongful death and survival claims. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to these claims.
See Cheatham, 465 F.3d at 582 (citation omitted).
See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court enters the following orders:
1. It is HEREBY ORDERED that “Defendant's Motion for Final Summary Judgment” [ECF No. 34] is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff's negligence claim.
2. It is FURTHER ORDERED that “Defendant's Motion for Final Summary Judgment” [ECF No. 34] is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff's wrongful death and survival claims.
SIGNED AND ENTERED.