Instead, the term means "that the two tracts must have been owned at some time in the past by the same person. It is not the law that both tracts must have been owned by the same person at the time of . . . conveyance . . . to [the owner of the servient estate]." DeWitt v. Cavender at ¶ 8, 878 P.2d at 1079 (emphasis and citations omitted); see also Haas v. Brannon, 1924 OK 500, 99 Okla. 94, 225 P. 931. ¶ 12 In the present case, Plaintiffs introduced into evidence a 1946 probate decree which recited that Pat Peck owned both properties at his death.

" Mooney v. Mooney, 2003 OK 51, ¶ 17, 70 P.3d 872, 876. An easement is a right to do something on another's land, coupled with an interest or estate in the land affected. See Haas v. Brannon, 1924 OK 500, 225 P. 931, 932 Fourth Syllabus by the Court and 936. As applicable here, the passageway or roadway crossing defendants' land is the easement whereby the landlocked parcel initially conveyed by defendants to their son may be accessed. In the Third Syllabus by the Court in Thomas v. Morgan, 1925 OK 494, 240 P. 735, overruled on other grounds, Pearson v. Hasty, 1943 OK 179, 137 P.2d 545, the Court stated:

There remains for consideration the issue of whether plaintiffs had a prescriptive easement or only a revocable license covering the property rights that they assert. Defendant cites Haas et al. v. Brannon, 99 Okla. 94, 225 P. 931, as being dispositive of this case. As we understand defendant, he contends and presents authority to the effect that an easement such as is asserted by plaintiffs must rest on an express grant where, as here, there was never common ownership of the lots; that in the absence of an express agreement, the owners of Lot 13 had only a license to use the common stairway, hall and dividing wall which was revocable by either owner at any time, and that the license was revoked upon defendant's electing to make improvements to his building or to demolish his building for the purpose of building a modern building.

Also see Tiffany on Real Property (Third Edition) Section 794 in which Professor Tiffany states: Thomas v. Morgan, 113 Okla. 212, 240 P. 735 (1925); Haas v. Brannon, 99 Okla. 94, 225 P. 931 (1924). "Since, as previously mentioned, the recognition of a way of necessity is based on the intention imputed to the parties at the time of the severance of the ownership, it follows that the existence of the privilege, and also its extent, is to be determined with reference to what is necessary for the use of the premises in the manner contemplated by the parties at the time of such severance."

Thus, it is necessary for the fair enjoyment of the Storys' estate and a reservation of their right to continue such use arises by implication of the law. Hefner relies on Haas v. Brannon, 99 Okla. 94, 225 P. 931 (1924), claiming that Story's use of the Hefner portion of the lake after the exchange of the deeds was based on an oral license and thus was revocable at will. The Court defined a license in Haas v. Brannon, as "an authority to do a particular act upon another's land without possessing an estate therein.

A license is defined as a privilege extended to do some acts on land without possessing an estate therein. In Haas v. Brannon, 99 Okla. 94, 225 P. 931, a license was defined thus: "License is an authority to do a particular act or series of acts upon another's land without possessing an estate therein. It is distinguished from an easement, which implies an interest in the land to be affected.

Neither was consideration given to any claim of an easement by implication, inasmuch as it was affirmatively disclosed that no unity of ownership in the two properties ever had existed. See 17 Am.Jur., Easements, Sec. 32 et seq.; Haas v. Brannon, 99 Okla. 94, 225 P. 931; Gorman v. Overmyer, 199 Okla. 451, 190 P.2d 447. The sole question remaining for consideration is the propriety of the trial court's adjudication that defendants had acquired an easement in the driveway over plaintiffs' property by prescription.

" 28 C.J.S. § 30, p. 686. In Haas v. Brannon, 99 Okla. 94, 225 P. 931, this court approves the necessary requisities to create an easement by implication as follows: "Three things are regarded as essential to create an easement by implication on the severance of the unity of ownership in an estate: (1) a separation of the title; (2) that before the separation takes place, the use, which gives rise to the easement, shall have so long continued and so obvious or manifest as to show that it was meant to be permanent; (3) that the easement shall be necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the land granted or retained."

In this court defendants contend that the trial court erred in refusing to require the plaintiffs to pay their proportionate part of the expense of said new line for the reason that because of the building of the Northwest Sewage Disposal line to the vicinity of the property of plaintiffs, the need for an easement or servitude upon the lands of the defendants, upon which the septic tank and disposal unit were located, had ceased, citing McKenna v. Williams, 196 Okla. 603, 167 P.2d 368, and cases from other jurisdictions. They also cite Catterall v. Pulis, 137 Okla. 86, 278 P. 292, holding that an easement for way is an interest in lands and cannot be created by parole grant, and that the mere permissive use of lands by another cannot give an easement by prescription. They also contend that an implied easement cannot be based upon convenience but must be reasonably necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the land granted, citing Haas v. Brannon. 99 Okla. 94, 225 P. 931, and Bixby v. Cravens, 57 Okla. 119, 156 P. 1184. Plaintiffs on the other hand contend that the right to use the sanitary sewer, and the septic tank and disposal unit upon the lands of defendant, constituted an appurtenance which was conveyed to them by the warranty deeds from the defendant, G.A. Nichols, Inc.; that it was necessary to the enjoyment of their property and therefore constituted an implied easement continuous in its nature, citing 16 O.S. 1951 § 14[ 16-14], which states that the word "appurtenances" unless otherwise qualified, shall mean all improvements and every right of whatever character pertaining to the premises described, Anthony v. Barton, 196 Okla. 260, 164 P.2d 642, and other authorities.

In order for an easement by implication to exist two elements must be established, i.e.: A unity of ownership of the dominant and servient estates and necessity for such way. Haas v. Brannon, 99 Okla. 94, 225 P. 931. And "the burden of proving that a purchaser acquired more than his deed describes, and thus that he comes within the rule" that gives rise to an easement by implied grant "rests upon him."