12. The Director's refusal to issue a declaratory ruling on duplicative matters raised in CARD's petition for a declaratory ruling was therefore not an abuse of his discretion under Department Rule § 3-5(3) and (5). See Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sae Temple, 87 Hawai'i at 231, 953 P.2d at 1329 ("Director was correct in concluding that it would be a waste of time and effort to duplicate his consideration of the same issues in the context of a request for a declaratory ruling" where issues raised were "`substantially the same' as those relating to the various variance applications."); cf. Haas Haynie Corp. v. Pac. Millwork Supply, Inc., 2 Haw.App. 132, 134, 627 P.2d 291, 293 (1981) ("It is well-settled that courts will not entertain a declaratory judgment action if there is pending, at the time of the commencement of the action for declaratory relief, an action or proceeding to which the same persons are parties and in which the same issues may be adjudicated.") (citing 22 Am. Jur.2d Declaratory Judgments § 16 (1965), for the proposition that "[u]nder the general rule, a declaratory judgment is not a proper mode of determining the sufficiency of legal defenses to a pending action"). 13. Additionally, the Director's decision to decline to rule on CARD'S petition was not an abuse of his discretion pursuant to HRS § 91-8 because the petition did not seek the determination of a prospective action of the Department in its interpretation of the LUO; rather, CARD requested the Director to determine the propriety of the Director's past action in approving the CUP under the LUO, which CARD had previously and repeatedly challenged in multiple forums.
"It is well-settled that courts will not entertain a declaratory judgment action if there is pending, at the time of the commencement of the action for declaratory relief, another action or proceeding to which the same persons are parties and in which the same issues may be adjudicated." Haas Haynie Corp. v. Pacific Millwork Supply, 627 P.2d 291, 293 (Haw.Ct.App. 1981). Further, a court will refuse to consider a complaint for declaratory relief if a special statutory remedy has been provided.
In such cases, it is generally held that there exists no actual or real existing controversy with which to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the latter court. See, e.g., Trimble v. City of Prichard, 438 So.2d 745 (Ala. 1983); Sim v. Comiskey, 216 Neb. 83, 341 N.W.2d 611 (1983); Haas Haynie Corp. v. Pacific Millwork Supply, 2 Hawaii App. 132, 627 P.2d 291 (1981). Furthermore, the general rule against entertaining a declaratory judgment proceeding if there is a pending action involving the same parties and issues has particular applicability in criminal cases.
"We regard the language of § 632-1, HRS, previously quoted, as being jurisdictional." Haas Haynie Corp. v. Pacific Mill Work Supply, Inc., 2 Haw. App. 132, 134, 627 P.2d 291, 293 (1981). Thus, Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 57 states in relevant part that "[t]he procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to statute shall be in accordance with these rules" and, in Life of the Land v. Land Use Commission, 63 Haw. 166, 177, 623 P.2d 431, 441 (1981), the Hawaii Supreme Court stated that "we next consider whether the criteria prescribed by the procedural statutes invoked, . . . and HRS § 632-1, have also been satisfied."
Moreover, "[w]here . . . a statute provides a specific form of remedy for a specific type of case, that statutory remedy shall be followed." Haas Haynie Corp. v. Pacific Millwork Supply, Inc., 2 Haw. App. 132, 627 P.2d 291 (1981). Cf. HRS § 632-1.