Opinion
No. 5-026 / 04-0674
Filed February 24, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Paul W. Riffel, Judge.
Plaintiffs-appellants, James E. Haag and Caroline C. Haag, appeal the district court's denial of certain injunctive relief. AFFIRMED.
David A. Kuehner of Laird Luhring Law Office, Waverly, appellants.
Gerald B. Carney, Waverly, for appellees.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Hecht, JJ.
Plaintiffs-appellants, James E. Haag and Caroline C. Haag, brought an action in equity against defendants-appellees, Earnest L. Tudor and Evelyn G. Tudor. The residential properties of plaintiffs and defendants adjoin. Plaintiffs sought to have the district court order that defendants remove a garage and part of a driveway that encroached on plaintiffs' property. The district court held plaintiffs were barred by the doctrines of equitable estoppel or laches from obtaining some of the injunctive relief they sought and denied plaintiffs damages. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
Defendants constructed a garage near the property boundary they share with plaintiffs. A common driveway partially on each party's land is shared by plaintiffs and defendants. In 1993 defendants sought to build the two-car garage that is the subject of this dispute. The applicable zoning ordinance required the garage be situated a minimum of five feet from defendants' property line, the measurement being from the foundation wall to the lot line. Because of the size and shape of their lot, defendants hoped to locate the garage closer than five feet to the lot line; thus, they requested and received a variance from the city. The ordinance allowed for such a variance, allowing reduction in the setback to two feet from the lot line. Plaintiffs did not object to the variance. The variance defendants received allowed them to locate the foundation wall of their garage not less than two feet from the lot line, the minimum distance did not pertain to the overhanging roof of the garage.
Defendants proceeded to construct the garage and rebuild and alter certain parts of the common driveway. Defendants constructed a new raised, concrete approach to their garage. Plaintiffs paid for a portion of the common driveway reconstruction and to fill in a grassy triangular area between the two separate approaches with concrete. At no time prior to, or during, construction of the garage or reconstruction of the driveway did plaintiffs protest that defendants were encroaching upon plaintiffs' land.
Nearly ten years after construction of the garage and reconstruction of the driveway, plaintiffs undertook the reconstruction of their sewer line, which apparently required demolition of some of the driveway. Plaintiffs had a survey done for the project, which showed that the overhang on the defendants' garage extended 0.57 feet onto plaintiffs' property and that a portion of the raised, concrete approach to defendants' garage extended a maximum of 2.54 feet over the property line onto plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs requested that the defendants remove their garage. Defendants had a survey done that revealed the same encroachments as plaintiffs' survey had.
Plaintiffs then filed the petition in equity that led to this appeal, alleging trespass and private nuisance. Plaintiffs sought removal of the encroachments and compensation for past loss of use. Plaintiffs also sought an order requiring defendants to come into compliance with the variance to the zoning ordinance they were granted.
After a hearing the district court ruled that (1) plaintiffs' claim regarding the raised, concrete approach's encroachment was barred under the doctrines of equitable estoppel and laches, (2) equity required defendants remove the portion of their garage roof that overhangs onto plaintiffs' property, (3) it would be inequitable to require defendants to relocate their garage to comply with the zoning ordinance, and (4) plaintiffs were not entitled to compensation for past loss of use of their property or any future loss until the removal of the encroachment.
Plaintiffs, on appeal, argue the district court erred by (1) denying their request for a permanent injunction ordering removal of that part of defendants' garage that violates the zoning ordinance and (2) denying their request for a permanent injunction against the defendants ordering the removal of that part of defendants' raised, concrete approach that is located on plaintiffs' property.
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW.
We review equity cases de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. We examine the entire record and adjudicate anew rights on the issues properly presented. Cranston v. Saggau, 526 N.W.2d 338, 340 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994). We may give weight to the factual findings of the district court, but are not bond by them. Id. III. ANALYSIS.
It is undisputed that defendants' garage is situated in violation of the zoning ordinance and that a portion of defendants' raised, concrete approach extends a maximum of 2.54 feet over the property line onto plaintiffs' property. Defendants assert the defenses of equitable estoppel and laches in arguing that we should not provide plaintiffs with the relief they request.
The essential elements of the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel are (1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact, (2) a lack of knowledge of the true facts on the part of actor, (3) the intention that the false representation or concealment be acted upon, and (4) reliance upon the representations by the party to the whom representations were made, to the party's prejudice and injury. City of Marshalltown v. Reyerson, 535 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). Additionally, our case law provides for estoppel in a special situation. "A neighbor who observes in silence and without objection as an adjoining landowner expends large sums toward property improvement may become bound by his silence." Conley v. Warne, 236 N.W.2d 682, 685 (Iowa 1976); see also Ivener v. Cowan, 175 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Iowa 1970); Alcorn v. Linke, 257 Iowa 630, 639-41, 133 N.W.2d 89, 95-96 (1965); Snieders v. Brantsen, 245 Iowa 81, 86-86, 60 N.W.2d 779, 781 (1953); McCartney v. Schuette, 243 Iowa 1358, 1361-62, 54 N.W.2d 462, 463-64 (1952); Cranston, 526 N.W.2d at 341. The party asserting equitable estoppel has the burden of establishing all of the necessary elements by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. Cranston, 526 N.W.2d at 341.
This case fits within the silence component of Iowa's equitable estoppel case law. Plaintiffs were well aware defendants were going to build the garage. Plaintiffs testified that defendants told them they planned to build a new garage and seek a variance from the city. Plaintiffs further testified they agreed to the variance and that they discussed with defendants how the driveway would be rebuilt and how the cost of rebuilding would be shared. Plaintiffs had the opportunity to inspect where the garage was placed with reference to the boundary line and had the opportunity to have a survey completed. Plaintiffs failed to raise an objection.
Additionally, defendants determined what they believed to be the boundary line in good faith, as the line they used had been treated as the boundary during the twenty years defendants and plaintiffs lived as neighbors prior to the time defendants built their garage.
Thus, the present case requires application of equitable estoppel, as plaintiffs witnessed their neighbors, in good faith, assume the boundary line was at a certain location and build valuable improvements based on the assumed boundary line. The district court appropriately denied plaintiffs' request for permanent injunctions seeking removal of the garage and removal of part of the raised, concrete approach.
Having resolved this case on the principles of equitable estoppel we need not determine whether the doctrine of laches applies.