HAAG v. C.I.R

11 Citing cases

  1. Leisure Dynamics, Inc. v. C. I. R

    494 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1974)   Cited 6 times

    Further, almost contemporaneous with the transfer of the rights to the Gumby trademarks, Toy dissolved and its stockholders agreed to share the income generated from the Toy-Lakeside contract among all the shareholders of Productions and Toy. Hence, we deem it appropriate to disregard the separateness of the corporations Toy and Productions and to treat them collectively as one owner holding all rights to effectively market Gumby dolls until these rights were partially transferred to taxpayer. For tax purposes, we must concern ourselves with actualities rather than the refinements of title; our concern is with the substance, not form. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 65 S.Ct. 707, 89 L.Ed. 891 (1945); Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355, 60 S.Ct. 277, 84 L.Ed. 319 (1939); Coca-Cola Co. v. Commissioner, 369 F.2d 913 (8th Cir. 1966); Haag v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1964). We note, too, that the tax court in its analysis of the transaction considered Productions in a transferor posture.

  2. David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States

    668 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2012)   Cited 103 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the district court did not err in finding a proposed expert qualified to testify on what constitutes reasonable compensation when the defendant demonstrated that the expert had worked on approximately 20 to 30 cases involving reasonable compensation during his tenure with the Internal Revenue Service

    Therefore, in discovering all remuneration for employment, "the substance of the transaction as revealed by the evidence as a whole controls over the form employed; i.e., the veil of form is pierced and the entire transaction is carefully scrutinized." Haag v. Comm'r, 334 F.2d 351, 355 (8th Cir. 1964). And, in light of all the facts and circumstances of the case, scrutinizing compensation for its reasonableness may guide a court in characterizing payments for FICA tax purposes.

  3. Exchange Security Bank v. United States

    492 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1974)   Cited 3 times

    Taxpayers argue that the income was realized in 1959 when the settlement was made on March 10 or at least in August when Judge Grooms found appellants had performed all their obligations under the contract. For tax purposes, we view the "substance" and not the "form" of a transaction, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 79 S. Ct. 1270, 3 L.Ed.2d 1360 (1959); Haag v. C. I. R., 8 Cir., 1964, 334 F.2d 351. It seems indisputably clear that after the August 18, 1959 District Court order enforcing the March 10 contract, nothing whatever took place but an unsuccessful appeal of that order. The Supreme Court said in Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 72 S.Ct. 571, 96 L.Ed. 833 (1952):

  4. Coca-Cola Company v. C.I.R

    369 F.2d 913 (8th Cir. 1966)   Cited 7 times
    In Coca-Cola v. Commissioner (8th Cir., 1966), 369 F.2d 913, this court frowned upon the attempt of the taxpayer to urge the agreement was other than stated and held the form stated the actual agreement.

    Taxpayer seeks to circumvent the written contract by arguing that it does not in fact represent the actual agreement of the parties, and that consideration of the prior negotiations between the parties requires the conclusion that a portion of the amount paid was for cancellation of the employment contract. It is, of course, the general rule that in the field of taxation the substance of the transaction as revealed by the evidence as a whole controls over the form employed. Haag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 334 F.2d 351, 355 (8th Cir. 1964) and cases cited therein. Certainly the courts are at liberty to pierce the form of a particular transaction to arrive at the just tax liability.

  5. Buder v. United States

    354 F.2d 941 (8th Cir. 1966)   Cited 3 times

    Its incidence "depends upon the substance, not the form, of the transaction". Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 461, 79 S.Ct. 1270, 1279 (1959); Haag v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 351, 355 (8 Cir. 1964). "Where the taxpayer does not receive payment of income in money or property realization may occur when the last step is taken by which he obtains the fruition of the economic gain which has already accrued to him".

  6. Meredith Corp. v. United States

    405 F. Supp. 3d 795 (S.D. Iowa 2019)   Cited 2 times

    The Eighth Circuit recognizes "the substance of the transaction as revealed by the evidence as a whole controls over the form employed." David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States , 668 F.3d 1008, 1017–18 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Haag v. Comm'r , 334 F.2d 351, 355 (8th Cir. 1964) ). Additionally, the benefits-and-burdens test requires a determination "based on all the facts and circumstances," not based on only the written agreements.

  7. Midwest Inv. Co. v. United States

    386 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.D. 1975)

    RATIONALE         Plaintiff argues that the sale of the building by Midwest and the subsequent distribution of cash to the stockholders in partial liquidation of stock should be treated as one integrated transaction, because that was the obvious intention of the parties and cites Haag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 334 F.2d 351, 355 (8th Cir. 1964), as authority for the general rule that the substance of the transaction as revealed by the evidence controls over the form employed.         Defendant argues that the desire and intended tax result could have been achieved only through acts by the corporation and the shareholders which meet the requirements of the statute, and that in this case those requirements were not met.

  8. Moscowitz v. United States

    314 F. Supp. 926 (E.D. Mo. 1970)   Cited 3 times
    In Moscowitz v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 926 (E.D.Mo. 1970), a taxpayer's suit was filed against the United States for recovery of alleged overpayment of federal income taxes.

    Generally, in the field of taxation, the substance of a transaction as revealed by the evidence as a whole controls over the form employed. See, e. g., Haag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 334 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1964). In all approaches and test, due consideration is given the contract.

  9. Matthies v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    134 T.C. 141 (U.S.T.C. 2010)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that the insurer's acceptance of the stated account value of a life insurance policy as payment in full of a single premium due on a replacement policy supported the conclusion that the entire cash value of the exchanged policy should be determined without regard to surrender charges

    Instead it was an arrangement by which an employer transferred valuable property to his employees in recognition of their services.” Id.; see also Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 65 S.Ct. 591, 89 L.Ed. 830 (1945) (holding that the bargain element of an employer's bargain sale of stock to an employee represented taxable income to the employee); Lowndes v. United States, 384 F.2d 635 (4th Cir.1967); Haag v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 488, 1963 WL 1570 (1963), affd. 334 F.2d 351 (8th Cir.1964); Waldheim v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 839, 850–851, 1956 WL 777 (1956), affd. 244 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.1957); Strake Trust v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 1131, 1943 WL 181 (1943). The transfer from the profit-sharing plan to petitioner was pursuant to a prearranged plan for him to use IRA funds to buy life insurance through the profit-sharing plan, which was established for this purpose and with the expectation that it would shortly thereafter distribute the policy to petitioner.

  10. Caracci v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    118 T.C. 379 (U.S.T.C. 2002)

    It contrasts strongly to situations cited by respondent involving compensation, such as Strandquist v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.1970–84 (president of car sales company taxable on value of new cars he received in excess of value of used cars he turned in). Nor is this a situation involving disguised rentals paid to a lessor-shareholder, as in Haag v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 351, 355 (8th Cir.1964), affg. 40 T.C. 488, 1963 WL 1570 (1963). Nor is it, in substance, a distribution with respect to the stock of a controlling shareholder for his personal benefit, as in Kenner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.1974–273 (doctor who owned tax-exempt hospital corporation taxed on relatively small amounts it transferred to corporation that operated his ranch in Arizona).