Gypsy Oil Co. v. Green

15 Citing cases

  1. Simpson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.

    70 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1934)   Cited 14 times

    . 621. In the last above cited case an instruction almost identical with the third instruction in this case, was approved by the Supreme Court. Dickinson v. Cole, 177 P. 570, and all other cases cited under point 3. (7) The court did not commit error in giving plaintiff's Instruction 4. The instruction properly stated the law as applied to the facts in this case, and even if there had been the omission complained of by appellant it was fully covered by other instructions, and taking the instructions as a whole the jury could not be and was not misled. City of Tulsa v. Loyd, 129 Okla. 27, 263 P. 152; Bucktrot v. Partridge, 130 Okla. 122, 265 P. 768; Ponca City Milling Co. v. Krow, 131 Okla. 98, 267 P. 629; Orcutt v. Century Bldg. Co., 214 Mo. 35; Cassin v. Lusk, 270 Mo. 663; Milligan v. Ry. Co., 79 Mo. App. 393; Hartpence v. Rogers, 143 Mo. 623. (8) The court did not err in giving plaintiff's Instruction 6. This form of instruction has been upheld in both the State of Missouri, and the State of Oklahoma. Gypsy Oil Co. v. Green, 198 P. 851; Big Jack Mining Co. v. Parkinson, 137 P. 679. It would have been reversible error for the court to have admitted evidence on the question of the expectancy of the deceased's wife, the respondent in this case, under the laws of the State of Oklahoma. Ry. Co. v. Lee, 175 P. 367; Jones v. Ry. Co., 178 Mo. 528. Even if the instruction should not prove exactly correct, yet if no prejudice was caused thereby this court will not reverse the cause. Jones v. Ry. Co., 178 Mo. 554; Big Jack Mining Co. v. Parkington, 137 P. 679.

  2. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Kilgore

    1961 OK 261 (Okla. 1961)   Cited 8 times
    In St. Louis-San Francisco Railway v. Kilgore, 366 P.2d 936 (Okla. 1961), the plaintiff was awarded $35,000 in a personal injury action as a result of a train-automobile collision.

    The above case was cited with approval in the case of Hembree Chevrolet v. Southard, Okla., 339 P.2d 771. See also Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Fontron Loan Trust Co., 89 Okla. 87, 214 P. 172; Oklahoma Portland Cement Co. v. Dow, 98 Okla. 44, 224 P. 168; Independent Cotton Oil Co. v. Beacham, 31 Okla. 384, 120 P. 969; Slick Oil Co. v. Coffey, 72 Okla. 32, 177 P. 915; Gypsy Oil Co. v. Green, 82 Okla. 147, 198 P. 851; City of Sapulpa v. Deason, 81 Okla. 51, 196 P. 544, and Southern Kansas Stage Lines Co. v. Crain, 185 Okla. 1, 89 P.2d 968. Proper consideration as to whether the verdict is excessive and the result of prejudice and passion necessitates a review of the facts concerning the nature and extent of the injuries.

  3. Connie's Prescription Shop v. McCann

    316 P.2d 823 (Okla. 1957)   Cited 4 times

    The expectation of a child for contribution from the parent who has been wrongfully killed is not necessarily limited to the minority of the child but may extend to all pecuniary benefit reasonably expected. Belford v. Allen, 183 Okla. 256, 80 P.2d 671; Cook v. Knox, Okla., 273 P.2d 865; Gypsy Oil Co. v. Green, 82 Okla. 147, 198 P. 851. In the case under consideration, the evidence as to the character, ability and attentive disposition of the deceased coupled with the medical testimony concerning the nature of her child's ailment is amply sufficient to establish a reasonable expectation that the deceased would have continued these services and attentions beyond the child's minority.

  4. Otis Elevator Company v. Melott

    1955 OK 364 (Okla. 1955)   Cited 14 times

    It is well settled that what is or what is not negligence in a particular case ordinarily is a question for the jury, and not the court. In this connection see Littlejohn v. Midland Valley Railway Company, 47 Okla. 204, 148 P. 120; Swift v. McMurray, 133 Okla. 104, 271 P. 635; Gypsy Oil Co. v. Green, 82 Okla. 147, 198 P. 851. In their requested instructions Nos. 8 and 9 defendants requested the trial court to submit to the jury the issue of third party negligence, that is, negligence on the part of the Masonic Building Association and its employees.

  5. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hicks

    1953 OK 189 (Okla. 1953)   Cited 5 times

    This court has frequently held that where from the facts shown by the evidence, although undisputed, reasonable men might draw different conclusions respecting the question of negligence, such question is properly for the jury. Gypsy Oil Co. v. Green, 82 Okla. 147, 198 P. 851. The converse of this principle of law comes into play where disputed facts fail to establish primary negligence.

  6. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Hawkins

    194 Okla. 272 (Okla. 1944)   Cited 14 times

    Upon thorough review of the contentions here we are likewise convinced that the ends of justice require that we hold this verdict for $50,750 to be excessive, and that we should remand this cause to the trial court with directions to grant a new trial unless the plaintiff files a remittitur in the sum of $15,000. See, also, C., R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Fontron Loan Trust Co., Adm'r, 89 Okla. 87, 214 P. 172; Oklahoma Portland Cement Co. v. Dow, 98 Okla. 44, 224 P. 168; Independent Cotton Oil Co. v. Beacham. 31 Okla. 384, 120 P. 969; Slick Oil Co. v. Coffey, 72 Okla. 32, 177 P. 915; Gypsy Oil Co. v. Green, 82 Okla. 147, 198 P. 251, and City of Sapulpa v. Deason, 81 Okla. 51, 196 P. 544. In its discussion of the Brooks Case, supra, defendant asserts that it points to the correlative proposition that the consideration of the question of excessive damages involves careful examination of the court's instructions, and that the court in this case erred in instructing the jury to the effect that plaintiff might recover for loss of contributions which she might ". . . reasonably have anticipated receiving from her husband for such period of the time as she might reasonably have been expected to live. . . ."

  7. Carpenter v. Kurn

    348 Mo. 1132 (Mo. 1941)   Cited 10 times
    In Carpenter v. Kurn, 157 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Mo. 1941), this Court said that where an experiment was made under similar or approximately similar circumstances, any dissimilarity goes to weight and not admissibility.

    (7) The verdict and judgment of $20,000 is grossly excessive, in view of the age and limited earnings of the deceased. Willgues v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 318 Mo. 28, 298 S.W. 817; Brown v. Chicago, R.I. P. Co., 315 Mo. 409, 286 S.W. 45; Gypsy Oil Co. v. Green, 82 Okla. 147, 198 P. 851; Chicago, R.I. P. Railroad Co. v. Brooks, 11 P.2d 142; City of Sapulpa v. Deason, 196 P. 544; New v. McMillan, 191 P. 160. Sizer Myres and Harry G. Waltner, Jr., for respondent. (1) Respondent made a case to go to the jury.

  8. Belford v. Allen

    183 Okla. 256 (Okla. 1938)   Cited 26 times
    In Belford v. Allen, 183 Okla. 256, 80 P.2d 671, and other cases, we have held that newly discovered evidence which only impeaches or contradicts former evidence does not justify the granting of a new trial, and we have further held in numerous cases that the overruling of such motion for new trial must be shown to be an abuse of discretion before we will reverse the action of the trial court.

    Plaintiff's petition plainly alleges damages "for pecuniary loss," and instruction number 9 informs the jury that plaintiff's measure of damages, in case of a finding in his favor, is the pecuniary loss to the children by virtue of the death of deceased. Instruction number 9 is in substance the same as that approved by this court in the case of Catto v. Maxey (1935) 170 Okla. 356, 40 P.2d 633. See, also, Big Jack Mining Co. v. Parkinson (1913) 41 Okla. 125, 137 P. 678. Instruction No. 10 is correct in all respects. See Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Canada (1928) 130 Okla. 171, 265 P. 1045, and Tackett v. Tackett (1935) 174 Okla. 51, 50 P.2d 293 (holding that in an action such as the present one, the law implies substantial loss to a minor child of the deceased), and Gypsy Oil Co. v. Green (1921) 82 Okla. 147, 198 P. 851 (holding that the right of recovery is not limited to children of deceased to losses suffered during their minority, but extends to probable pecuniary loss after they reach their majority; the recovery, however, whether by minor or adult children, to be based upon the reasonable expectancy of pecuniary benefit, of which they were deprived by the death of their parent). Nor can we agree with defendant that the giving of the instructions constituted reversible error for the reason that there was no pleading or evidence to warrant them. Plaintiff's third cause of action was predicated on pecuniary loss, and the evidence clearly showed pecuniary loss to at least one of the adult children and the two minor children.

  9. Westgate Oil Co. v. McAbee

    181 Okla. 487 (Okla. 1938)   Cited 17 times

    The recovery, if any, must be based upon the reasonable expectancy of pecuniary benefit of which the children were deprived by the death of their mother. In Gypsy Oil Co. v. Green, 82 Okla. 147, 198 P. 851, this court held: "Under section 5281, Rev. Laws 1910, the right of recovery is not limited to children of a deceased father to losses suffered during their minority, and they may recover for probable pecuniary loss after they reach their majority, but the recovery had, whether by minor or adult children, must be based upon the reasonable expectancy of pecuniary benefit, of which they were deprived by the death of their father."

  10. Clanton v. Chrisman

    51 P.2d 748 (Okla. 1935)   Cited 12 times
    In Clanton v. Chrisman, 174 Okla. 425, 51 P.2d 748, 749, an objection was lodged to an instruction in that it did not state: "and you further find that said failure proximately contributed to the injury."

    It is only when the facts are not controverted or whether controverted or not, when all men must draw the same conclusion from them, that the question of negligence becomes one of law for the court, and when fair-minded men may honestly draw different conclusions, the question is always one of fact for the jury. Gypsy Oil Co. v. Green, 82 Okla. 47, 198 P. 851; Harris v. M., K. T. Ry. Co., 24 Okla. 341, 103 P. 758; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Teel, 82 Okla. 31, 198 P. 78. The same rule prevails regarding the matter of proximate cause.