Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover

29 Citing cases

  1. Hall v. Galmor

    2018 OK 59 (Okla. 2018)   Cited 15 times
    Discussing James Energy Co. v. HCG Energy Corp., 1992 OK 117, 847 P.2d 333, and its statement "the lessor must demand that an implied covenant be complied with before a court of equity will grant a forfeiture"

    1939 OK 335, ¶ 14, 186 Okla. 144, 96 P.2d 322, 325 ; see also Walker & Withrow, Inc. v. Haley , 1982 OK 107, ¶ 5, 653 P.2d 191, 193 ("Since § 87.1 did not apply retroactively, the 1958 lease is still in force because there is a producing well upon lands located within the same well spacing unit."); Wickham v. Gulf Oil Corp. , 1981 OK 8, ¶ 14, 623 P.2d 613, 616 (stating "the previous law [provided] that the production of oil and gas in commercial quantities from any part of the leased premises during the primary term extended the lease not only as to the acreage committed to the drilling and spacing unit but also as to the lands lying outside of the unit area."); Siniard v. Davis , 1984 OK CIV APP 13, ¶ 12, 678 P.2d 1197, 1200-01 ("Prior to the enactment of the statutory Pugh clause ..., production from the unit satisfied the habendum clause of the lease as to the part of the leased premises included in the unit and also as to the part of the leased premises outside of the unit."); cf. Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover , 1920 OK 94, ¶¶ 0, 18, 189 P. 540, 540, 544, 78 Okla. 158, 189 P. 540 (citing Pierce Oil Corp. v. Schacht , 1919 OK 142, 75 Okla. 101, 181 P. 731 ).Kardokus v. Walsh , 1990 OK 39, ¶ 5, 797 P.2d 322, 324 ; Rein v. Humble Oil & Ref'g Co. , 1965 OK 51, ¶ 13, 400 P.2d 800, 803 ; Layton , 1963 OK 140, ¶¶ 4-6, 383 P.2d at 625-26 ; Carter Oil Co. of W. Va. , 1958 OK 289, ¶ 33, 336 P.2d at 1093 ; Kunc , 1956 OK 118, ¶ 29, 297 P.2d at 376.

  2. Sauder v. Mid-Continent Corp.

    292 U.S. 272 (1934)   Cited 66 times
    Holding that the lessee of an oil and gas lease who produced oil on a forty-acre tract, but abstained from drilling on an adjacent section of land, could not hold the undeveloped part of the land indefinitely without drilling or establishing an intention to drill in the future; as a result, the lessor was equitably entitled to cancel the lease

    Respondent contends that its lease does not impose upon it any implied obligation to drill an additional well upon the leased premises, in the absence of an affirmative showing that, under all the circumstances, there was a reasonable probability that oil or gas, in paying quantities, would have been discovered, or that a reasonably prudent operator would have drilled. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801; Texas Co. v. Waggoner, 239 S.W. 354; Goodwin v. Standard Oil Co., 290 F. 92; Orr v. Comar Oil Co., 46 F.2d 59; Smith v. McGill, 12 F.2d 32; Denker v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 56 F.2d 725; Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, 55 F.2d 634; Franklin v. Wigton, 132 Okla. 236; Robinson v. Miracle, 146 Okla. 31; Empire Gas Fuel Co. v. Haggard, 152 Okla. 35; Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover, 78 Okla. 158. Inasmuch as it is admitted that the two wells were drilled during the primary term of the lease; that oil was discovered in paying quantities in each of them; that at all times subsequent to their completion they had produced oil in paying quantities and were still so producing, it necessarily follows that respondent's lease was in full force and effect as to each and every part of the leased premises, unless it had abandoned some portion, or unless it had failed to drill some "offset" well, which it was required to drill, or unless a reasonably prudent operator, under the circumstances, would have drilled an additional well.

  3. Berry v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co.

    188 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1951)   Cited 14 times
    In Berry v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 5 Cir., 188 F.2d 820, a suit was filed to cancel an assignment of a portion of the lease because no well was drilled on such assigned portion within the time provided for in the lease although the original lessee had brought in a producing well on his retained portion within the time provided.

    Stokely v. State, 149 Miss. 435, 115 So. 563; Cummings v. Mid-States Oil Corp., 193 Miss. 675, 9 So.2d 648; Koenig v. Calcote, 199 Miss. 435, 25 So.2d 763. Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, 5 Cir., 55 F.2d 634; Pearson v. Black, Tex.Civ. App., 120 S.W.2d 1075; Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Campbell, 5 Cir., 164 F.2d 907; Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover, 78 Okla. 158, 189 P. 540; Smith v. Gypsy Oil, 130 Okla. 135, 265 P. 647; State ex rel. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Worden, 44 N.M. 400, 103 P.2d 124; South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S.E. 961, 962, 43 L.R.A., N.S., 848; Cadillac Oil Gas Co. v. Harrison, 196 Ky. 290, 244 S.W. 669; Wilson v. Purnell, 199 Ky. 218, 250 S.W. 850; Cowman v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 142 Kan. 762, 51 P.2d 988; Wilson v. Texas Co., 147 Kan. 449, 76 P.2d 779; and such textbooks as Thuss, Texas Oil Gas (2nd Ed.) Sec. 74, p. 102; 3 Summers Oil Gas (Per. Ed.) Sec. 512; Glassmire, Oil and Gas Leases and Royalties (2nd Ed.) Sec. 86; Thornton (Willis) Oil and Gas, Vol. 2, Sec. 338; and Professor A.W. Walker, Jr., in his mimeographed text on oil and gas, on page 705. Supporting their claim, indeed basing it entirely, on their construction of White v. Hunt, 193 Miss. 742, 10 So.2d 539; they insisted below, they repeat that insistence here: that in and by that decision the Supreme Court of Mississippi, deliberately rejecting t

  4. Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Spencer

    6 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1925)   Cited 4 times

    A temporary suspension of operations may not be inconsistent with the exercise of due diligence, where it occurs under circumstances warranting the inference that a continuance of operations would not be of benefit or profit to parties in interest. Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover, 78 Okla. 158, 189 P. 540, 11 A.L.R. 129, 137. That the suspension of operations was unaccompanied by any intention on appellant's part to abandon the enterprise or terminate the lease may be inferred from the fact that it left its equipment on the premises, and did not exercise the right given to it by the lease to draw and remove the casing in the well. Support for the conclusion that the suspension of operations was consistent with the exercise of due diligence in prosecuting the work was furnished by the evidence to the effect that during the period of suspension there was no market for the gas in the well and no commercial pipe line through which it could be carried, by the fact, of which judicial notice may be taken, that gas, unlike oil, cannot be brought to the surface and stored to await a market for it, and by the absence of evidence showing that either the lessor or the lessee would have been benefited by the well being completed as a gas well in August instead of in the following November. It well might be inferred th

  5. Watchorn v. Roxana Petroleum Corp.

    5 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1925)   Cited 16 times

    Many cases have established the doctrine as to leases covering different tracts, some contiguous and some not, that the lease covered the entire tract as an entity, and that the drilling of a well upon a noncontiguous tract thereof was sufficient to extend the life of the lease on the entire tract. See Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover et al., 78 Okla. 158, 189 P. 540, 11 A.L.R. 129; South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438, 76 S.E. 961, 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 848; Wilson v. Purnell et al., 199 Ky. 218, 250 S.W. 850; Harness et ux. v. Eastern Oil Co. et al., 49 W. Va. 232, 38 S.E. 662; Cadillac Oil Gas Co. v. Harrison et al., 196 Ky. 290, 244 S.W. 669; Thornton on Oil and Gas, § 920. The terms "proper development" and "development" have been considered by the courts in connection principally with leases of oil and gas rights.

  6. Hurley Enterprises, Inc. v. Sun Gas Co.

    543 F. Supp. 359 (W.D. Ark. 1982)   Cited 1 times

    See Berry v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 188 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. (Miss.) 1951); Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Campbell, 164 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. (Tex.) 1947); Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, 55 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. (Tex.) 1932); Gulf Oil Corporation v. Prevost, 358 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Civ.App. 1976); Dacamara v. Binney, 146 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.Civ.App. 1940); Pearson v. Black, 120 S.W.2d 1075 (Tex.Civ.App. 1938); Smith v. Gypsy Oil, 130 Okla. 135, 265 P. 647 (1928); Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover, 78 Okla. 158, 189 P. 540 (1920); State ex rel. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Worden, 44 N.M. 400, 103 P.2d 124 (1940); Wilson v. Texas Co., 147 Kan. 449, 76 P.2d 779 (1938); Cowman v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 142 Kan. 762, 51 P.2d 988 (1935); McCammon v. Texas Co., 137 F. Supp. 256 (D.C.Kan. 1955); Cameron v. Lebow, 366 S.W.2d 164 (Ky. 1962); Cameron v. Lebow, 338 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1960); Wilson v. Purnell, 199 Ky.218, 250 S.W. 850 (1923). In Berry v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., supra, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in words that this Court believes appropriate in this case, stated:

  7. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. McCornack

    33 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Okla. 1940)

    The same rule is recognized by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma State Court of Oklahoma in Oklahoma State Bank of Wapanucka v. Burnett et al., 65 Okl. 74, 162 P. 1124, 4 A.L.R. 430.         In 38 C.J. 53, Section 89, it is said: 'The lis pendens of a suit pending in a federal court extends to the property involved in the suit which is within the jurisdiction of the court. ' See, also, Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover et al., 78 Okl. 158, 189 P. 540, 11 A.L.R. 129, and Zorn v. Van Buskirk, et al., 111 Okl. 211, 239 P. 151.          The court finds that the description of the lands, occupied by the plaintiff company as right of way which are in controversy in this suit, was included in the mortgage to Fleming, in the petition filed by Fleming in the state court, and in the judgment of the foreclosure, through inadvertence, and that it was not the intention of the parties themselves to include said right of way property in the Fleming foreclosure.

  8. Shields v. Moffitt

    1984 OK 42 (Okla. 1984)   Cited 9 times

    In Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover, we said (189 P. at p. 544): "This Court held in the case of Roach v. Junction Oil Gas Co. [ 72 Okla. 213], 179 P. 934, 935 [1919], that after gas was found upon the leased premises (within the primary term of the lease) in paying quantities, the lessee became vested with a limited estate in the leased premises for further operations in accordance with the terms of the lease — citing Brennan v. Hunter [ 68 Okla. 112], 172 P. 49, citing numerous cases." 78 Okla. 158, 189 P. 540, 11 A.L.R. 129 (1920). From the foregoing, we conclude that the holder of an oil and gas lease during the primary term or as extended by production has a base or qualified fee, i.e., an estate in real property having the nature of a fee, but not a fee simple absolute.

  9. Caney Production Company v. Kane

    438 P.2d 938 (Okla. 1968)

    In the Kolb case no issue or proposition was presented relative to the effect of including non-contiguous tracts in an oil and gas lease, and consequently the decision is not determinative of such proposition in the present appeal. Plaintiffs also cite Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover, 78 Okla. 158, 189 P. 540, 11 A.L.R. 129. In that case two non-contiguous tracts were included in an oil and gas lease, and production was secured by one tract, and the royalties were paid and accepted by the owners of the land.

  10. RIST v. WESTHOMA OIL COMPANY

    1963 OK 126 (Okla. 1963)   Cited 20 times
    In Rist, there could have been no controversy as to the facts the decision was based upon, because the case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts.

    To reach a different conclusion we would, in our view, be obliged to rewrite the contract and to change the obligations, rights and duties of the parties so that the lessors' rights were enlarged and the lessees' duties increased at the instant of the assignment of an interest in that part of the leasehold below sea level. See Gypsy Oil Co. v. Cover, 78 Okla. 158, 189 P. 540, 11 A.L.R. 129. We have said before that "Courts will not make contract for parties, but will only effectuate purpose of contract actually made.