Opinion
No. 2312 C.D. 2011
06-05-2012
Gypsy Lane Owners Association v. Lissette DeJesus, Appellant
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE McGINLEY
Lissette DeJesus (DeJesus) appeals the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (common pleas court) that approved and entered as an order a "Consent and Agreement Order to Settle Matter" (Agreement) and entered judgment in the amount of $40,000.00 in favor of Gypsy Lane Owners Association (Gypsy) and against DeJesus and Timothy Murphy (Murphy).
Murphy did not appeal the common pleas court order.
DeJesus and Murphy owned Unit #245 at Gypsy Lane Condominiums. As a result, DeJesus and Murphy were members of Gypsy. Gypsy required its members of Gypsy to pay monthly condominium assessments.
On October 27, 2009, Gypsy commenced an action against DeJesus and Murphy and alleged that DeJesus and Murphy had failed to pay condominium dues, water, cable, reserve, and electric charges. Gypsy alleged that DeJesus and Murphy owed a total of $31,205.90 plus ongoing fees and charges.
Previously, on October 6, 2006, a judgment was entered in favor of Gypsy and against DeJesus and Murphy in the amount of $4,438.58. A writ of execution was filed in August 2008. The condo was sold at sheriff's sale to Arthur Lerner who sold or assigned his bid to DeJesus and Murphy who satisfied the judgment.
Murphy answered and denied the allegations. DeJesus also answered and denied the allegations. DeJesus also filed an amended joinder complaint. DeJesus intended to add Eugene Curry (Curry) as a co-defendant. The joinder complaint did not mention Curry other than one reference to him as a friend of DeJesus who assisted her. No cross-claims were filed against Curry. Gypsy did not recognize Curry as an owner because he did not have an ownership interest in the condominium. Both Murphy and DeJesus appeared pro se when they answered the complaint.
The matter was heard by a board of arbitrators of the common pleas court. On October 22, 2010, the arbitrators found in favor of Gypsy and against DeJesus and Murphy jointly and severally in the amount of $28,915.70. Murphy and DeJesus were unrepresented before the arbitrators.
On or about November 15, 2010, DeJesus and Murphy appealed from the award of the board of arbitrators. Anthony L. Richardson (Attorney Richardson) filed the notice of appeal and listed himself as "Attorney for Appellant." Notice of Appeal from Award of Board of Arbitrators, November 15, 2010, at 1.
On July 20, 2011, Glenn M. Ross, attorney for Gypsy, and Attorney Richardson entered into the Agreement. The Agreement provided that the common pleas court would enter judgment in favor of Gypsy and against DeJesus and Murphy in the amount of $40,000.00. Also, as part of the Agreement, DeJesus and Murphy agreed to pay Gypsy $30,000.00 with an initial down payment of $10,000.00 due on August 20, 2011, and then eleven monthly installments of $1,666.66 and one installment of $1,666.74 for a total of $20,000.00 in monthly payments. DeJesus and Murphy agreed to remain current with the monthly condominium fees. Under the Agreement, failure to make any required payment more than seven days past the due date resulted in default and the judgment of $40,000.00 would stand minus any payments made by DeJesus and Murphy. Curry did not attend the settlement conference and was not mentioned during the conference before the common pleas court.
On July 20, 2011, the common pleas court approved and entered the Agreement as an order of the common pleas court and judgment in the amount of $40,000.00 was entered in favor of Gypsy against DeJesus and Murphy.
On August 3, 2011, Curry filed a petition to compel Gypsy to comply with the terms of the Consent Agreement and accept DeJesus's condominium fee payment for August 2011. In the answer to the petition to compel, Gypsy alleged that DeJesus and Murphy contacted management on August 3, 2011, in an attempt to pay the fees. The manager told them that she wanted to confirm with Attorney Ross that she could accept the payments and told DeJesus and Murphy to return. They did not return. On August 5, 2011, Gypsy through Attorney Ross sent a default notice to Attorney Richardson. DeJesus and Murphy had seven days to cure the default and had not done so as of the date of the answer.
Curry also appealed the July 20, 2011, order of the common pleas court to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. The Superior Court transferred the appeal to this Court.
The common pleas court denied the petition to compel because it lacked jurisdiction after the appeal to Superior Court.
On appeal, DeJesus contends that the judgment against her was already satisfied in Philadelphia Municipal Court; that Attorney Ross satisfied the judgment with the court clerk in both the Philadelphia Municipal Court and common pleas court; that the Agreement was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel; that Attorney Ross has conducted "legal harassment and abuse of judicial resources"; that Gypsy attempted to relitigate in a different court; that it was not fair to her to be put through municipal, bankruptcy, common pleas, Superior, and Commonwealth Court; that there was standing because there was a direct and immediate interest; that Gypsy continued to pursue a writ in another jurisdiction; that collateral orders may be reviewed; that Rule 341 final orders are appealable; that the common pleas court and the attorneys drafted the Agreement; that there was no meeting of the minds so there was no agreement; and there was a hidden intent that changed the interpretation of the Agreement.
When reviewing a trial court's decision to enforce a settlement agreement, a reviewing court will only overturn the decision when the factual findings are against the weight of the evidence or the legal conclusions are erroneous. Bennett v. Jezelenos, 791 A.2d 403 (Pa. Super. 2002). --------
Gypsy filed a motion to quash the appeal on or about February 13, 2012. By order dated February 23, 2012, this Court directed the motion to quash be determined with the merits. In the motion to quash, Gypsy initially argues that there are no outstanding issues on appeal because DeJesus did not file any motions or petitions for post-judgment relief and DeJesus consented to the Agreement and, in fact, sought to enforce it. Gypsy also argues that DeJesus lacks standing because she consented to the Agreement and did not enter into the agreement as a result of fraud or mistake. Further, Gypsy asserts that Curry, who actually filed the appeal, lacks standing because he was not a party in the underlying case, did not have any ownership interest in the condominium, and could not represent DeJesus because he was not an attorney. As a result, Gypsy argues the appeal was brought by an improper party.
The common pleas court addressed this issue:
The appeal should be dismissed for lack of standing because Curry is not an attorney and as such has no right to appeal on DeJesus' behalf. Moreover, DeJesus is not an aggrieved party. Finally, Curry was not a party to the settlement nor harmed by it. Legally, he has no complaint.
Pennsylvania law permits an aggrieved party to appeal from a final order. Pa.R.A.P. . . 501. However, a party must demonstrate standing as a matter of law to seek judicial resolution. Fumo v. City of Philadelphia, , 972 A.2d 487, 496 (. . . 2009). . . . '[T]he core
concept of standing is that a person who is not adversely affected in any way by the matter he seeks to challenge is not aggrieved thereby and has no standing to claim a judicial resolution of his challenge.' Id.
The general rule is only parties may appeal. Id. A party may also demonstrate aggrieved status by showing a 'substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation.' In Re Hickson, , 821 A.2d 1238, 1243 (. . . 2003). . . . A substantial interest arises when the party's interest surpasses that 'of all citizens in procuring obedience to the law.' Id. There is a direct interest when a causal connection exists 'between the asserted violation and the harm complained of.' Id. 'An immediate interest exists if the causal connection is not remote or speculative.' City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, , 838 A.2d 566, 577 (. . . 2003).
Here, Curry has no standing to appeal on DeJesus' behalf because he is not an attorney nor was he a party to the settlement. The Joinder Complaint did not assert any cross-claims against Curry. Gypsy Lane had no claims against Curry because he was not an owner. He did not have a substantial interest because he was not an owner. There was no direct or immediate interest because he wasn't responsible for condo fees. Only DeJesus and Murphy had a substantial, immediate and direct interest and were the only parties besides Gypsy Lane. Moreover, Curry was neither a party to the settlement agreement nor was he aggrieved by [o]ur July 20, 2011 Order.
Curry had no license to practice law, although he managed to be docketed as a defendant despite lack of claims or cross-claims. After defendants' acquired attorney Richardson, Curry still completed multiple filings allegedly for represented defendants without being licensed. Since Curry was not permitted to file pleadings for represented defendants, it follows he was not permitted to file the instant appeal on DeJesus' behalf. . .
Even if said appeal was proper or DeJesus appealed pro se, she has no valid appealable issue. She was not adversely affected by the settlement because she freely agreed to it through Attorney Richardson. Judicial policy favors settlements, which are enforceable absent fraud or mistake. Miller v. Clay Township, 555 A.2d 972 (Pa. C[mwlth.]. . . 1989). Settlement results in a party forfeiting substantial rights. Reutzel v. Douglas, , 870 A.2d 787, 790 (. . . 2005). . . . Fraud or mistake might be found where a client's attorney settled without client's express authority. Id. 789-790.Common Pleas Court Opinion, October 11, 2011, at 2-4.
Here, it is undisputed attorney Richardson signed the settlement Agreement on DeJesus' behalf. Thus, there is no evidence he acted without her authority. More important, Curry's August 3, 2011 Motion to Compel allegedly filed on DeJesus' behalf attempted to enforce the settlement. An attempt to enforce settlement would certainly bolster the Agreement's validity and attorney Richardson's express authority to settle. If the Agreement is valid, we can infer DeJesus voluntarily gave up her rights and agreed to it. Thus, she has no valid issues to appeal pro se or otherwise. (Emphasis in original. Footnotes omitted).
This Court agrees with the common pleas court's reasoning. As Curry was not a party to the underlying proceeding, he was not an aggrieved party. Further, he was not an owner of the condo and was not responsible for paying any fees. To the extent that DeJesus filed the appeal on her own, she lacks standing as well because she, through Attorney Richardson, was a party to the Agreement. Reviewing the argument section of her brief, DeJesus does not allege that the Consent Agreement was entered into by way of fraud or mistake.
Accordingly, Gypsy's motion to quash is granted and DeJesus's appeal is dismissed.
/s/_________
BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th day of June, 2012, Gypsy Lane Owners Association's motion to quash in the above-captioned matter is granted and the appeal of Lissette DeJesus is dismissed.
/s/_________
BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge