This two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims similarly applies to cases resolved by either a guilty or a no contest plea. SeeGuzman-Aviles v. State , 226 So. 3d 339, 343 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (citing Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 57–59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) ). To establish the prejudice prong in cases involving a plea, the movant must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."

” Guzman-Aviles v. State, 226 So.3d 339, 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (citation omitted). The record reflects that the trial court would have denied a motion to suppress the marijuana because the trial court found Officer Cao's testimony credible and Mr. Howard's testimony not credible.

A postconviction claim, such as the one raised by Reyna-Duran subsequent to his no contest plea, that trial counsel was ineffective in this context for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence is cognizable under rule 3.850. Guzman-Aviles v. State, 226 So.3d 339, 342 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) ("A trial attorney's failure to investigate a factual defense or a defense relying on the suppression of evidence, which results in the entry of an ill-advised plea of guilty, has long been held to constitute a facially sufficient attack upon the conviction." (quoting MacKinnon v. State, 39 So.3d 537, 538 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010))).

We affirm the summary denial of ground one of Appellant's motion, which asserted a claim for relief based on juror misconduct, but not for the reason provided by the court. SeeGuzman-Aviles v. State , 226 So. 3d 339, 343 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (applying the "tipsy coachman" rule in a rule 3.850 summary denial proceeding). Ground one is procedurally barred because, on the face of the motion, it raises a claim that could have been brought on direct appeal.

Affirmed. See, e.g., Hunter v. State, 29 So.3d 256, 268 (Fla. 2008); see also Guzman-Aviles v. State, 226 So.3d 339, 343 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (applying the “tipsy coachman” doctrine to postconviction proceedings).

Affirmed. See, e.g.,Hunter v. State , 29 So. 3d 256, 268 (Fla. 2008) ; see alsoGuzman-Aviles v. State , 226 So. 3d 339, 343 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (applying the "tipsy coachman" doctrine to postconviction proceedings). SILBERMAN, ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, and STARGEL, JJ., Concur.

Defendant argued in his motion that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to inform him of the alleged adverse immigration consequences resulting from tendering a no contest plea to the charge of tampering with a witness or victim in a misdemeanor proceeding, a third-degree felony. We affirm the order under review, but not for the reasons provided by the postconviction court. SeeGuzman-Aviles v. State , 226 So. 3d 339, 343 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (affirming denial order entered on rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief under the "Tipsy Coachman" rule because the court reached the right conclusion); Montero v. State , 996 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (affirming the postconviction court's denial of a rule 3.850 motion for reasons other than those given by the court in its order of denial).See § 914.22(1) –(2), Fla. Stat. (2018).

Based on the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, contrary to Attorney Oliver's testimony that there was no basis for the motion, there is a reasonable probability that Madison would have prevailed if a motion to suppress had been filed. See Guzman-Aviles v. State, 226 So. 3d 339, 343-44 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (explaining that defendant, seeking postconviction relief following plea based upon ineffective assistance of counsel in not pursuing or misadvising about defense, is not required to allege and prove that he or she would have prevailed at trial on defense; however, viability of defense and strength of state's case are both relevant to analyzing credibility of defendant's assertion that defendant would have insisted on going to trial); see also Grosvenor, 874 So. 2d at 1181 ("Counsel's effectiveness is determined according to the totality of the circumstances." (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 )).

"A trial attorney's failure to investigate a factual defense ... which results in the entry of an ill-advised plea of guilty, has long been held to constitute a facially sufficient attack upon the conviction." Guzman-Aviles v. State, 226 So.3d 339, 342 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (quoting MacKinnon v. State, 39 So.3d 537, 538 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) ). Since Minix had a potentially viable claim, he should have been given the opportunity to amend his rule 3.850 motion to allege the requisite prejudice required under Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(2) ; Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754, 761 (Fla. 2007).

A trial attorney's failure to investigate a factual defense that results in the entry of an ill-advised plea of guilty can constitute a facially sufficient attack upon the conviction. Guzman-Aviles v. State , 226 So.3d 339, 342 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (quoting MacKinnon v. State , 39 So.3d 537, 538 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) ). Murray asserted in his motion that his case is factually similar to Zelaya v. State , 713 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). In that case, the defendant was placed on community control, and one of his conditions of supervision required that he be at home after work no later than 6:30 p.m.